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Proliferation of missile technology has increased in recent years.  Today, almost 
every military force in the world maintains an arsenal of Theater Ballistic Missiles 
(TBMs) and Cruise Missiles (CMs).  These technologies are less expensive to acquire 
and maintain than a conventional air force, but offer many of the same advantages, such 
as precision strike and deep shaping operations. This proliferation is advancing much 
faster than the Air Defensive Artillery (ADA) system’s capabilities, since the cost of 
counter-missile systems is much greater than the ballistic or cruise missiles that they 
target.  Additionally, much of the ADA system’s tactics were developed on past 
battlefields, with small and uniform raids made up of only a limited number of TBMs or 
CMs.  Today, the ADA systems face raids composed of a large number of systems made 
of combinations of different types of TBMs and CMs.     
 This dissertation presents a new methodology that can be used to address large-
scale, complex raids made up of different types TBMs and CMs that attempt to 
overwhelm the ADA systems at a particular location.  This method will allow for 
technology gap identification, but the primary focus will be on how existing ADA 
systems can adjust their tactics in order to minimize the damage caused by threats that are 
not shot down and impact friendly forces.   
 Nearly all the literature to date optimizes systems and tactics to reduce the 
number of leakers — threats not shot down — that impact the ground.  However, simply 
counting the number of leakers does not adequately describe the effects to friendly forces.  
Instead, the first part of this work combines existing methods for external ballistics, 
concrete penetration, explosive cratering, and weapon blast and fragmentation damage in 
 xxxiv 
order to create an integrated program that can describe the damage to an airfield runway, 
infrastructure, and parked aircraft. The second part of this work focuses on modeling the 
ADA missile engagements using an accredited Department of Defense ADA simulation 
model called the Extended Air Defense Simulation (EADSIM). 
 Both the airfield damage model and ADA simulation have run times ranging from 
minutes to hours. They are also stochastic; so a large number of runs are required for 
each input vector in order to properly understand the output range.  In order to reduce the 
computation time to allow for later optimization, the methods of Design of Experiments 
and Machine Learning, such as Neural Networks and Gaussian Process Models, were 
used to create fast running models that predict the outputs of these simulations.  
 The final part of this work uses these prediction algorithms to first optimize the 
enemy fire plan, then optimize the ADA defense tactics, and finally optimize the ADA 
defense tactics with a new interceptor missile system. Initially, the enemy attack plan 
must be optimized in order to discover combinations of the different types of TBMs and 
CMs that cause the most damage to different areas of the airfield.  This analysis produces 
a frontier of non-dominated solutions that maximize different effects, such as damage to 
the runway, aircraft, or fuel points.  Given this set of optimized fire plans, the friendly 
ADA tactics are optimized in order to minimize the damage to friendly assets for the 
lowest cost. A multi-attribute decision making tool is then used to select a specific set of 





“They may vex us with shot, or with assault.  To intercept this inconvenience, a piece of 
ordnance ‘gainst it I have placed.” 
    - Shakespeare, Henry IV 
 
 The threat of attack from Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) and Cruise Missiles 
(CMs) is not new to the Army.  Since the first V-2 Rockets were launched from Germany 
into England during World War II, countries have strived to find defensive measures 
from their devastating effects.  The dawn of the Cold War ushered in renewed emphasis 
once Ballistic Missile (BM) technology progressed far enough to allow nuclear weapons 
to be delivered across oceans in a matter of minutes.  Unfortunately, BM defense has 
progressed much slower than the BM technology itself.  This is not unusual since BM 
and CM defense technology has been equated to trying to hit a bullet with another bullet.  
A more accurate analogy for today’s modern battlefield with its many threat types such as 
TBMs, CMs, and unmanned aerial systems (UASs), would be trying to find many 
different bullets, birds, and mosquitos and shooting all with three with different types of 
guns and bullets. 
 Almost every modern military force in the world today has some type of TBM 
and CM arsenal. These technologies are less expensive to maintain than a conventional 
air force and many times much cheaper to acquire as well.  They offer many of the same 
advantages as a manned air force such as precision strike, deep shaping operations, and 
air interdiction at a fraction of the price.  As a result, countries are investing millions of 
dollars into the development of TBM and CM technology in order to counter the 
advantages of advanced military’s manned air forces.  The advances in these technologies 
and their proliferation are progressing much faster than the defensive systems.   
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 The defensive systems against TBMs and CMs originated from systems designed 
to defend against manned aircraft (helicopters or airplanes).  Now, these systems are 
collectively known as Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems or Air Defense Artillery 
(ADA) systems, and target a collection of threats ranging from TBMs, CMs, UASs, and 
manned aircraft. The heart of AMD systems is their radar.  The radar is what allows the 
AMD systems to detect targets and allow weapon systems to track and hone-in on a 
target (refer to appendix A for an overview of radar technology). TBMs and CMs 
generally carry a lethal payload while UASs are generally used for surveillance. For the 
foreseeable future, the most modern militaries will maintain air dominance, or at least air 
parity, in almost any conflict.  This means that the threat from manned aircraft will be 
small.  Most countries understand this and do not invest in a manned air force.  Instead 
they invest in TBMs and CMs in order to deliver lethal effects.  Thus, this work will 
concentrate on defense from TBMs and CMs. 
1.1. TBM and CM Definition 
1.1.1. Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs)  
 A TBM is a sub-class of BMs.  A BM is a missile that follows a ballistic flight 
path [1].  This means that it spends a significant portion of its flight subject to only the 
forces of drag and weight.  A ballistic trajectory is the same as a ball being thrown into 
the air.  Once the main engine cuts off shortly after liftoff, usually 1-8 minutes later, the 
missile is in free-flight.  BMs are categorized according to their maximum range as 




Table 1: Ballistic Missile Categories 
Missile Type Abbreviation Maximum Range (Km) 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICBM Over 5500 
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile IRBM 3000 – 5500 
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles MRBM 1000 – 3000 
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles SRBM Up to 1000 
 
TBMs are either Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) or Medium-Range 
Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Army ADA systems are generally used against TBMs while 
National Level Defenses are used against longer range BMs.  The accuracy of a TBM is 
given by its Circular Error Probability (CEP).  This is the radius of a circle where 50% of 
the TBMs are expected to impact within.  Generally, a TBM’s CEP is about 1% of its 
range for low cost systems [3].  There are some systems, however, with advanced 
guidance systems that can achieve a CEP of 35-50 meters [3].  Examples of US TBM 
systems are the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile or the 
Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rocket system. 
   
Figure 1: Ballistic Missile Stages (Image From [4]) 
 
1.1.2. Cruise Missiles (CMs)  
A Cruise Missile (CM) is a missile that is self-propelled, guided, and sustains 
flight through aerodynamic forces such as lift for most of its flight and whose mission is 
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to deliver ordnance onto a target [5].  In essence, a CM is like what we think of as a UAS 
today, but whose mission is to impact a target in order to cause damage.  CMs are 
generally categorized by their mission and launch mode.  The two broadest categories are 
Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM).  Either 
type can be launched from a ground based launcher, an aircraft, a ship, or a submarine 
[6].  An example of a US CM is the Tomahawk missile (shown below in Figure 2).  This 
missile is either a ship or a sub-launched LACM.   
  
Figure 2: General Dynamics AGM-109H/L Cruise Missile (Image From[7])  
 
1.2. TBM and CM Proliferation 
TBMs and CMs were first used in WWII when Germany terrorized England by 
launching the V-1 and VM-2 rockets at population centers.  The V-1 operated more like a 
cruise missile, while the V-2 operated more like a TBM.  Since that time, most large and 
modern militaries have acquired ballistic missile technology.  The proliferation, however, 
has been increasing in recent years with the spread of the internet.  More and more 
countries are gaining know-how and physical systems that allow them to not only 
maintain a robust TBM and CM force, but also to aim them accurately.  The spread of 
UASs is also giving these countries a new and efficient means to aim these TBMs and 
CMs accurately and then to assess the damage they inflict after the attack.  This threat 
will assuredly increase with time.  As guidance and electronic systems become less 
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expensive, the proliferation of CMs and TBMs will increase and those systems will 
become the predominate threat to military forces.  In modern warfare against an enemy 
that posses TBMs and CMs, the military must be prepared to operate in an environment 
where critical infrastructure and forces are under constant threat from these systems.  
1.2.1. Theater Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
 TBM acquisition has traditionally been tempered by an international treaty that 
limits the export of technology and sale of BMs and their sub-systems.  This treaty, 
known as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), was founded in 1987 by the 
G8 partners.  The MTCR is politically binding, but not legally binding, and restricts the 
proliferation of rockets and missiles capable of carrying a payload of at least 500 kg for at 
least 300 km [8, 9].  This treaty limits the proliferation of TBM technology; however, 
many smaller non-signature countries are beginning to acquire the technology and are 
exporting them heavily, unregulated by the MTCR.  In 2012, over 31 countries (23 of 
whom are not part of the MTCR) had BM systems and that number is growing [2].  Some 
of these countries, such as North Korea, are avid exporters of the technology [10].  While 
others, such as China, have large Research and Development Programs [11].  Figure 3 
below shows a map of countries and the TBM names and types they are suspected to 
operate.   
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Figure 3: Ballistic Missile Proliferation (Image From [12]) 
 
1.2.2. Cruise Missile Proliferation  
 As Dennis Gormley so elegantly states: “CMs traditionally fly under the radar 
literally and figuratively” [13].  Their proliferation has only just begun to accelerate and 
as a result they are typically overlooked in favor of TBMs.  CMs will not supplant TBMs, 
but when deployed together, they can overwhelm even the best ADA systems [13].  In 
fact, a Defense Science Board concluded that within 5-10 years, America’s ability to 
defend and deter aggressors in regional conflicts could be severely challenged due to the 
threat of CM proliferation [14].  There are approximately 75 different countries that 
operate over 130 different types of CMs today [14, 15].  A majority of these are short 
range ASCMs.  Only about 12 countries are known to produce LACMs, however, many 
experts expect this number to increase due to the availability of lower price technology 
[15, 16], and due to new systems that allow ASCMs to be converted to potent LACMs 
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[17].  When compared to TBMs, CMs are generally more accurate (by a factor of at least 
10), cost about half as much, are easier to maintain and transport, and can be launched 
from a variety of platforms including land, air and sea based systems [13].  All of these 
advantages have fueled their spread in recent years. 
 LACM are also restricted by the MTCR, however, their restriction is much harder 
to enforce than that of BMs.  Most countries agree that TBM should be limited, but there 
is no consensus about CMs and their closely related cousin, the UAS.  There are also 
exemptions in the treaty for civilian and military aircraft that create loopholes for dual-
use sub-systems like autopilot guidance systems and gyro stabilization systems.  Finally, 
the modularity of CMs allows technology to fall under the regulation limits but then be 
installed on larger systems [8].  Traditionally, CMs have been extremely expensive and 
highly technical thus limiting their proliferation.  The most challenging aspect was the 
auto-pilot and internal guidance system.  The invention of the GPS constellation along 
with advances in guidance systems has offset these technological challenges [8, 18, 19].  
Today, the US Army estimates that with a $50 million investment, a country could 
acquire over 100 CMs, which could be outfitted to fire from any vehicle, ship, or aircraft.  
An equal investment in TBMs would only acquire 15 missiles with three transporter-
erector-launcher (TEL) platforms [14].  Perhaps even more alarming, in 2003 a New 
Zealand engineer documented how to build a CM for under $5,000 in response to US 
experts who challenged his claim that it could be done [17].  The alarming drop in the 




1.3. A Poor Man’s Air Force 
As the combat power from modern military’s air forces continues to grow, many 
countries will come to the conclusion that they cannot directly confront those militaries in 
an air-to-air engagement.  They will look for other ways to gain the same capabilities, 
avoiding an air-to-air confrontation.  This is known as an asymmetric approach.  An 
enemy avoids direct confrontation against a strength, and instead seeks to counter with 
systems that target a weakness.  TBMs and CMs offer a way to balance the threat of an 
advanced manned air force since they provide many of the advantages of a manned air 
force.  Traditionally, an air force has looked to shape the “deep fight” attacking strategic 
targets such as Command and Control (C2) nodes, large tank or troop formations, choke 
points in supply routes, or logistic staging areas.  These deep-shaping operations can also 
be accomplished by TBM or CM raids. The Army recognized this trend in its FY98 Air 
and Missile Defense Master Plan.  A graphic from this plan is shown below in Figure 4.  
This figure shows how TBMs and CMs are effective against the US for the least amount 
of difficulty. 
 
Figure 4: Adversary's Missiles v. Air Force (Image From [3]) 
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In addition, a manned air force provides precision strike and air interdiction 
against high valued targets.  As guidance systems and GPS technology have come down 
in price, CMs are now able to accurately strike targets many miles away through heavily 
defended areas.  This is why the US Air Force and Navy fire the Tomahawk CM into 
enemy ADA positions before sending in manned fighters.  
TBMs and CMs are much cheaper to operate and maintain compared to a manned 
air force.  The life-cycle cost of a system is dominated mainly by its operations and 
maintenance costs.  Fuel, maintenance, and pilot training are traditionally the largest 
component of a manned air force’s budget.  In contrast, a missile force needs minimal 
maintenance and crew training.  Advanced TBMs and CMs vary in cost and some are 
more expensive to initially purchase than a manned fighter, but many are less expensive 
and the cost is falling every day.  Taken in the context of reduced operations cost, it is 
easy to see why many countries have opted for a missile force as opposed to a manned air 
force.  In fact, US Air Force Lt Col David Nicholls showed that as long as CMs were shot 
down at a rate less than 80% in a raid, then CMs are more cost effective than a manned 
air force [17].     
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2. THE NEED FOR A NEW METHOD 
“Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power.  We have guided missiles and 
misguided men.” 
     - Martin Luther King, Jr. 
  
The previous section discussed the evolution and spread of TBMs and CMs.  This 
proliferation has increased exponentially in the last few years, particularly with CMs.  
This next section will show that historically the largest threat has been mainly from small 
raids of TBMs.  Looking to the future, the trend will be to a mix of TBMs and CMs in 
larger sized raids.  The current ADA systems and tactics are unprepared to handle large-
scale attacks from a mix of these threat systems.   
2.1. Historical Trends 
 The use of TBMs and CMs in modern war is relatively new.  Due to their high 
expense, they were usually reserved as a strategic weapon. In modern war, advanced 
TBMs have only seen large-scale use in the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan Civil War, and the 
two Gulf Wars.  In the eight year Iran-Iraq war, a total of 189 TBMs were launched and 
135 of them landed on their intended target, the city of Tehran [20]. Over the span of the 
13 year Afghanistan civil war and subsequent Russian invasion, almost 2,000 TBMs were 
launched [20].  This is a much larger number compared to the Iran-Iraq war, but still only 
equates to an average of less than 13 missiles per month, and the USSR was a global 
super-power at the time.   
 Looking at more recent wars with US involvement, TBMs have seen very limited 
use and in very small raids.  In the first Gulf war, 39 TBMs were fired at Israel.  Of these 
39, 27 occurred when the Patriot missile system was operational and that system achieved 
 11 
a 40% success rate [20].  The 2003 Gulf War saw more variety and variability in the 
attacks.  The diffusion of technology allowed Iraq to acquire more varied and accurate 
systems.  In the war, Iraq launched 18 TBMs, 5 CMs, and 2 ultralight aircraft at the US 
and allied forces [17].  These attacks and their results are enumerated in Table 2.   
 The important thing to note from Table 2 is that systems other than TBMs were 
used.  UAS technology was still in its infancy, but the success of the ultralight aircraft 
shows that small non-metallic aircraft can evade even the most sophisticated radar.  Also 
note that none of the CM strikes were detected or intercepted.  These CMs, flying at a 
low altitude or as close to the terrain as possible in a flight mode called Nap of the Earth 
(NOE), hid the missile in the clutter of the ground.  They also indirectly caused three 
friendly fire incidents.  The radar operators knew that CMs were a threat and that their 
signatures would look very much like an aircraft.  These CMs were slightly smaller than 
the coalition aircraft operating in the region, but they have similar radar cross sections 
(RCSs) (see appendix A for a discussion on RCS).  The CMs also flew at the same 
altitude and airspeed as the aircraft.  Thus, when the operators saw a signature on their 
radar that looked like a CM and did not respond to the standard Identify Friend or Foe 
(IFF) interrogations, they assumed that they were CMs.  This unfortunately resulted in 
the destruction of one radar, the downing of two aircraft, and the tragic loss of three 
pilots.  Thus, for the first time CMs and TBMs were used to create synergetic effects.  
This highly complex attack is what the future of modern warfare will look like.   
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Table 2: Missile Threat and Response From 2003 Iraq War (Reproduced From [17]) 




Apparent Targets Response 
20 March 
0718 
1 CM: Seersucker Marine Camp 
Commando 






TAA Thunder Missile was detected by USS Higgins and intercepted 






and Camp Doha 
Missile was detected by Air and Missile Defense 
Workstation (AMDWS) and intercepted after two PAC-3 
















TAA Fox, AlJahra Missile was detected by AMDWS and intercepted after 








US Patriot PAC-2 battery misidentified friendly aircraft 
as a missile threat and destroyed the aircraft, killing the 
two pilots. 
23 March 1 BM: al-
Samound 
Camp New Jersey Missile was intercepted after US Patriot battery fired one 





Camp Virginia and 
Camp New Jersey 











Camp Commando Missile was intercepted by Kuwaiti Patriot battery. 
26 March 
1250 
Friendly Fire – 
US F-16 CJ 
Patriot battery 
forward- to protect 
3rd Infantry 
Division 
Mistaking the F-16 for a missile threat, the Patriot’s radar 
“painted” the F-16, which in turn fired on the radar, 
damaging it.  The Patriot battery, reportedly, was 














Missile was intercepted by US and Kuwaiti batteries after 




100 or FROG-7 
Northern Iraq Missile was not intercepted and landed in the desert. 
28 March 
2250 
1 CM: Seersucker Struck shopping 
mall outside 
Kuwait City 
Press reports indicate no detection and no interception. 





No detection until two penetrating aircraft were directly 
over encampment. Tracked by avengers, but no 









Forced in LSA 
Bushmaster 
US Patriot battery intercepted the missile with one PAC-3 
interceptor. 
1 April 1 unknown 
missile 
 Missile was not intercepted. 
1 April 3 CM: Seersucker  Missiles were not intercepted, landed near Iraq-Kuwait 
border. 
2 April Friendly Fire – 
US F/A-18C 
Near Karbala A US Patriot battery misidentified the F/A-18 as a 
threatening missile and destroyed the aircraft, killing the 
pilot. 
3 April 3BM: FROG-7  Missiles were not intercepted, landed in An Najaf. 
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2.2. The Future and the Threat of a Complex Attack 
A complex attack is an attack from more than one threat system.  In the context of 
the ADA systems, this is an attack from one or more types of systems: TBMs, CMs, 
UAVs, and aircraft.  Typically the raids will consist of TBMs and CMs since these are 
the less expensive to maintain than a manned air force, and UAVs typically carry a very 
small payload and are used for surveillance.  Note that within each of these types there 
can also be several different categories.  The TBMs can include a mix of SRBMs and 
MRBMs.  Each of these will approach the target at a different angle and speed.  
For a ballistic missile, at the normal intercept attitudes (0-60 km), these speeds 
can range from 2-3 km/s at sea level, or Mach 5.8 to 8.7 [21].  See Figure 5 below, which 
shows the re-entry velocity v. altitude of various reentry vehicles (RVs) at different TBM 
coefficients (β).  The TBM coefficient is roughly equivalent to a flat plate drag index. 
The approach angle, as measured from the horizon, is typically 45-90 degrees. 
 
Figure 5: Reentry Vehicle Speeds for Ballistic Missiles (Image From [21]) 
 
A CM is typically sub-sonic although new variants are being designed for 
supersonic or even hypersonic cruise [22].   The approach angle for these is much less 
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than that of a TBM, typically 0-20 degrees. CMs have the added advantage of being able 
to use aerodynamic forces to bank and turn.  This means that CMs can approach a target 
from many angles including directly behind the ADA radar systems.   
The TBM and CM threats will be timed to all arrive at the same time, but at 
various speeds, altitudes, and directions.  Each of these systems will also have very 
different RCS values (see appendix A), which mean they will be detected at different 
ranges. The difference in attack profiles, speed, and size is what makes defeating these 
complex attacks much harder than an attack from TBMs only.   
The results of these attacks also vary significantly from system to system.  
Typically, TBMs carry a larger payload than CMs.  This means that the TBMs are able to 
deliver larger blast and fragmentation damage than CMs [23].  Although they deliver a 
smaller payload, CMs are more maneuverable and generally more accurate than TBMs.  
This is due to advanced avionics, the ability to update its position in flight, and the slower 
speed allows for more advanced seekers.  This makes CMs more accurate than TBMs 
[24]. 
 The large diversity in the speed and RCS of TBMs and CMs also affects the ADA 
system’s engagement window.  This is the time or distance from where the ADA system 
can begin engaging the threat to the time it must stop.  The start of the engagement 
window is generally limited to either the maximum range of the weapon or the maximum 
range at which the radar can reliably detect the target. The minimum engagement range is 
generally limited to either the minimum range of the weapon or the time/distance where 
the ADA system stops the engagements because the target is handed off to another 
system.  Because the TBMs generally have a smaller RCS and travel faster than the CM, 
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they will have a smaller engagement window than CMs [25].  These characteristics are 
summarized in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: TBM and CM Characteristics 
Characteristic TBM CM 
Explosive Payload Large Small 
Accuracy Low High 
Engagement 
Window 
Speed Fast Slow 
RCS Small Large 
Resulting Engagement Window Short Long 
 
To date, most academic analysis involving ADA has focused almost exclusively 
on TBMs only [26-38].  Large TBMs were the main threat, especially to the mainland 
US, during the Cold War.  Only recently has the technology proliferated to allow many 
countries to operate a sizable CM force [17]. As a result, most ADA systems were 
designed to face a TBM threat, not necessarily a CM threat, and definitely not a 
combined threat from both TBMs and CMs arriving simultaneously.  A raid made up of 
TBMs and CMs will have systems with vastly different RCS values, so detection of all 
targets simultaneously is not guaranteed.  Only a few recent studies have considered the 
detection aspect of the missile defense problem along with the target allocation problem.  
A majority of these studies involved TBMs only, and did not consider a complex raid that 
included CMs [39-46].   
The increased difficulty of combating a complex attack creates a capability gap 
for many military force’s ADA units.  The ADA systems were designed to defeat smaller 
uniform raids, but not necessarily the larger mixed raids that can be expected in the 
future.  In order to close this capability gap, military planners and leaders must consider 
both material and non-material solutions.   
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2.3. JCIDS and the DOTMLPF Solutions 
 Within the DoD, the Joint Capabilities Integration Development Systems (JCIDS) 
process helps planners and leaders understand the solution space for a given problem or 
capability gap.  This solution space can involve any combination of available resources: 
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF) [47].  Sometimes Policy is also included (DOTMLPF-P).  If 
policy is not included, then it is assumed to be part of Leadership and Education.  These 
elements of the solution space are abbreviated DOTMLPF, but lately the DoD has 
changed the abbreviation to DOTmLPF with a “little m” to emphasize that a material 
solution should be considered only after all other elements have been shown incapable of 
closing the capability gap [48].   
The JCIDS process is shown below in Figure 6.  In this diagram, once a capability 
gap is identified, it must first be vetted against all the areas of DOTmLPF and if a 
solution is found, it is documented in a DOTmLPF Change Request (DCR) of the 
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA).  Only after all non-material solutions are 
exhausted is a material acquisition process started with the Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD) and the Material Development Decision (MDD).   
The material acquisition process then proceeds through milestone (MS) A-C.  MS 
A decision is the initial investment decision.  This is a decision on whether to pursue 
product or design concepts and commit resources (human and monetary) to the 
maturation of the concept both technologically and conceptually [49].  MS B is the 
development decision that commits resources to award contracts in order to develop and 
produce prototypes of the system for testing [49].  MS B initiates an acquisition program 
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[50].  MS C is the initial production decision to enter low-rate initial production of the 
system [49].  Reference [48] contains more information on the JCIDS process, the 
acquisition process, and how each fits into the larger joint force analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6: DoD Acquisition / JCIDS Process (Image From [51]) 
  
The emphasis of this process is to force leaders and planners to look at non-
material solutions first.  The material solution was often the first thing people turned to in 
order to close a capability gap, but that solution is generally more expensive compared 
with other DOTmLPF solutions.  Most other solutions involve changing the 
organizational structure or leveraging other already available resources to fix a problem.   
Going straight to a material solution is recognized throughout the Army and DoD 
as a problem.  Lieutenant General David Mann, the head of Army Space and Missile 
Command, stated that “we will never heave enough interceptors, we need to add a level 
of sophistication to the way we look at the threat [52].”  The late Major General John 
Rossi, the former commander of the Army Fires Center of Excellence, stated the problem 
even more precisely when he said: “I get a lot of offers to consider tools and technology.  
I get less on, ‘Here’s a concept on how to employ what you have in a different way to 
gain some advantages,’ because when there’s limited resources, you’re not going to get a 
whole lot more [52].”  The proliferation of missile technology and the threat of a complex 
attack have caused a capability gap in many country’s ADA forces.  Only a relatively few 
studies in the literature have considered the cost along with the optimization of the 
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defense [29, 53, 54].  In this era of shrinking defense budgets, this capability gap needs to 
be addressed by changes in our tactics or organization before a new ADA system is 
developed, and in both cases the cost of the defense must be considered. 
2.4. ADA System Analysis Simulation: EADSIM 
In the CBA shown in Figure 6, as well as the analysis supporting each MS 
decision, is conducted with the use of computer simulations.  ADA systems and their 
interceptors are very expensive.  Typically, only a small number of tests are conducted 
each year with actual systems.  A majority of the testing of tactics and the evaluation of 
new systems is done digitally through computer simulations [46].  One of the primary 
computer simulations used throughout DoD is the Extended Air Defense Simulation 
(EADSIM). Teledyne Brown Engineering (TBE) maintains EADSIM and the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) is the executive agent for the program.  EADSIM is the 
accredited ADA simulation program for DoD, meaning that it has been validated and 
verified.  Within the DoD, the users of the program include: the Center for Army 
Analysis, the Army Fires Center of Excellence, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) Simulation Analysis Center (SAC), Air Force A9, Navy N81, US Central 
Command (CENTCOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA).  It is also used by over 350 agencies in over 31 countries.  The 
model is continuously updated by TBE based on user requests and funding in order to 
ensure that it is up to date with the latest innovations and remains useful for emerging 
threats.  The framework of the EADSIM program is summarized in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7: EADSIM Program Framework (Image From [55]) 
 
Systems within EADSIM are modeled as a collection of individual elements with 
a rule set that the user modifies to fit the role of the individual system.  Each aircraft, 
missile, and ground system is individually modeled and tracked within the simulation 
environment [55].   
The main advantages of EADSIM are that it has an advanced radar model and 
flight dynamics model built into the program.  This allows for targets to be dynamically 
detected and tracked.  EADSIM also has the ability to account for target RCS fluctuations 
and degradations.  Swerling models (see appendix A) can be used to model target RCS 
fluctuations and additional detection degradations can be used to account for terrain and 
range or speed ambiguities. The different Swerling models and RCSs used for TBMs and 
CMs will mean that each individual missile will be detected at different ranges.  
EADSIM also has the capability to dynamically model the Pk of a system based on the 
target-shooter pair, range to the target, and altitude of the target.  In addition, it is also 
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able to model the communications between systems and is able to allow a simulated 
commander to dynamically allocate targets among his subordinate systems.   
The main disadvantages of EADSIM are its long the run time and storage 
requirements.  EADSIM is a stochastic simulation.  Therefore, many Monte Carlo runs 
are required for each simulation input vector.  A single simulation run on a standard 
desktop can take anywhere from minutes for simple models to hours for complex 
campaign length scenarios.  This means that a 30 run Monte Carlo can take hours to days 
to complete.  The storage requirements are also very large.  A 30 Monte Carlo run for a 
campaign length scenario can produce 2-3 gigabytes of data.  These files must be post-
processed in order to extract the information relevant for a particular study and analysis 
question. 
Due to all of its advantages, and because it is the DoD accredited model, 
EADSIM is the simulation software that is used to support the analysis in the CBA and 
MS decisions illustrated in Figure 6.  However, due to its disadvantages in setup and run 
time, only a handful of cases are typically developed and simulated.  Additionally, the 
JCIDS process specifies that an approved concept of the operations (CONOPS) must be 
used [48]. Because the entire decision space cannot be simulated, the tactics tested are 
limited and typically based on the currently accepted tactics.  With a new system or a 
new threat, these tactics may not remain optimal.  
2.5. The Enemy Fire Plan and Damage from Leakers 
In most higher fidelity ADA simulations like EADSIM, the enemy missile fire 
plan is pre-scripted.  The missile fire plan is the number, type, launch location, launch 
time, and target set of the TBMs and CMs that the ADA systems will try to defend 
 21 
against.  In most of these simulations, the ADA system’s results and demonstrated 
capability are highly dependent on that initial fire plan.  In most analyses, however, only 
one fire plan is tested.  Many times it is not known if this fire plan represents the 
maximum capabilities of the enemy force or if it is optimized to achieve a desired effect.  
Even in the literature there are relatively few studies that have considered the 
optimization of the enemy fire plan along with the optimization of the ADA defense [30, 
56].    
A single fire plan is typically used for two main reasons.  First, the JCIDS process 
specifies that the CBA should use the Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) for long-term 
scenarios, or developed operations plans (OPLAN) for near-term scenarios [50, 57].  The 
time horizon for the development of a new system typically dictates a long-term scenario, 
so the DPS are typically used over the OPLANs.  Many times only a single fire plan is 
specified in the DPS, and there is little justification given for why that one particular fire 
plan is included.  Second, there is no established model to articulate why one fire plan 
may be more optimal than another.  This is because the DoD does not have a large-scale 
accredited damage effects model that will specify the damage to a large target made up of 
small and different individual targets such as an airfield, port, or assembly area from an 
enemy missile attack.  The Joint Weaponeering System is the accredited weapons effects 
model used by the DoD, but typically it only models the damage against a single target or 
small target group with similar characteristics [58, 59].  
 Because there is no model to describe the effects, most analyses simply try to 
minimize the number of leakers – the threats that are not shot down and impact the target 
area.  In the past, minimizing the number of leakers was sufficient because with small 
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and uniform raids, the damage was highly correlated to the number of leakers.  In the 
future, this may not be the case due to the differences in the speed, accuracy, engagement 
window, and payload of TBMs and CMs as expressed in Table 3.  This diversity means 
that the capability of the ADA system to defend against each missile type is different and 
the effects of leakers from each missile type are different.   
Using a single fire plan or a fire plan that is assigned without prior analysis and 
forethought ignores the differences in the capabilities of different types of TBMs and 
CMs.  Because the outcome of an ADA simulation is so highly dependent on the initial 
fire plan, without the proper analysis of the fire plan, the overall analysis of the ADA 
system may not be optimal.  This will be demonstrated in the next chapter. 
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3. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE 
“As you know, you go to war with the Army you have.  They’re not the Army you might 
want or wish to have at a later time.” 
    - Donald Rumsfeld, former US Secretary of Defense 
 
 The previous chapter showed that the systems and doctrine of the ADA forces has 
been developed to face small raids composed of TBMs only due to the fact that this was 
the historical threat.  The rapid advancement and proliferation of both TBM and CM 
technology means that in the future, that same ADA force will face larger raids made up 
of both TBMs and CMs.  This creates a capability gap in the ADA force.  To solve this, 
the JCIDS process demands that analysts consider all aspects of the DOTmLPF 
framework and look at non-material solutions before deciding that a new material 
approach is needed.   
 The testing of these DOTmLPF solutions will be conducted with high fidelity 
ADA simulations, such as the DoD accredited simulation program EADSIM, due to the 
high costs of live tests.  Within EADSIM, the enemy fire plan is pre-scripted, so 
considerable thought must be placed into the development of that fire plan.  This chapter 
will show how changes in the ADA system’s tactics and enemy fire plan can result in 
large changes in the number of missiles that are not intercepted and impact the ground – 
commonly called leakers.  Using this example, it will then summarize the current 
problems with the existing methodology.   
3.1. ADA Doctrine Example 
Three of the most common ADA tactics that are examined include the firing 
doctrine, the interceptor-target pairing, and the hand-off altitudes or ranges.  The firing 
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doctrine is the number of missiles that are simultaneously shot at a target in a salvo.  The 
interceptor-target pairing is the selection of the interceptor to use against each incoming 
target [60].  For ADA systems that can engage both TBMs and CMs, the hand-off 
altitude is the altitude where the systems stop engaging TBMs and shift their focus to 
CMs. 
The most commonly varied ADA tactic in the literature is the firing doctrine.  The 
ADA system can use a shoot-look-shoot (SLS) doctrine, sometimes referred to as a 
shoot-1 doctrine, or a shoot-shoot-look (SSL) doctrine, sometimes referred to as a shoot-2 
doctrine.  The SLS doctrine means that one interceptor is shot at a given incoming missile 
and the operator then waits to see what the result of that intercept is before deciding on 
the next action.  If the missile is not destroyed, then the operator can attempt to shoot 
another interceptor if there is time.  The SSL fire doctrine means that two interceptors are 
fired in a salvo and the operator looks to see the effect of both of these interceptors.  If 
both are not successful and the incoming missile is not destroyed, then the operator can 
shoot two more interceptors if there is time [61].   
 The advantage of the SSL fire doctrine is that by shooting two interceptors the 
combined probability of kill (Pk) is larger than a single interceptor’s Pk.  This assumes 
that one interceptor hit is sufficient.  In essence, both interceptors have to miss in order 
for the missile to survive.  Thus, for a given number of interceptors, n, the combined 𝑃𝑘 
is given by [38]: 
𝑃𝑘!"#$%&'( = 1− (1− 𝑃𝑘)!                
This equation simply says that the combined 𝑃𝑘 is one minus the probability of 
all interceptors missing.  Traditionally, ADA systems have used SLS for CM 
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engagements and SSL for TBM engagements, except when the cost of the interceptor is 
very high.  If this is the case, then some ADA systems will use a SLS strategy against 
TBMs. 
The interceptor-target pairing is important because many ADA systems have a 
number of different interceptors available to shoot at each target.  These interceptors have 
their own unique advantages and disadvantages, as well as different costs and inventory 
levels.  An interceptor that is optimized to engage TBMs at a great distance may have its 
own internal seeker.  This allows the interceptor to find the target without the aid of the 
ground-based radar, since radar detection power decreases as distance to the fourth power 
(see appendix A).  This would increase the Pk of the interceptor against certain TBMs.  
However, the advanced technology of an internal seeker will typically make the 
interceptor more expensive than one that relies on the ground-based radar for guidance.   
The hand-off altitude determines the engagement window for the TBMs and CMs 
(see section 2.2 for a description of the engagement window).  A higher hand-off altitude 
will shrink the engagement window against TBMs, but increase the engagement window 
against CMs.  A lower hand-off altitude will do the opposite.  A smaller engagement 
window means that there are fewer opportunities to engage all threats.  With a large 
number of threats, too small of an engagement window might also mean that some threats 
cannot be engaged, since the ADA system is typically limited in the number of 
interceptors it can control in flight simultaneously.  Finally, if an interceptor does not hit 
its target, too small of an engagement window can also mean that the target cannot be 
reengaged a subsequent time.   
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To illustrate just how these three tactical options can change the number of 
leakers and the number of interceptors fired, a 300 run Monte Carlo simulation was 
conducted in EADSIM.  This test scenario was for an attack with 10 TBMs and 10 CMs 
arriving simultaneously against a target that is being defended by a single ADA system 
with 40 interceptors of one type (Interceptor A) and 40 interceptors of another type 
(Interceptor B).   
Using this test scenario for all cases, the effects of a change in shot doctrine and 
interceptor selection are shown below in Figure 8.  The first and second rows of the 
figure show histograms of the number of cases with different quantities of TBM and CM 
leakers.  The third row shows a histogram of the cases with different quantities of 
interceptors fired.  The left column corresponds to a SSL shot doctrine while the middle 
column corresponds to a SLS shot doctrine.  The right column is a SLS fire doctrine with 
a different interceptor choice.   
 
Figure 8: Test Case for Change in ADA Shot Doctrine and Interceptor Choice 
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Looking at the first two columns of Figure 8, a change in shot doctrine from SSL 
(left column) to SLS (middle column) resulted in an increase in TBM and CM leakers, 
but a large decrease in the number of interceptors fired.  Likewise, looking at the two 
right columns, a change from Interceptor A (middle column) to Interceptor B (right 
column) resulted in a decrease in the number of CM leakers with a slight increase in the 
number of TBM leakers.  The number of interceptors fired, however, increased 
substantially.   
These results beg the question of whether or not the change in the number of 
leakers results in significantly more or less damage.  Section 2.2 showed that TBMs are 
less accurate than CMs, but deliver more explosive power.  Does the decrease in TBM 
leakers with a SSL doctrine result in significantly less damage?  Is this enough to justify 
the large increase in the number, and therefore the cost, of the interceptors fired?  
Likewise, does the decrease in the number of CM leakers and increase in TBM leakers 
with a change from Interceptor A to Interceptor B significantly change the damage 
resulting from the attack?  Does this change in tactics offset the cost change from the 
increase in the number of interceptors fired?  Without a damage effects model, an analyst 
cannot accurately express the results for each attack. This is especially true since one set 
of tactics decreases the number of TBM leakers, while another decreases the number of 
CM leakers.  Which leakers are more dangerous and at what point does the damage 
become statistically different or unacceptable to the commander?  With a large attack 
made up of two or more dissimilar weapons, simply minimizing the number of leakers is 
no longer sufficient. The analyst must be able to express the resulting damage from those 
leakers. 
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 A similar analysis can be conducted for a change in the hand-off altitude.  In this 
test case, the ADA system has a TBM engagement window from 10,000-20,000 meters. 
Figure 9 below shows the results from changing the hand-off altitude from 18,000 meters 
(high hand-off altitude) to 12,000 meters (low hand-off altitude).  The first and second 
rows show histograms of the number of cases with a given number of TBM or CM 
leakers.  The third row is a histogram of the number of interceptors fired.   
 
Figure 9: Test Case for a Change in Hand-Off Altitude 
 
 As expected, the higher hand-off altitude (left column) shows a greater number of 
TBM leakers with a small number of CMs leakers.  This is because the higher hand-off 
altitude increases the engagement window against CMs at the expense of the engagement 
window against TBMs.  The lower hand-off altitude (right column) shows the opposite.  
The average number of interceptors fired in each case is about equal, but the higher hand-
off altitude shows a bi-model distribution likely due to the SSL shot doctrine used against 
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the TBMs.  If the radar detected the TBMs early, the engagement window was sometimes 
large enough to allow a small number of reengagements against TBMs that were missed 
during their first engagement.   
 Once again, these results show the need for a damage effects model.  The hand-
off altitude directly affects the number of TBM and CM leakers.  Changing the hand-off 
altitude increases one type of leakers while decreasing the other.  Without knowing which 
of these missiles causes more damage, the analyst might conclude that a mid-range 
altitude is best, so that no one missile type has a larger number of leakers.  The flaw in 
this logic is that the damage caused by the two missile types is not necessarily equal (as 
per Table 3).  The question that must be answered is does a greater number of TBM 
leakers cause more damage than a greater number of CM leakers? 
 These two case studies also highlight the dilemma in optimizing the ADA 
doctrine.  A change in fire doctrine, interceptor-target pairing, or hand-off altitude causes 
different amounts of TBM and CM leakers and different amounts, and therefore cost, of 
interceptors fired.  This simple example did not include the complexity of a multi-layered 
defense, which is what most ADA forces maintain.  In a multi-layer defense the analyst 
must also consider the hand-off altitude between layers, as well as the fire doctrine and 
weapon-target pairing of each system.  Without a structured and fast running simulation, 
the resulting large design space cannot adequately be explored and the analyst is left to 
rely on historical data and tactics, or simple deviations from the historical tactics.       
3.2. Enemy Fire Plan Example 
The number of leakers is also highly sensitive to the initial enemy fire plan.  The 
enemy fire plan is the number, type, launch location, launch time, and target set of the 
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TBMs and CMs.  The number of leakers is highly correlated to the number of initial 
missiles fired.  Typically, a greater number of incoming missiles results in a greater 
number of leakers.  However, even for equally sized raids, the type of TBMs or CMs in a 
raid can affect the number of leakers.  Each TBM and CM has a different trajectory, 
flight pattern, and RCS.  This means that each one will be detected at a different time and 
the time from interceptor launch to interceptor impact will vary for each missile.  Each 
TBM and CM also has different susceptibility to a given interceptor, which results in a 
different Pk for each interceptor-target pairing.  A good overview of the Pk and damage 
from a weapon’s impact, blast, or shrapnel is given by Driels [62].   
 In order to illustrate this point, Figure 10 shows the results of a 300 run Monte 
Carlo simulation with EADSIM for three test cases of raids made up of 10 total TBMs 
and 10 total CMs.  Two different types of TBMs were used in this scenario.  TBM1 had a 
high and fast trajectory, while TBM2 had a shallow and relatively slow trajectory.  There 
were also two different types of CMs.  CM1 was a slower and larger CM, while CM2 
was a faster and smaller CM.  The first column shows histograms for the number of runs 
that had a given number of TBM leakers (top row) and a given number of CM leakers 
(bottom row) for a raid made up of 10 TBM1 missiles and 10 CM1 missiles.  The second 
column shows the histograms the number of cases that had a given number of leakers for 
a raid made up of 10 TBM2 missiles and 10 CM2 missiles using the same ADA tactics 
from the first column.  
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Figure 10: Test Case for Different TBMs and CMs Used in Similarly Sized Raids 
 
 These results show that even for a similarly sized raid, the number of leakers is 
dependent on the type of inbound missile.  Looking first at TBM leakers (first row), a 
raid made up of only TBM2 missiles tended to have a smaller number of leakers and a 
smaller variation in the number of leakers, than a raid made up of TBM1 missiles.  The 
second row shows that a raid made up of CM2 missiles was likely to have more leakers 
and a larger variation in the number of leakers, than a raid made up for CM1 missiles.  
 This analysis did not consider the cost or inventory of each missile.  The enemy 
missile commander must balance the cost and inventory with the damage he or she hopes 
to create.  TBMs and CMs are used to enable other actions on the battlefield.  For an 
attack on an airfield, the purpose of the TBMs and CMs may be to shut down the airfield 
long enough to stop aircraft from interfering with a main effort attack.  Likewise, an 
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attack on a port could be meant to stop the flow of supplies long enough to halt an enemy 
advance.  Without a weapons effects model it is difficult to know how many TBM and 
CM leakers are required to ensure a high probability of success for either of these two 
actions.  The enemy fire plan should fire just enough missiles of each type to ensure a 
high probability of success in order to preserve the limited missile inventory for other 
targets throughout the campaign. In wartime, the enemy missile force will likely conduct 
this pre-mission analysis, so the ADA analyst must do the same before optimizing the 
ADA tactics.   
 A similar tradeoff can also be shown for the release altitude of submunitions from 
a missile.  TBMs and CMs typically carry two different types of warheads: unitary and 
submunitions.  A unitary warhead contains all the explosive power in a single container.  
This delivers a larger amount of damage to a single impact point.  A submunition 
warhead releases many smaller bomblets at a given release altitude.  These bomblets then 
spread out as they fall from the release point to the ground.  This delivers a large number 
of small blasts over an area.  The spread of the submunitions is directly correlated to the 
release altitude [63].  In addition, most ADA interceptors cannot defeat the submunitions 
once they are released from the TBM or CM.   This means that the higher the 
submunition release altitude, the lower the likelihood that the TBM will be intercepted 
before it can drop its bomblets.  For CMs, however, a higher release altitude means that 
the CM must cruise to the target at a higher altitude.  This means that the CM crosses the 
radar horizon sooner and is more susceptible to being detected and destroyed.   
The effect of different submunition release altitudes is illustrated in Figure 11.  
This figure shows the results from a 300 run Monte Carlo simulation in EADSIM for a 
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raid made up of 10 TBMs and 10 CMs each carrying submunitions.  The left column 
shows the histograms for the number of cases that had a given number of TBM leakers 
(top row) and CM leakers (bottom row) for a low altitude submunition release (12,000 
meters for TBMs and 20 meters for CMs).  The second column shows the same 
histograms for a high altitude submunition release (18,000 meters for TBMs and 170 
meters for CMs).   
 
Figure 11: Test Cast for Different Submunition Release Altitudes of TBMs and CMs 
 
 As expected, the lower release altitude resulted in less TBM leakers than the 
higher TBM release altitude.  The effect was the opposite for CMs.  A higher release 
altitude resulted in less CM leakers due to the increased susceptibility of the CM at the 
higher cruise altitude.  Looking at only these results, an analyst might conclude that 
TBM Leakers
Low Altitude Release
4 6 8 10 12














4 6 8 10 12














0 2 4 6 8 10
















0 2 4 6 8 10















TBMs should release their submunitions as high as possible and CMs should release their 
submunitions as low as possible.  However, this ignores the spread of those submunitions 
and the resulting damage.  If released too high, the submunitions from a TBM might 
disperse so far that the resulting damage does not achieve the desired effect.  A weapons’ 
damage effects model coupled to an ADA model is needed to balance the Pk change from 
a higher release altitude with the spread and damage from the submunitions.   
A weapons’ damage effects model coupled to the ADA model can ensure that the 
enemy fire plan is optimized to maximize the damage resulting from submunition and 
unitary warheads delivered by different TBM and CM types.  Due to competing demands 
to cause damage to different target sets, there will likely be many optimal fire plans 
depending on the enemy forces commander’s goals for maximizing damage, minimizing 
the number of missiles in a raid to keep inventory levels high, and minimizing the cost of 
the missiles fired.     
3.3. Problem Statement 
The proliferation of TBM and CM technology is accelerating.  The cost of these 
systems is decreasing, allowing more and more countries to purchase them in large 
quantities.  The threat from a large complex attack of TBMs and CMs is an emerging 
threat that creates a capability gap in most ADA forces.  
The JCIDS process demands that non-material solutions be considered before any 
new material solution, so there is an immediate need to use the current ADA systems in a 
more effective manner.  The ADA simulations that are used to test these systems have 
enough fidelity to reliably test different tactics or systems, but their long run times and 
setup times, coupled with their large data storage needs makes them too cumbersome for 
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this task.  In addition, the absence of a damage effects model means that analysts cannot 
adequately express the effects of leakers in order to ensure that the initial enemy fire plan 
is optimized. The lack of a damage effects model also means that analysts cannot show 
how a change in ADA tactics or organization results in a change to the damage that 
leakers cause to the defended assets.  These challenges can be categorized into three 
general problem statements: 
• Problem 1: There is no established method or model to either describe the damage 
to a target from missiles that leak through the ADA defenses or to optimize the 
enemy fire plan to achieve certain effects against a target. 
o Problem 1.a: Historically, analyses relied on minimizing the number of 
leakers, but the diversity of a complex threat means that the greatest 
number of leakers may not represent the largest amount of damage to 
specific area of the target. 
o Problem 1.b: ADA system’s analysis is highly sensitive to the initial 
enemy fire plan.  If this plan is not optimized first, then the resulting ADA 
system’s optimization may not be correct. 
• Problem 2: New tactics are needed against large complex raids made up of both 
TBMs and CMs that enables the ADA systems to minimize the damage to the 
defended asset for the lowest cost. 
o Problem 2.a: There is no historical framework for a large complex raid 
composed of many different missile types. 
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o Problem 2.b:  The current fiscal environment and the JCIDS process 
demand that non-material solutions be considered before the development 
of a new ADA system. 
• Problem 3: Due to the high cost of ADA systems and their interceptors, testing is 
typically done in high fidelity computer simulations.  These high fidelity models 
are difficult to use in trade-studies due to their long run times and storage 
requirements.  These models also only count the number of leakers and do not 
estimate the damage from those leakers. 
o Problem 3.a: A new simulation method is needed that maintains close to 
the same level of accuracy as the high fidelity simulations, but runs at least 
an order of magnitude faster, so that it can be used in trade studies. 
o Problem 3.b: This new simulation should link the ADA simulations to the 
damage effects models. 
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4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, QUESTIONS, AND HYPOTHESIS 
“No problem can withstand the assault of sustained thinking.” 
   - Voltaire, French writer and philosopher 
 
 
 The premise of this research is twofold.  First, there is not an integrated ADA 
model that will allow for rapid trade studies of different tactics, organization structures, 
or systems while still maintaining a level of accuracy comparable to higher fidelity 
simulations.  Secondly, there is also not an established simulation to assess the damage 
and effects of a missile attack on a large target set, such an airbase or seaport.  As a 
result, the changes in ADA doctrine or organization cannot be mapped to changes in the 
damage done to friendly assets, and the enemy fire plan cannot be optimized to achieve 
damage to these different areas of the target set.   
 The first problem creates a gap in ADA systems because historically conflicts 
involving missiles have used small raids of TBMs, thus the ADA doctrine has been 
optimized to fight this legacy threat.  However, the rapid proliferation of missile 
technology may lead to future conflicts that involve large raids made up of a mixture of 
these systems.  A new method is needed to test doctrine of the current ADA systems and 
trade doctrine with system capabilities in order to meet this new threat.  
 In most of the recent literature, the studies look at only a single threat type, and a 
vast majority of the studies deal with TBMs only.  A small percentage of the studies look 
at defense against aircraft, but virtually none have examined the optimal defense against 
CMs.  The current ADA systems and doctrine were designed around small raids of 
mostly TBMs.  The doctrine is not designed to handle large raids of TBMs and CMs 
together.  In addition, the doctrine is not optimized to maximize the defense while 
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minimizing the cost. The JCIDS process demands all non-material solutions be explored 
before new system capabilities.  There is no simulation or analytical tool that exists to 
rapidly explore the effects of changes in doctrine with system capabilities.   
 The second problem creates an issue with ADA analysis in general.  Because 
there is no model that allows analysts determine what are the effects of the threats that 
“leak” through the friendly defenses, analysts attempt to minimize the number of leakers.  
The number of leakers is not nearly as important as the effects those leakers have on 
friendly operations.  A weapons effect models will also allow an analyst to develop a 
good enemy fire plan.  Most studies in the literature do not have a good analytical 
underpinning to the number of enemy missiles used in the analysis. 
 In order to address these problems, this research will have three major objectives.  
The first objective is to develop a tool for analyzing the effects of leakers.  This tool is 
needed in order to optimize the enemy fire plan and to express how changes in the ADA 
systems’ tactics and organization translate to damage done to the defended asset.  Once 
created, it can then be used to test the theory that minimization of the aggregate number 
of leakers equates to minimization of the damage to the defended asset. 
 
Objective 1:  Determine a method to merge existing tools for ballistics, cratering in 
concrete, and weapons effects to create a program that will optimize the enemy fire plan 
to create the most damage to runways, POL sites, and aircraft for a set number of cruise 
and ballistic missiles as opposed to simply maximizing the number of leakers.   
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Research Question 1: Will a fire plan optimized to achieve a given effect 
(destruction of aircraft, POL sites, or runway) be the fire plan with the greatest 
number of leakers? 
 
Hypothesis 1: A fire plan weighted with CMs, as opposed to TBMs, will destroy 
more point targets such as POL sites and aircraft. A fire plan weighted with 
TBMs, as opposed to CMs, will destroy more area targets, such as the runway.  
These will not necessarily be the fire plans with the most leakers. 
  
The second objective is to create a framework that will guide analysts through 
optimization of the enemy fire plan, then investigating non-material changes in the ADA 
system in order to close any capability gaps, before examining potential material 
solutions.  The solutions from this methodology must also include the cost of the defense, 
since ADA systems are generally one of the highest costing systems in a military force.  
In a protracted conflict, the ADA system’s interceptors will have to be used in a manner 
that will give an adequate level of protection to the defended asset while preserving the 
number of interceptors so that they are available throughout the length of the campaign. 
This framework should be based on higher fidelity simulations and the results 
reproducible in these simulations.  These higher fidelity simulations are the agreed upon 
method for analysis since actual testing of ADA systems is generally too expensive. 
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Objective 2:  Determine a method to close existing ADA capability gaps through changes 
to organization and/or doctrine against a given set of complex threats, at a given location, 
and for a given a set of ADA systems, that will optimize the defense at the lowest cost. 
 
Research Question 2: Will the proposed method allow for rapid optimization 
tactics against a complex attack that is reproducible in the higher fidelity 
simulation? 
 
Hypothesis 2: When the optimized result from the proposed method is tested in 
the higher fidelity simulations there will be a reduced amount of damage to the 
airfield for an equal or lower cost as compared to the base case, with a 95% 
confidence level. 
 
The final objective is to determine a method to reproduce the results of the higher 
fidelity ADA simulation and damage effects model proposed in objective one, but in a 
much more rapid manner.  The higher fidelity simulations take minutes to hours for a 
single run of the input vector and because they are stochastic, many runs are required to 
understand the output range.  In most cases, the large design space in these simulations 
cannot be proven to be convex, so gradient-based optimization methods cannot be used to 
find the global optimum.  This means that a stochastic optimization method is required.  
Stochastic optimization methods require many function calls, so their use necessitates a 
faster running model.  This last objective and research question will attempt to show that 
the outputs from these simulations can be modeled with known distributions and the 
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shape parameters of these distributions can be predicted with machine learning 
techniques.  Once trained, the machine learning techniques can predict an output in 
fractions of a second.  If these outputs are the shape factors of a known distribution, then 
the entire output space can rapidly be described.  
 
Objective 3:  Determine a method that combines ADA simulations and weapons effect 
simulations such that the method maintains the same accuracy as high fidelity models, 
but runs at least an order of magnitude faster. 
 
Research Question 3: Can machine learning accurately predict stochastic high 
fidelity air defense and weapons effects simulation outputs? 
  
Hypothesis 3:  Space filling designs of experiments coupled with predictive 
models will be able to predict the shape factors for the distributions of the outputs 
of higher fidelity models. They will be able to do this to such an extent that more 
than 95% of validation cases pass the chi-squared test at a 99% confidence level 
and will run at least an order of magnitude faster. 
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5. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK AND MODELS 
“I think that only daring speculations can lead us further and not the accumulation of 
facts.” 
                      - Albert Einstein 
 
In order to address the problems and objectives outlined in the previous two 
chapters, a new framework if needed for ADA analysis.  This new framework should link 
ADA simulation tools to analytically based damage effects models.  This new framework 
should also maintain the robustness and accuracy of large scale vetted models, but should 
allow different tactics and organization to be rapidly tested.  These tactics should 
minimize cost while simultaneously maximizing the defense of the defended assets.  
Finally, this new framework should allow rapid tradeoffs between system capabilities and 
tactics in order to close capability gaps.  The framework developed in this dissertation to 
meet all these goals is called the ADA doctrine, organization, and systems optimization 
(ADOSO) framework 
5.1. New Framework: ADOSO 
 The general methodology for the new framework, ADOSO, is shown in Figure 
12.  The process starts with the rectangle on the top, labeled “Develop Enemy Fire Plan 
Based on Effects.”  This is the first major goal of the process.  For any given effect and 
enemy missile set, there are numerous combinations of munitions that will achieve the 
tactical effect that is mapped to the desired operational or strategic level effect; however, 
not every combination of weapons will be optimal.  The goal of this first step is optimize 
the enemy fire plan to achieve different outcomes. These fire plans are then are carried 




Figure 12: Overall ADA Doctrine, Organization, and Systems Optimization (ADOSO) Framework 
 
 Once these fire plans are created, the process continues clockwise where the 
current systems and current doctrine are tested against those fire plans to determine if a 
capability gap exists.  This capability gap is quantified by a significant departure from the 
commander’s desired protection levels and tactical requirements.  For example, if the 
commander states that the longest an airport can be closed due to a missile attack is one 
hour, than an aggregate mean across all the attack plans that is longer than this 
requirement would be a capability gap.   
 Assuming that a capability gap does exit, ADOSO initially examines non-material 
solutions in accordance with the DOTmLPF framework.  In this problem, the non-
material DOTmLPF solutions will be either doctrine and/or organization.  In order to 
close the capability gap, a range of cases for different firing doctrine and different 
organizational structures is established and tested against a range of enemy fire plans.  
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These cases are then optimized.  This optimization takes place at the bottom of Figure 12.  
Again, if the aggregate mean of the effect is still significantly deviated from the 
commander’s objective then the capability gap still exists.  If this is not the case, then the 
gap can be closed through a non-material solution.  
 In both cases, if the capability gap is closed or still remains open, a sensitivity 
analysis is needed to highlight the robustness of the proposed solution.  If the gap is 
closed, then the sensitivity analysis will show how sensitive the outcome is to the 
doctrine, organization, and fire plan so that the commander can factor this into his or her 
risk analysis.  If the gap cannot be closed and a material solution is required, this 
sensitivity analysis will show the types of capabilities the new product will require and 
the risk associated with each level of capability. 
5.2. Integration of the New Framework into the JCIDS Process 
The CBA of the JCIDS process shown in Figure 6 is comprised of three separate 
steps: the functional area analysis (FAA), functional needs analysis (FNA), and 
functional solutions analysis (FSA) [50, 64].  These steps are sequential and are shown 
below in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Capability Based Assessment (CBA) Steps (Image From [64]) 
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The FAA examines the operational environment by synthesizing presidential and 
DoD guidance and specifies the problem and scenario to be studied.  The FNA then 
determines how well existing and programmed capabilities, structure, and doctrine can 
address the problem defined by the FAA.  The output of the FAA is a set of capability 
gaps that must be addressed.  The FSA then examines the DOTmLPF solutions for these 
capability gaps [50, 64].  A good solution should not only close the capability gap, but 
should also be affordable (cost), feasible (technologically and policy), and strategically 
responsive (delivers solutions when needed against the entire threat identified in the 
FAA) [64].  The steps of the FSA as well as the overall breakdown of the FAA, FNA, 
and FSA within the CBA are shown below in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Steps of the Capability Based Analysis (Image From [64]) 
 
The ADOSO methodology proposed in Figure 12 facilitates the FSA process by 
first examining the non-material solutions and then examining material solutions only if 
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the gap is not closed with a non-material solution.  In addition, by first optimizing the 
enemy fire plan, it ensures that the solution is strategically responsive against the missile 
force of the threat. If a cost model is also included, then the new methodology meets all 
the requirements of the FSA: affordability, feasibility, and strategically responsive.  The 
complete integration of the new method within the CBA and FSA is shown below in 
Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: ADOSO Methodology Within the JCIDS Framework 
 
  
In addition to being used in the FSA, the new framework also facilitates MS 
decisions.  These are the blue triangles in Figure 15.  Each MS decision determines 
whether to continue the program to the next phase, modify the program, or terminate it.  
Each of these MS decisions involves a review of the merits and costs of the system.  
 47 
Because ADA systems are typically too expensive to conduct large-scale testing, a 
majority of the testing is done in simulation and hardware in the loop tests.  These tests 
lead to greater understanding of the capabilities of the new system.   
 The increased knowledge of the system’s capabilities necessitates that previous 
analysis is revisited and analyzed to determine if the initial assumptions for the capability 
of a new system are different than what the current testing shows.  If this is the case, then 
the ADOSO framework can be used to optimize the enemy fire plan again to account for 
the new capability.  Once this is complete, the doctrine and organization of the ADA 
forces can be re-optimized to ensure that the new system still meets the feasibility, 
affordability, and strategic responsiveness criteria.   
5.3. The Use of Surrogate Models in the New Framework 
 The ADOSO framework is iterative.  It loops back upon itself because the enemy 
force will constantly adjust their methods, systems, and doctrine to what they perceive as 
the tactics that the ADA system will employ.  Thus, as soon as a new material or non-
material solution is implemented, then the fire plan used to create and test that solution is 
no longer valid.  Instead, the enemy fire plan model must be re-optimized and the new 
solutions tested against the newly optimized enemy fire plan.  Because many simulation 
runs are needed for this process, a method is needed to replicate the results of higher 
fidelity simulations at a much faster pace, while still maintaining the same level of 
accuracy.  This is realized through the use of designs of experiments (DOEs) and 
surrogate models.  An overview of DOEs and surrogate models is given in Appendix B 
and C.  Their application to the fire plan is explained in section 6.3 and 6.5, and their 
application to the ADA simulation is explained in section 7.7. 
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6.  AIRFIELD AND RUNWAY DAMAGE MODELS 
“I think frugality drives innovation, just like other constraints do. One of the only ways to 
get out of a tight box is to invent your way out.” 
                         - Jeff Bezos, founder and CEO, Amazon.com 
 
The first step of the new ADOSO methodology is to optimize the enemy fire plan.  
As explored and stated previously, most analysis of missile defense uses the number of 
leakers, or missiles that are not shot down, as the measure of effectiveness.  When raids 
were small, uniform, and composed primarily of ballistic missiles, this measure worked 
reasonably well since the expected damage could be easily calculated from a known 
missile quantity and type.  Now that most raids are expected to consist of a mixture of 
cruise and ballistic missiles, this measure is no longer sufficient [25].  The measures of 
effectives must include the direct effect on friendly forces.  It must show how the 
operations of the friendly forces are disrupted through either the destruction of combat 
assets or the destruction of enabling assets.   
6.1. Scenario, Model, and Weapons Selections 
 The proliferation of CMs and UASs means that the US ADA systems will face 
large-scale complex attacks in future conflicts.  There are no historical examples of such 
attacks because this proliferation has just begun to accelerate.  A new analytical method 
is needed to generate feasible and realistic fire plans.    
When a rational enemy decides to launch a combination of TBMs, CMs, and 
UASs, they are hoping to achieve some effect for the least amount of resources expended 
and at the smallest risk to their own force.  TBMs and CMs are not inexpensive weapons 
and their use comes with risk.  TBMs must be launched from a Transporter, Erector, and 
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Launcher (TEL) vehicle.  CMs must be launched from a ground vehicle, ship, or aircraft.  
When launching either of these weapons the weapons themselves as well as the launch 
platform is subject to enemy fire.  The loss of a TEL or CM launch platform obviously 
means that platform cannot be used in future missions.   
The enemy must balance the payoff, or the benefit, of the attack with the risks and 
constraints or limitations.  Whenever a TEL is moving or setting up for a launch it is at 
risk of being detected and destroyed.  Limitations can range from the maximum number 
of TBMs or CMs an enemy can launch at a single time to the time and distance 
constraints to get the launch platform in position.  
The benefit the enemy wants to achieve is best measured by the effects they want 
to see after the attack.  This is known as effects based targeting.  Instead of deciding to 
launch ten CMs from two aircraft and ten TBMs from ten TELs, the enemy will ask what 
effect they want to achieve and then look at multiple methods to achieve that effect.  This 
is a subtle change in thinking, from platforms to effects, but the efficiency it brings is 
enormous.  
For a given effect, say the destruction of a friendly asset, the enemy force first 
determines all ways to achieve that effect. If those ways are kinetic and involve TBMs 
and CMs, the enemy must determine how many assets of each type to fire in order to 
ensure that the desired number hit the target.  Not all the missiles shot will hit the target.  
In addition to missing the target, some will be intercepted by friendly ADA units. 
Therefore, the number required must be scaled up to account for misses and intercept 
losses. The amount of increase due to accuracy and intercept losses is based on the 
accuracy of the missiles and the lethality of the defending ADA units.  These are both 
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probabilistic in nature, so there are many options that achieve the desired effect within a 
given certainty.  
6.1.1. Scenario Selection 
The missile force is an enabler on the battlefield.  The effects from a missile 
attack are used to enable other decisive action in the campaign.  This effect will vary 
from target to target and across time over the campaign. These effects can also be non-
material or non-military force related such as using missiles as a terror weapon or for 
attention grabs in the media.  These effects are harder to quantify in simulation, so the 
effects against material and military operations will be the focus of this work.  Some of 
the typical effects an enemy may want are listed below in Table 4.  This table shows how 
an operational effect is mapped to a tactical effect at a given target. 
Table 4: Example Target and Desired Effects from Missile Attack 
Target Desired Tactical Effect Operational Effect 
Airport Damage Runway, fuel, or support 
infrastructure to prevent all 
takeoffs/landings for two hours.  
Damage aircraft to prevent use in war 
effort. 
Degrade enemy capability to generate close air 
support (CAS) sorties during an operation. 
Port Damage pier structure to prevent ship 
unloading for six hours. 
Slow the flow of forces arriving into theater via 





Disrupt communications in order to 
cause a temporary halt of enemy 
formation. 
Disrupt enemy offense long enough to allow 




Destroy 20% of vehicles in a 
defensive formation. 
Degrade enemy forces prior to an attack. 
 
The above targets and effects are just a brief example, but it shows how an enemy 
force has a certain operational effect it hopes to achieve by using its missile force.  The 
enemy must calculate which tactical effect will cause the desired operational effect, then 
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determine what mix of capabilities will achieve the tactical effect.   In this work, the 
attack on an airport (the first row of Table 4) will be used as the test case.   
In the airbase attack, the enemy forces want to damage the runway to such an 
extent that they cause it to be unusable for takeoffs and landings for a certain period of 
time or limit the number of takeoffs and landings to an acceptable level to meet other 
operational goals that those aircraft might impact.  Likewise, they might also choose to 
damage the support infrastructure such as the Petroleum, Oil, and Lubrication (POL) 
points to achieve the same type of degradation.  Finally, they may choose to directly 
target the aircraft on the ground in order to destroy them before they can be used in the 
campaign. The friendly forces want to maintain the takeoff and landing operations on the 
runway, facilities at the airport, and aircraft on the ramp, so that they can launch enough 
aircraft at a given time to meet the needs of the Joint Force Commander.  These 
objectives are summarized in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Attack on Airfield Enemy Objectives 
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Typically runways are much larger than what a single aircraft needs to take off or 
land.  The smallest continuous and undamaged area of the runway needed for a given 
aircraft to takeoff and land is called the Minimum Operating Strip (MOS).  Therefore, the 
enemy forces are attempting to damage the runway through impact craters such that the 
number of MOSs are below a given threshold.  The friendly forces are trying to ensure 
that a minimum number of MOSs remain available to accomplish their missions.  Note 
that these objectives are temporary because the friendly forces will begin repair of the 
runway as soon as the attack is over.  This struggle is illustrated below in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Attack on a Friendly Airfield Scenario: Runway Attack 
 
The POL points and hangars are fixed based on the airfield original construction, 
so they are typically easier to target because they are stationary and the enemy force can 
use the time before hostilities to develop location and targeting data on them.  
Additionally, there are typically more hangars and POL points than what is needed to 
maintain operations for a short period of time.  The hangars typically house the 
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maintenance facilities, parts, personnel, and equipment, and the POL points are needed to 
fuel the aircraft between each mission.  If enough POL points or hangars are destroyed, 
the remaining facilities can form a bottleneck of aircraft trying to get through these 
facilities or if they are all destroyed then operations on the airfield will decrease or cease.  
The enemy forces are attempting to destroy enough hangars and POL points to reduce 
operations below a specific threshold for a specific amount of time.  The friendly forces 
are trying to maintain enough of these facilities to keep operations at a level required by 
the Joint Forces Commander.   
 The last method for attacking an airfield, attacking the aircraft directly, is much 
more straightforward.  The enemy forces recognize that it is more advantageous to 
destroy the aircraft on the ground than in the air.  Therefore, the enemy forces wish to 
destroy as many aircraft as possible and the friendly forces want to minimize the number 
of aircraft destroyed.  Unlike the fixed hangars and POL points, however, the aircraft are 
always moving on the airfield and airfield personnel attempt to minimize damage to them 
by parking them in a fashion that maximizes the minimum distance between aircraft.  In 
this way, a single missile has a reduced chance of damaging more than one aircraft.  
These objectives, including the objectives for the POL and infrastructure attacks are 
summarized in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18: Attack on a Friendly Airfield Scenario: Airfield Infrastructure and Aircraft 
 
6.1.2. Weapons Damage and Effects Model Selection 
The DoD maintains several different damage models.  One of the primary models 
used for blast and fragmentation damage is the Joint Weaponeering System (JWS) [62].  
The JWS model also has modules for concrete and soil penetration.  This would have 
made JWS an effective tool for this research, unfortunately, it is based on single 
engagements.  The detailed setup and execution of the JWS model allows it to be used 
only for a single engagement against a single target of server targets close together and in 
a known formation.  The research in this study requires a model that can estimate the 
damage across an entire airfield with many weapons and target pairings.  Luckily, the 
methodology for most of the models in JWS is summarized in the book, Weaponeering: 
Conventional Weapon System Effectiveness by Morris Driels [62].  This dissertation will 
leverage the methods described in this book as well as other supporting research to 
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develop damage effects models that can be applied to the larger simulations with many 
different weapons effects happening simultaneously. 
6.1.3. Scenario Weapon Selection 
The enemy force has a set of missiles to use in its attack on the airfield.  Each 
missile system has unique capabilities and weaknesses.  These were enumerated in Table 
3.  A TBM arrives at a high rate of speed, so the AMD engagement window against it is 
small.   They carry a large amount of explosives, but the TBMs are not very accurate.  
The CMs travel at a slowed speed and are usually detected from further away making the 
engagement window large.  However, CMs are generally more accurate due to their more 
advanced seekers and internal guidance systems but carry a smaller sized payload.     
Typically TBMs and CMs have two distinct warhead categories: unitary and 
submunitions.  A unitary warhead has a single large explosive payload, typically tied to a 
point or a proximity fuse.  These warheads deliver a large amount of explosive power to a 
single location on the ground.  These types of munitions are primarily used to target the 
aircraft and airfield infrastructure such as the hangars and POL points, but can also cause 
damage to the runway.   
The submunition warheads dispense many smaller “bomblets” that disperse as 
they fall to the ground.  These smaller bomblets each have a small warhead tied to a 
proximity or point-detonating fuse.  This type of warhead delivers a smaller amount of 
explosive power dispersed over a large area.  In an attack on a runway, a specific type of 
submunition is often used called a runway-penetrating munition.  In order to create a 
large crater in concrete, the detonation of the explosive should be within or below the 
pavement layer.  Therefore, these munitions are designed to maintain a higher velocity as 
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they fall and are shaped to burrow into the concrete on impact.  A delay fuse is used to 
delay the detonation until the munitions penetrates into the concrete layer to a certain 
depth (defined by a time after impact with the surface).  Because the detonation is 
subsurface there is generally only a small amount of damage to surface targets since most 
of the overpressure and fragmentation is contained by the earth.   
In order to properly model both a unitary and a runway-penetrating warhead, 
several sub-models will be required.  These models include a flight dynamics model, a 
concrete penetration model, and a cratering model.  An overall illustration of these 
models for each type of munition is shown below in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Airfield Effects Model for the Different Warhead Types 
 
6.2. Runway Damage Effects Model 
The overall damage to a runway caused from a series of TBM and CM attacks 
with different warheads can be calculated with an Airfield Effects Model.  This model is 
composed of five main parts: the missile flight propagation model, the penetrator flight 
propagation model, the concrete penetration model, the cratering model, and finally, the 
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runway availability model.  These models apply to both TBMs and CMs and for both 
unitary and penetrator submunition warheads; however, the unitary warhead does not use 
the penetrator flight or the penetrator penetration models.  Also, the CMs do not use the 
missile flight model.  A short description of each is described below, followed by a 
detailed explanation of the methodology.  A diagram illustrating the submodels and the 
overall methodology is illustrated in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Runway Damage Model with Submodels and Links 
 
The flight propagation model is a three-degrees of freedom (3-DOF) model for 
TBMs that propagates the TBMs from launch to impact.  This is needed to determine the 
orientation and speed of the TBM submunition at the release point of the submunitions 
for penetrator warheads or at the impact point for unitary warheads.  A 3-DOF model was 
used because the TBM reentry vehicles (RVs) are typically axisymmetric aligned to the 
velocity vector with little to no yaw perturbations.  This means that the roll axis is 
inconsequential and the pitch and yaw can be determined from the angle of the velocity 
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vector.  The main input for this model is from the EADSIM fight propagation model. For 
CMs, the missiles are assumed to pitch to a 45-degree downward angle when they release 
their submunitions.   
The penetrator flight model is a six-degrees of freedom (6-DOF) model that 
calculates the speed and orientation of each submission from its release point to the 
ground.  The additional three degrees of freedom (pitch, roll, and yaw) are needed, 
beyond the 3-DOF model used in the flight propagation model, because the runway 
penetration model is highly sensitive to the initial angle and velocity and impact.  The 
additional accuracy of the 6-DOF model ensures that the follow-on concrete penetration 
model is accurate.   
The concrete penetration model determines the depth that the submunition 
burrows into the concrete of the runway given its impact velocity and orientation.  This 
model has additional modules for penetration into the rock/aggregate layer below the 
concrete and the soil layer below the rock.  This model is important because the cratering 
model is highly sensitive to the depth of the explosion. 
The concrete cratering model determines the size of the crater from either a 
detonation on the surface, for a unitary munitions, or from a detonation at a given depth, 
for a penetration munitions.  This model describes the depth and width of a crater that is 
formed in the concrete from the size of the warhead, the weight of explosive, and depth 
of explosion. 
Finally, the runway availability model uses the above models to predict the 
impact locations of a given set of inbound missiles.  If there are runway penetrator 
submunitions, it then calculates the submunitions’ impact points, given the carrier TBMs 
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impact points.  Next, it determines the crater size for each impact and projects the crater 
outline polygons onto the larger runway rectangle.  Finally, it determines the maximum 
number of MOS sized rectangles that can be fit fully within the overall runway rectangle 
without any MOS rectangle overlaying on top of another MOS rectangle or a crater 
polygon.   
6.2.1. Runway Damage Effects Model: Missile Flight Sub-Model 
 A TBM motor can be fueled by either solid or liquid propellant.  Typically the 
propellant used in liquid propelled TBMs is very caustic, so the propellant must be 
drained from the TBM when it is in storage.  Therefore, a solid propellant TBM is easier 
to handle because it does not need to be fueled before the mission limiting the exposure 
of personnel and missile components to the fuel.  This means, however, that the amount 
of fuel and the amount of resulting thrust that the TBM motor will produce is set at the 
time of manufacturing.  A liquid propelled TBM can be fueled with different amounts of 
fuel to control the burn time.  Due to the simplified handling procedures, most TBMs 
(SRBMs and MRBMs) are solid propelled motors.  This analysis will focus on these 
types of missiles.  Because the burn time is set, the range is controlled by the vertical 
launch angle.  A close-range target requires a very step launch angle while a long-range 
target requires a relatively low launch angle.  This is illustrated in Figure 21 below. 
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Figure 21: Solid Propellant TBM Altitude and Velocity as a Function of Target Range 
  
The missile flight model propagates a TBM from its launch point to its impact 
point using a 3-DOF model.  The purpose of this model is to determine the impact 
velocity and orientation for unitary warhead munitions or the velocity and orientation of 
the TBM at the release altitude for submunition warheads.  For a given TBM, the 
orientation and velocity of that TBM at the release altitude depends on the distance from 
the launch point to the impact point and the release altitude.  This is illustrated below in 
Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: TBM Flight Profiles for Different Ranges 
 
In the model selection section, EADSIM was determined as the best model for an 
air defense simulation.  EADSIM has a built-in and validated 3-DOF missile flight 
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module.  This research will make use of this model.  Details from the EADSIM flight 
model are available from the playback section using the report called a trajectory report 
[65].  In order to produce the trajectory report, the TBM and the target must be created in 
a scenario, the scenario run through the EADSIM compiler, and then the scenario “played 
back” through the playback window.  This means that to develop a set of velocity and 
orientation statistics for a large set of TBM ranges (distance from TBM launch point to 
impact point), each range will need to be run through the EADSIM scenario.  Because 
this study uses DOEs where the range of the TBM is an input, a method was required to 
allow the author to quickly populate in EADSIM the TBMs at the ranges given in the 
DOE and then extract the relevant data for use in evaluating the surrogate models.   
In order to create an instance of a TBM in EADSIM, or a platform as it is called 
inside the program, at a minimum that platform requires a system type (TBM type), an 
initial location, a target, and a launch time.  The initial location must be specified in a 
latitude and longitude (decimal degrees) format [65].  Therefore, for a given range 
specified in the DOE, the latitude and longitude of the TBM must be calculated.  This 
calculation depends on the earth model being used in EADSIM.  EADSIM has the 
capability to use both a spherical earth and the earth model specified in the WGS84 
model [55, 65].   
For a spherical earth model, the haversine formula, or the spherical law of 
cosines, are simple formulas to find the arc length between two points of longitude and 
latitude [66-68]. The haversine formula is well conditioned even for small distances and 
is extremely accurate even for use on the actual earth.  The haversine formula is given as: 
𝑎 = 𝑠𝑖𝑛!
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝐴 − 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝐵
2 + cos 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝐴 ∗ cos 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝐵 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐴 − 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐵
2   
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𝑐 = 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛2 𝑎, 1− 𝑎   
𝑑 = 𝑅 ∗ 𝑐  
In this formula, the locations of the two points are given in latitude (Lat) and 
longitude (Long), and d is the distance between them.  The spherical law of cosines is a 
slightly simpler version of the haversine formula and with the numerical precision of 
modern computers it will generally be as accurate as the haversine formula [66]. The 
spherical law of cosines is also easier to manipulate into other useable forms such as 
finding the location of a point along a bearing from a known point.  Therefore, in this 
work, the spherical law of cosines will be used over the haversine formula.  Using the 
spherical law of cosines, the latitude and longitude of a point along a distance and bearing 
from a known point can be calculated as: 
𝐿𝑎𝑡2 = asin (sin 𝑙𝑎𝑡1 ∗ cos
𝑑
𝑅
+ cos 𝑙𝑎𝑡1 ∗ sin
𝑑
𝑅
∗ cos (𝑏𝑟𝑔) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛2 = 𝑙𝑜𝑛1 + 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁2 (sin 𝑏𝑟𝑔 ∗ sin
𝑑
𝑅
∗ cos 𝑙𝑎𝑡1 , cos
𝑑
𝑅
− sin 𝑙𝑎𝑡1 ∗ sin (𝑙𝑎𝑡2) 
In the above equations, lat1 and lon1 are the latitude and longitude of the start 
point in radians.  R is the average radius of the earth commonly given as 6,371.22 km 
[66, 67].  The variable brg is the direction of travel from the known start point (lat1, 
lon1) in radians and d is the distance to travel along that direction.  Also note that the 
latitude and longitude calculated for the new point (lat2, lon2) will be in radians so the 
answer must be converted back to decimal degrees [66].  
For the WGS84 model (or any ellipsoid), the Vicenty’s algorithm can be used to 
calculate the latitude and longitude of a point on a sphere given a starting point and an 
azimuth and distance (arc length) [67].  Unlike the direct formula of the spherical law of 
cosines, the Vicenty algorithm must be solved iteratively and requires the use of a 
 63 
computer program capable of using conditional loops.  The major equations of this 
algorithm are listed below: 
Known values [69]: 
 a: major semiaxis of the ellipsoid (6,378.137 km for WGS84) 
 b: minor semiaxis of ellipsoid (6,356.752315 km for WGS84) 
Vicenty Formulas [67, 69]:  
 𝑓 = !!!
!















! −128+ 𝑢!(74− 47𝑢!)  
The next three equations are solved iteratively until the difference between σ 
values calculated in two consecutive iterations is less than an acceptable tolerance.  The 
initial guess for σ is: 𝜎 = !"#
!"
 
2𝜎! = 2𝜎! + 𝜎 







!𝜎 −3+ 4𝑐𝑜𝑠!2𝜎!)  
𝜎 =
𝑑𝑖𝑠
𝑏𝐴 + Δ𝜎 
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Once σ has converged, the process continue with: 
𝐿𝑎𝑡2 = 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑁2 (sin𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜎 + 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑈𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜎 cos 𝑏𝑟𝑔 , (1
− 𝑓) 𝑠𝑖𝑛!𝛼 + (𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑈𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜎 − 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑈𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜎𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛼)!
!
!) 




!𝛼 4+ 𝑓(4− 3𝑐𝑜𝑠!𝛼  
𝐿 = 𝜆 − 1− 𝐶 𝑓𝑠𝑖𝑛𝛼 𝜎 + 𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜎 𝑐𝑜𝑠2𝜎! + 𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜎(−1+ 2𝑐𝑜𝑠!2𝜎!)  
𝐿𝑜𝑛2 = 𝑙𝑜𝑛1+ 𝐿 
In the above equations, the known variables are given below.  The others specified above 
are intermediate variables.  For a description of these variables and the Vicenti algorithm 
see Vicenty, 1975 [70].  
𝑙𝑎𝑡1 Starting point latitude in radians. 𝑙𝑜𝑛1 Starting point longitude in 
radians. 
𝑑𝑖𝑠 Distance to move along the 
given bearing 
𝛼 Bearing from initial point in 
radians 
𝑙𝑎𝑡2 Ending point latitude in radians. 𝑙𝑜𝑛2 Ending point longitude in radians. 
 
Using one of the two formulas given above for either a spherical or ellipsoid earth 
model (whichever one is currently set to be used in EADSIM) a set of latitude and 
longitude points can be developed for a given set of distances from a known point as 
specified in the DOE.   
Once the initial set of latitude and longitude points are created, the platforms can 
be rapidly generated in EADSIM using the “Converlay” tool.  This tool comes with the 
normal EADSIM package and uses a csv file to rapidly generate TBM and CM platforms.  
Using the latitude the longitude points calculated above, each TBM was coded with the 
convertlay tool and established in an EADSIM scenario.  For this initial run of the DOE, 
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terrain should not play a role in the TBM’s flight calculations.  The terrain will be taken 
into account in later modeling, but this initial DOE should ignore the effects of terrain, 
therefore the EADSIM model and the initial point (target) can be chosen outside of any 
map and terrain data loaded into the EADSIM program. A screen shot from one of the 
author’s DOE creation runs is shown in Figure 23.  This shows the TEL icons in a north-
south line at the distances from a target (shown in blue to the South) specified from the 
DOE.  
  
Figure 23: Screen Shot of EADSIM Range Runs 
 
Once the EADSIM platforms are created and the simulation is run through the 
EADSIM compiler, the trajectory report can be generated for all the missiles shot in the 
simulation using the trajectory extractor report.  The critical data needed out of this report 
is the missile position, velocity, altitude (in MSL or AGL since they will be equal with no 
terrain data), heading, and orientation.  EADSIM is also capable of producing other data, 
but the data listed will be used later in subsequent calculations.  A screenshot of the 
trajectory report generation tool is shown below in Figure 24.   
The trajectory report that is generated will be saved to the disk in a “.txt” format. 
On occasion, EADSIM will fail to “fly” certain missiles.  This only happens occasionally 
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and when it does happen it is usually just one or two missiles out of several hundred.  It is 
not known why this occurs and calls to Teledyne Brown Engineering could not solve the 
phenomenon.  To help catch this, the author generated a MATALB code that checks for 
missing flight data.  When this occurs, one can go back into the scenario generation and 
move the TEL by 0.00001 degrees of latitude and rerun the scenario.  This typically 
solves the mysterious no-fly problem.   
 
Figure 24: EADSIM Trajectory Report Generation Tool 
 
For submunition warheads, the DOE will also specify a release altitude.  Once the 
trajectory report is saved to a disk, it can be analyzed to calculate the velocity and 
orientation at a given release altitude.  From the inertial from, a the body frame is 
established where the x-axis is coincident with the axis of symmetry of the TBM reentry 
vehicle (RV), the y-axis is parallel to the y-axis of the inertial frame and the z-axis is 
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perpendicular to these two axis.  From the inertial frame, the vertical and horizontal 
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Where z is the MSL or AGL altitude (both equal with no terrain data), t is the 
simulation time, and d is the horizontal distance from the launch point.  Initially, the time 
step just before the release point is found from interpolation of the altitude data.  This 
time point and its associated altitude and distance, as well as the time, distance, and 
altitude of the time point immediately following are then used in equations 12 and 13.  
The total velocity is then found by: Vtotal=(Vvert2+Vhorz2)0.5.  The orientation of TBM RV 
at the release altitude is found from the orientation of the body frame.  The body frame is 
inline with the line of flight of the TBM RV, so there is no yaw angle and the pitch is 
found by atan(Vvert/Vhorz).  
6.2.2. Runway Damage Effects Model: Penetrator Flight Sub-Model 
The Penetrator flight model is a 6-DOF-ballistics model.  This model uses small 
time steps to propagate a penetrator to the ground from its release points.  At each time 
step it calculates the gravity and aerodynamic forces and moments on the body based on 
its current velocity and orientation and uses those forces and moments to calculate the 
velocity and orientation at the next time step.  The initial conditions for the penetrators 
released from the TBM RV are the RV speed and orientation calculated in the last 
section. 
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The ballistics model used in the analysis is given in Robert McCoy’s Book [71-
73] and is explained below.  The 120mm mortar was chosen as a good representative 
runway penetrator given its size and weight.  A diagram of the 120mm mortar is shown 
below.   
 
Figure 25: 120 mm Mortar (Image From [74]) 
 
McCoy’s book also has additional tables and values that specify the aerodynamic 
characteristics of a 120mm mortar [71, 75].   The 120mm is normally a sub-sonic 
munitions.  The runway penetrators are deployed from the TBM at supersonic speed, so 
the author had to extend the aerodynamic coefficient trends into the supersonic regime.  
The extensions were based on other supersonic munitions found in McCoy’s book and 




Figure 26: Extended Aerodynamic Coefficients for a 120mm Mortar (Data From [71]) 
 
In the 6DOF-ballistics model, the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that 
describe the time rate of change of the munitions’ speed in the inertial x, y, and z frames, 
as well as the angular velocity of the body frame’s x, y, and z axes are shown below.  
These equations reference the frames of reference shown below in Figure 27.  They are 
derived from Newtons’s equation that the time rate of change of the linear or angular 
velocity is proportional to the mass (or mass moment of inertia) and the resultant sum of 
the forces (or moments) on acting on the body.  The equations are transformed from the 
inertial frame to the body frame through the Euler angles.  For addition information on 
transformations through the Euler angles please see Harkins, 2003 [76]. 
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Figure 27: 6-DOF Frames of Reference 
   
In these equations, several assumptions were made.  Because the runway 
penetrators do not have a motor (they are in free-fall flight), the thrusting terms for the 
ballistic equations are not shown [71-73].  It was also assumed that there was no wind so 
the wind components have been neglected and because this analysis did not assume a 
launch location to Coriolis accelerations have been neglected.  Normally, neglecting both 
the wind and Coriolis acceleration would lead to large aiming errors in an actual scenario, 
however, this analysis is seeking to find the general orientation of the TBM RV for any 
given launch condition.  Wind will extend or reduce the range of the TBM RV for a given 
launch angle.  Additionally, the Coriolis forces will cause the flight path to appear to 
curve along the surface of the earth.  This will have the effect to reducing the range.  
Therefore, for an actual scenario, the user should first calculate the theoretical range 
assuming no wind or Coriolis acceleration.  Then use the calculations in the Missile 
Flight Section to find the orientation.  Finally, calculate the actual range, but continue 
using this orientation throughout further analysis.  The equations used in the 6-DOF 
ballistics model are shown below.  Here axis 1, 2, and 3 are the x, y, and z-axis 
respectively.   
 71 
The first equations describe the acceleration of the projectiles center of mass 
relative to the initial frame.  The next three equations describe the angular acceleration of 
the projectile about its center of mass relative to the body frame.  The next three 
equations describe the orientation of the unit vector through the rounds center of gravity 
and pointed along the axis of symmetry.  These equations are relative to the inertial 
frame.  Finally the last three equations describe the rounds distance traveled relative to 
the initial frame.   
𝑉! = −𝐶!𝑣! + 𝐶!! 𝑣
!𝑥! − 𝑣𝑣!𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛼! − 𝐶!!" 𝑥!𝑣! − 𝑥!𝑣! + 𝐶!! ℎ!𝑥! − ℎ!𝑥! + 𝑔! + Λ! 
𝑉! = −𝐶!𝑣! + 𝐶!! 𝑣
!𝑥! − 𝑣𝑣!𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛼! − 𝐶!!" 𝑥!𝑣! − 𝑥!𝑣! + 𝐶!! ℎ!𝑥! − ℎ!𝑥! + 𝑔! + Λ! 
𝑉! = −𝐶!𝑣! + 𝐶!! 𝑣
!𝑥! − 𝑣𝑣!𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛼! − 𝐶!!" 𝑥!𝑣! − 𝑥!𝑣! + 𝐶!! ℎ!𝑥! − ℎ!𝑥! + 𝑔! + Λ! 












𝑥! = (ℎ!𝑥! − ℎ!𝑥!) 
𝑥! = (ℎ!𝑥! − ℎ!𝑥!) 
𝑥! = (ℎ!𝑥! − ℎ!𝑥!) 
𝑥! = 𝑣!𝑑𝑡 
𝑥! = 𝑣!𝑑𝑡 
𝑥! = 𝑣!𝑑𝑡 
Where: 
𝑉 Velocity vector with 
respect to (wrt) the inertial 
frame. 
ℎ Angular momentum divided 
by the transverse moment of 
inertia 
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x Unit vector along the 
projectiles rotational axis 
t time 
ρ Air density d Projectile reference diameter 
S Projectile reference area m Projectile mass 
Ix Projectile axial moment of 
inertia 
Iy Projectile transverse moment 
of inertia 
CD Coefficient of drag CLα Coefficient of lift 
CNpa Magnus force coefficient (CNq+ CNa) Pitch damping force 
coefficient 
Clp Spin damping moment 
coefficient 
Clδ Rolling moment due to fin 
cant 
CMa Pitching moment 
coefficient 
CMpa Magnus moment coefficient 
(CMq+ CMa) Pitch damping moment 
coefficient 
𝛬 Coriolis acceleration 
αt Angle between the 
velocity  vector and the 
body x-axis 
g Gravity vector 
 
In these equations, the Euler angles of pitch, role, and yaw were used to transfer 
between the inertial frame and the body frame.  In these equations, the pitch (α) is used in 
several trimetric terms.  Specifically, many of the terms have a cos α that can become 
numerically unstable at high angles of attack, typically beyond +/- 89.5 degree.  The 
advantage of the Euler angles is their ease of use and interpretation, but one must be 
cautious of the pitch term instability.  Another method that does not have this singularity, 
but is more difficult to implement and interpret is a transformation via quaternions.  An 
excellent summary of quaternions and their use to develop the equations of motion is 
available in Siouris’s book [77].  In the analysis used in this dissertation, the Euler angles 
were used, but the author continuously checked the pitch value to ensure it did not 
increase beyond 89.5 degrees. 
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The twelve-coupled ballistic equations of motion ODEs explained above need to 
be solved simultaneously.  In MATLAB, this is best done with the ODE45 algorithm.  A 
good introduction and example of the ODE45 are found in [78, 79].  The overall initial 
conditions for the 6-DOF model is the speed and orientation of the TBM RV at the 
penetrator release altitude as calculated in the last section.  When released, not all 
penetrators are released at the same angle in order to ensure a fairly uniform spread of the 
resulting craters.  Therefore, in the 6-DOF model, the initial orientation of the penetrator 
was formed from the orientation of the RV plus a release angle.  This release angle was 
specified in the DOE as a value between 0 and a maximum release angle of 10 degrees.  
The penetrator was then propagated to the ground using the 6DOF equations specified 
above.  The impact time was found through interpolation of the altitude to find the time 
step when impact occurred.  The impact angle and speed could then be interpolated using 
this impact time.  In addition to the impact speed and orientation, a spread radius was also 
calculated.  This was the horizontal ground distance from the impact point of the 
projectile at the given release angle to the impact point of a projectile with a release angle 
of zero.  This would later allow the author to use the output “spread radius” from this 
program as a regression input for the cratering program.  
The results of this analysis are shown below for two different test cases each with 
40 penetrators for six different ranges from 50km to 300km with a constant release angle.  
The first test case has a release altitude from the TBM of 30,000 ft above ground level 
(AGL) and the second has a release altitude of 10,000 ft AGL.  Figure 28 and Figure 29 
shows a close in view of the impact pattern for these test cases.  Because the release angle 
was constant, the impact pattern in each case was circular.  For a normal TBM the release 
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angle is not constant.  Note that the impact angle increases as the range increases and as 
the release altitude decreases.  Looking left to right of each release altitude case, the 
impact angle decreases as the range increases.  Note that the effect is more exaggerated 
for the lower release altitude, 10,000 ft, than the higher release altitude, 30,000 ft.  
 
 




Figure 29: 6DOF Model Output for 10,000 ft Test Case: Zoomed to Impact 
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This same 6DOF model was also used for a CM releasing penetrators.  Here it is 
assumed that the CM pitches to 45 degrees down angle and releases the penetrators at 
100 ft AGL.  These results are shown below in Figure 30.  Again, this test case was 
conducted with a set release angle resulting in a circular impact pattern on the ground.  In 
reality and in subsequent analysis in this dissertation, the release angle will vary between 
zero and a set maximum release angle.   
 
Figure 30: 6DOF Model Output for CM Test Case: Overall Flight 
 
6.2.3. Runway Damage Effects Model: Penetration Sub-Model 
Once the penetrators reach the ground, the impact force initiates a time delay on 
the fuse.  In addition, the body shape and material allows the penetrator to use the impact 
energy to begin to penetrate into and possibly through the concrete layer.  If they 
penetrate through the concrete layer they will continue onto the next layer, typically 
crushed and compacted aggregate rock, and finally into the semi-infinite soil layer below.  
A side view of a typical runway construction with these layers is shown below in Figure 
31.  Once the penetrator loses all its energy from the impact it will come to rest inside 
one of these runway layers.  If the time delay fuse detonates before the penetrator has 
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come to rest then the penetrator will explode at whatever depth it currently is within a 
layer.   
 
Figure 31: Typical Runway Construction Layers 
 
There is significant amount of ongoing research into concrete penetration theories 
and to a slightly lesser extent into soil and rock penetration.  An excellent summary of the 
current work is from Li, et al. [80].  The most active research in concrete penetration is 
from the nuclear engineering field.  These scientists are concerned about penetration of 
critical shielding around nuclear reactors.  The penetrators in these cases can range from 
weapons like bullets and fragments, to objects that might be thrown in a natural disaster 
such as metal pieces, glass, and wood, to objects that would be ejected from a mechanical 
failure inside the power plant such as turbine blades and shaft components [81].   
Most research in the last ten years has been into numerical simulation of concrete 
penetration.  This is because concrete has a complicated non-linear response to impact 
loading [82, 83].  As a result, there is not a closed form solution to the penetration depth 
for any penetrator into any concrete structure.  Most modern research uses computational 
structures codes, such as ABAQUAS, AUTODYN, and LS-DYNA [83].  These 
computational studies are applicable to a wide range of impact situations from shallow to 
deep penetration and deformable penetrators and is a good tool to help extend the 
applicability of existing empirical equations [84-87].  Although numerical simulation is 
superior to empirical formulas for many cases, in this research empirical formulas will be 
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used.  There are several reasons for this. First, most empirical codes have been shown to 
match experimental data especially for cases that are present in this dissertation: 
specifically high speed strikes on concrete with ogive-nose shaped projectiles.  Also, the 
penetration depths needed to be solved for any general case of impact depth and speed, 
because the penetration code is run in sequence with the 6-DOF flight model.  The 
penetration code is passed impact speed and angles values from the 6-DOF model code, 
and it would be difficult setup a numerical simulation that would capture the wide range 
of impact conditions and target conditions [88].  
Because of this wide range of projectiles and speeds there are many empirical 
forms of penetration equations.  The selection of the correct empirical equation depends 
on the speed of the projectile, the size of the projectile compared to the target, and the 
material of the target and projectile.  For low velocity impacts (200-300 mps) the most 
common formulas are: CEA-EDF formula, UKAEA formula, Degan Formula, Chang 
Formula, and Adeli-Amin Formula [80, 89].  For penetration of concrete due to 
explosively formed fragments, the Ammann and Whitney Formula and the Whiffen 
Formula are good choices [80].  For this application of penetrator rods into concrete the 
most commonly used formulas are the Modified National Defense Research Council 
(NDRC) formula, the Haldar formula, and the Sandia Equations.  In fact, these formulas 
are even recommended by various Army and Air Force Manuals [84].   
The three penetration equations all deal with high-speed impacts (200-1500 fps) 
with non-deformable missiles.  These types of impacts are generally called “Hard” 
impacts.  In reality, all missiles that impact at that speed will deform to varying degrees.  
The deformation has the effect of reducing the actual depth of penetration; however, the 
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missile must deform to at least 40% of the calculated non-deformable penetration depth 
before the deformation effects become significant [90].  In the analysis conducted in this 
dissertation, the penetrators typically did not penetrate deep enough for this effect to 
become significant.  For the hard, non-deforming penetrator, the penetration path is 
typically a straight line.  Therefore the vertical depth that the round penetrates is a factor 
of its impact angle and its penetration length as see below in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32: Straight Line Penetration Through Concrete 
 
6.2.3.1. Modified NDRC Formulas 
The Modified NDRC formula was developed in 1946 and put forward by a 
committee in the National Defense Research Council [91].  The original formulations for 
the Modified NDRC formulas came from the Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) in 
1941.  The equations were later modified by the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to fit 
the latest test data at that time in 1943.  Although an older formula, it is still applicable 
today because it is based on an actual theory of penetration for non-deforming missiles 
[92].  Because the model is based on a theory of penetration and is not a simple curve fit 
to data, the model can be expanded beyond its original test data with confidence.  The 
main assumptions of the theory that the contact force between the target medium and the 
projectile increased linearly to a maximum value.  The theory also assumes that the 
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penetrator does not deform, is cylindrical, and that the target concrete is semi-infinite.  
The semi-infinite assumption means that the theory does not consider spalling or cracking 
effects on the opposite side of the target.  The original NDRC equations were extended 
by Kennedy to account for the “K” term [90].  It is these new equations that are 
collectively known as the Modified NDRC Formulas.  Kar extended the Modified NDRC 
formulas to account for other types of penetrator materials other than steel, but for this 
analysis with steel projectiles, his equations simplify back to the original modified NDRC 
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𝑥 Penetration depth (in) W Penetrator Weight (lbs) 
𝑉𝑜 Impact velocity (ft/s) d Penetrator Diameter (in) 
fc Concrete Compressive 
Strength (psi) 
N Nose Factor = 
0.72 for Flat-Nosed 
0.84 for Blunt-Nosed 
1.0 for Spherical-Ended 
1.14 for Sharp-Nosed 
6.2.3.2. Haldar Formulas 
Haldar and Hamieh used the Modified NDRC formulas as a baseline, but 
expanded them because they saw variations from experimental data for larger types of 
penetrators [82].  Unlike the modified NDRC formulas, they did not use a penetration 
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theory, but instead an empirical curve fit the data.  They did, however, non- 
dimensionalize the data with a new impact factor, I.  This non-dimensionalization makes 
their formula unit independent (any consistent set of units can be used) which is a 
significant improvement over many other empirical formulas mainly because the units 
give undo importance to some factors over others mainly due to their relative magnitude 
that results from the units chosen [82, 84].  Similar to the Modified NDRC, the Haldar 
equations assume a cylindrical and non-deforming penetrator and because it is based on 
empirically fitted data, it is only valid for impact factors between 0.3 and 455.  The 
Haldar equations is given as [80-82]: 
𝑥 = 𝑑 −0.0308+ 0.2251 ∗ 𝐼      𝑓𝑜𝑟 0.3 ≤ 𝐼 ≤ 4.0 
𝑥 = 𝑑 0.6740+ 0.0567 ∗ 𝐼     𝑓𝑜𝑟 0.4 < 𝐼 ≤ 21.0 






𝑥 Penetration depth W Penetrator Weight  
𝑉 Impact velocity  d Penetrator Diameter  
fc Concrete Compressive 
Strength 
N Nose Factor = 
0.72 for Flat-Nosed 
0.84 for Blunt-Nosed 
1.0 for Spherical-Ended 
1.14 for Sharp-Nosed 
6.2.3.3. Sandia Formulas 
The Sandia equations were developed at the Sandia National Laboratory.  The 
original formulation was derived in 1967, but later modified in 1972, 1988, and most 
recently in 1997 by C.W. Young [94].  The Sandia equations are empirical curve fits 
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similar to the Haldar equations, but unlike Haldar’s they are not completely based on 
non-dimensional factors.  This does give them the same disadvantage that the Modified 
NDRC equations have, in that the units tend to give undue importance to certain factors.  
Unlike the other two formulations, however, the Sandia equations are based on thousands 
of test cases and accounts for factors that the others do not, such as the amount and 
strength of reinforcement, cure time, and finite target thickness.  The Sandia equations 
also apply to soil and rock as well as to concrete.  The equations have also been 
combined and used with other penetration equations of more complicated formula 
beyond the scope of this research into an elaborate penetration code called the Simplified 
Analytical Model of Penetration with Lateral Loading (SAMPLL) [94].  The SAMPLL 
code is used today by the US Army.  The Sandia equations have been shown to be within 
10-15% accurate of true penetration depth.  This is typically within the spread range of 
repeated measurements in experiential data [86].  The main assumptions of the Sandia 
Equations are that the penetrator weighs more than 5 lbs for soil or 10 lbs for rock and 
concrete and remains intact following a stable trajectory, impact velocity is less than 
4,000 fps, and the penetration depth is more than three calibers.  The Sandia Penetration 
Equations are given below [62, 94]:  
For concrete and Rock: 




ln 1+ 2𝑉! ∗ 10!!     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑉 < 200 𝑓𝑝𝑠 




𝑉 − 100      𝑓𝑜𝑟 200 ≤ 𝑉 ≤ 4000 𝑓𝑝𝑠 
where: 
𝑥 Penetration depth (ft) W Penetrator Weight (lbs)  
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𝑉 Impact velocity (fps)  A Penetrator Cross 
Sectional Area (in2)  
S Target Material S-Number 
(Explained Below) 
N Nose Factor (Explained 
Below) 




For concrete and rock, the Lightweight Penetrator Factor can be calculated as: 
𝐾! = 0.4 ∗𝑊!.!"   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊 < 400 𝑙𝑏𝑠 
𝐾! = 1   𝑓 𝑜𝑟 𝑊 ≥ 400 𝑙𝑏𝑠 
In the Sandia Equations, the target material S-Number plays a critical role.  The 
S-number equations given in the Sandia report are as follows.  These S-numbers are 
estimated to be within 10% accuracy which is the typical scatter spread of most test data 
[94]. 
For concrete: 






𝑆 = 12(𝑓!𝑄)!!.! 
where: 
𝑃 Volumetric Percent Rebar (%) tc Concrete Cure Time (yrs).  If 
tc > 1 then tc =1  
Tc Target Thickness (calibers).  If 
Tc> 6 then Tc =6  
fc Concrete/Rock compressive 
strength (psi)  
Kh Edge Correction Factor 
(Explained Below) 
Q Rock Quality (dimensionless) 
 
The Edge correction factor, Kh can be found for reinforced (F=20) and 
unreinforced (F=30) concrete as: 
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   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊! < 𝐹 
𝐾! = 1     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑊! ≥ 𝐹 
Where W1 is the target thickness in calibers of the penetrator.  The rock quality, 
Q,  in the rock S-Number equation is a dimensionless factor that varies between 0 and 1.  
It is 0 for very loose and low quality rock and 0.9 for massive, high quality rock. 
Finally, the Nose Factor in the penetration distance equations can be found for 
any projectile by measuring its Caliber-Radius-Head (CRH).  The CRH is a 
dimensionless number that describes a rounds ballistic length to the radius of curvature of 
its nose.  CRH number for most munitions is formally shown as a dual number such as 
3/4 crh where the first number is the ballistic length and the second number is the radius 
of curvature; however, it is many times abbreviated to just the second number such as 
4crh [95].  The radius of curvature is the length of the radius, centered at point E, for the 
arc that forms the nose cone shape as seen in Figure 33.   
 
Figure 33: Caliber Radius Head (CRH) (Image From [95] ) 
 
The formula for the simplified CRH is given below where r is the radius of 





For a given penetrator the nose factor can be found as: 
𝑁 = 0.18 ∗ 𝐶𝑅𝐻 − 0.25 !.! + 0.56 
6.2.3.4. Comparison of the Concrete Penetration Equations 
The last few sections explained the three most common penetration equations for 
hard penetrators hitting concrete targets at high velocities: the Modified NDRC Formulas, 
the Haldar Formulas, and the Sandia Equations.  Each of these equations is empirical in 
nature.  They were modeled and adjusted based on the best test data available at their 
creation.  In order to validate which one to use, they each need to be tested against new, 
modern penetration data that was not used in their creation.  Test data from Forrestal, et 
al, and Cargile, J.D., and Canfield and Clator will be used for this validation [97-99].  
These experiments used hard, ogive-nosed projectiles with a CRH of either 2 or 3 fired 
into concrete with compressive strengths ranging from 34 MPa to 63 MPa.  The six plots 
in Figure 34 show the results of the test data (blue stars) compared to the three 
penetration models: Sandia (red solid line), NDRC (dashed red line), and Haldar (dotted 
red line).  
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Figure 34: Penetration Model Comparison to Test Data 
 
The results show good agreement in all cases below 800 mps (2,625 fps).  The 
two top graphs used hard concrete  (fc=62.8 MPa and 51 MPa).  For these two cases, all 
three equations have large errors beyond the 800 mps.  Looking at the residuals shown in 
Figure 35, the difference between the predicted and actual penetration values, Modified 
NDRC (middle graph) and the Haldar (lower graph) both under predict the penetration 
depth.  These two graphs show consistent positive residual values.  The Sandia has a 
more consistent prediction interval.  When the R-Squared values are compared in Table 
5, the Sandia also shows a better correlation with the test data.  Therefore, the Sandia 




Figure 35: Residuals of Test Data to Predicted Penetration Depth 
 
 




Sandia NDRC Haldar 
1 0.7404 0.3831 0.2257 
2 0.9753 0.9592 0.8882 
3 0.9453 0.8755 0.8279 
4 0.9354 0.5451 0.9731 
5 0.9138 0.4140 0.9486 
6 0.9761 0.9556 0.9693 
 
 
6.2.3.5. Penetration through Soil 
The Sandia equations also have application in soil; however, it is possible to 
derive a more physics based model.  The soil penetration model is developed by Driels 
and is based on decelerating viscous forces on the round as it moves through the soil [62].  
These equations are solved in a sequential fashion where one first calculates the 
acceleration based on the current velocity and then uses that acceleration to find a new 
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velocity.  Using that velocity and a given time step to move the round further into the 
soil.  The equations for penetration through soil are below [62].  
The deceleration force on the round is: 
𝐹 = −𝜋𝑟! 𝛾!" + 𝛽!"𝑉!  




𝑉 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑣(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡  
The velocity at the next time step is: 
𝑉 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑣 𝑡 −
𝜋𝑟!
𝑚 𝛾!" + 𝛽!"𝑉
!  
The position at the next time step is: 
𝑥 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑥 𝑡 +
𝑉 𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑉(𝑡)
2 𝑑𝑡 
These equations are solved iteratively until the velocity goes to zero.  In the above 
equations γsl is the soils static soil constant and βsl is the dynamic soil constant.  Driels 
recommends the following values for these terms [62]: 
Table 6: Soil Constants (Data From [62]) 
Soil Type Example γsl (psi) Βsl (lb-s2)/in4 
Hard (S<6) Hard, Dense, Clay or Permafrost soil 750 0.0000824 
Medium (6<S<12) Loose dry or moist sandy soil 350 0.0000689 
Soft (S>12) Wet, Soft, Clay, Tidal mud flats 160 0.0000592 
 
6.2.4. Runway Damage Effects Model: Cratering Sub-Model 
Referring back to Figure 19 and Figure 20, the cratering model is applicable to 
both unitary (surface burst) weapons as well as penetration weapons.  For the penetration 
munitions, the round will tunnel through the concrete, rock, or soil until it comes to rest 
or the timed delay fuse detonates after a pre-determined time from the initial impact with 
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the surface.  Therefore, there are five distinct regions where the detonation can take 
place: a detonation on the surface of the concrete runway, a detonation within the 
concrete layer, a detonation under the concrete in either the rock or soil layer, a 
detonation on the surface of the soil off the runway, or a detonation within the soil off the 
runway.   Because this analysis is meant to inform the runway availability model, it will 
only consider the first three cases: detonation on, within, or below the runway concrete 
layer.  
6.2.4.1. Cratering From Explosions on or Within Concrete and Soil 
When measuring the size of explosively formed craters there are normally two 
measurements given for every dimension: the apparent and true dimension.  This is 
because material from the medium in which the explosion took place is initially ejected 
upwards and then some will fall back into the crater.  The true and apparent dimensions 
are shown in Figure 36.  
 
Figure 36: Apparent and True Measurements of a Crater (Image From [100]) 
  
For surface bursts or shallow depths of burst, most of the material is ejected 
outward and very little will fall back into the crater.  In these types of craters, the 
apparent and true measurements are nearly equal.  As the depth of burst increases, more 
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and more material is deflected vertically and subsequently falls back into the crater.  This 
increases the true dimensions and reduces the apparent dimensions. As the depth 
increases, more and more of the medium falls back into the crater resulting in a very 
small apparent dimension [101, 102].  This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: Apparent and True Crater Size as a Function of Depth of Burst (DOB) (Image From 
[103]) 
 
The two critical factors in crater formation are the explosive weight or mass and 
the depth of burst.  For a given amount of explosive, the true size of the crater will 
increase with depth of burst until a certain point where most of the energy is absorbed by 
the medium between the explosive and the surface.  Beyond that depth, the explosive will 
form a buried cavern called a camouflet.  When a camouflet is formed, there is a small 
entry hole with possible blast damage, but a majority of the crater is buried below the 
surface [104, 105].  In addition, if the explosion takes place below a layer of concrete, the 
explosive force can cause parts of the concrete layer above to deform or “heave.”  The 
various types of craters are shown below in an image adopted from [62].  The time and 
effort to repair the crater is a function of the size as well as the type of crater.  A spall 
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crater can normally be fixed with some fill material and a cap.  A blowout or standard 
crater will require the crater to be filled and a patch applied over the hole.  A crater with 
heave will require the heaved portion be cut out before the hole can be filled and patched 
[106].   
 
Figure 38: Types of Craters (Adopted From Image in [62]) 
 
Because the main factors that affect the size of a crater are the amount of 
explosive and the depth of burst, cratering equations typically used a scaled depth of 




Where Z is the scaled depth of burst, Zc is the actual depth of burst, W is the 
explosive weight, and n is an exponential factor.  The original value proposed for n was 
1/3 by Hopkinson in 1915 [107].  Hopkinson postulated that the blast waves from two 
different charges would be identical at some scaled distance from either charge [108].  
The 1/3 scaling exponent was proposed because the characteristic length in cratering 
studies was the radius of the spherical charge.  This radius is proportional to the cube-root 
of the spherical charge’s mass.   Lampson [109] and Morrey et al [110] later confirmed 
the 1/3 scaling for crater radius for crater depth and radius based on experimentation.  
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Other researchers have suggested scaling exponents of 3/10, 7/24, and 5/16 [62].  Many 
of these alternatives are based on observations of craters in various materials by different 
charge masses. For smaller explosions of less than 10 lbs of TNT equivalent explosive, 
Chabai found that the 1/3 scaling factor was adequate [111].   Because the runway 
penetrating bomblets used in this study each contain 5-10 lbs of TNT equivalent weight, 
the 1/3 scaling will be used in this work. 
For any real explosive, the chemical charge is encased in some protective shell.   
In the case of the penetrating munition used in this study, this shell is the metal of the 
penetrator.  Because this shell must be strong enough to maintain its shape during the 
impact and tunneling through the concrete, it will absorb a significant portion of the 
energy of the explosive detonation.  The amount of energy that is absorbed is described 





Where W is the explosive weight, We is the equivalent weight of uncased 
explosive available after the case fracture, EEW is the equivalent explosive weight factor, 
M is the case mass, and C is the charge mass.  The original Fano equation appeared in a 
Navy Report in 1953.   The original equation contained the constants 0.2 and 0.8, and the 
EEW factor was not included, but these constants were later modified to the 0.6 and 0.4 
seen in the above equation and the EEW factor added to account for different types of 
explosives [112].   This factor scales different explosives to an equivalent weight of TNT, 
upon which the Fano equation is based.  The EEW factors for several common explosives 
is shown below in Table 7.  These EEW factors are from Driels [62].  A more extensive 
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list of EEW factors can be found in Maienschein [113] and a third list with the derivation 
of EEW can be found in [114]. 
Table 7: Equivalent Explosive Factors (Data From [62]) 




Comp B 1.11 
Comp A3 1.07 
Comp C4 1.30 
Explosive D 0.92 
HBX-1 1.17 
HBX-3 1.14 
Minol II 1.20 
 
The current form presented above is called the Modified Fano equation and is in 
wide-spread use for a variety of applications; however, its use is best limited to steel and 
stronger materials.  Other lighter and weaker materials show poor correlation with the 
Modified Fano Equation [115].  In this application, the runway penetrators are made of a 
strong steel-like material in order to maintain their shape after impact.  Therefore, the 
Modified Fano Equation is appropriate.  A plot of the Modified Fano equation appears 
below in Figure 39 for increasing case mass to charge mass (M/C) ratios.  This plot was 
constructed to model a similar plot in both Bulson and Needham [112, 115].  From this 
chart it is apparent that the fraction of available energy quickly decays as the case mass is 
increased and approaches a limiting fraction of 60% of the energy available for large case 




Figure 39: Portion of Explosive Energy Absorbed by Case Material (Adopted From Image in [112]) 
 
Referring back to the Hopkinson scaling equation, the discussion above showed 
that 1/3 is an appropriate scaling exponent and the weight used in the equations should be 
the equivalent explosive weight after the case fracture as descried by the Modified Fano 









Where r and d are the scaled radius and depth of the crater, rc and dc are the actual 
radius and depth of the crater and We is the equivalent weight of explosive available after 






Where DOB is the scaled depth of burst, DOBc is the actual depth of burst, and We 
is the equivalent explosive charge after case fracture.  Using these scaling terms, the US 
Army conducted a series of tests and developed a 90% confidence band for the size of a 
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crater on the surface and within concrete.  Some of these tests are publicly available such 
as the test by Chabai [116].  Other tests were conducted and not publically published.  
The end result from these several hundred tests were charts of scaled depth of burst vs 
scaled diameter and depth as shown by Kiger and Balsara [117].  The author digitized 
this diagram, as well as the diagram in Driels [62] using the iOS application called Graph 
Click.  This produces a series of points that fall along the curves in these graphs.  These 
curves are then fitted with a polynomial using the MATLAB polyfit function.  The result 
is a polynomial equation that described the scaled diameter and depth vs scaled depth of 
burst.  These results are plotted below in Figure 40.   
For any given explosion by an explosive charge with a known case mass to charge 
ratio at a given depth, the polynomials plotted below allow the calculation of the depth 
and diameter of the resulting crater.  For each set of curves, the diameter and depth, the 
top curve is for unreinforced concrete and the bottom curve is for reinforced concrete.  
These lines represent the boundaries of a 90% experimental data fit.  This means that for 
reinforced concrete, 90% of the test data fell above the bottom curve and below the 
midpoint between the top and bottom curve.  For unreinforced concrete, 90% of the test 
data fell below the top curve and above the midpoint between the top and bottom curve.   
As can be seen from the plot in Figure 40, the diameter and depth initially 
increase as depth increases until a maximum value of 0.6 to 0.8 m/kg1/3 then decreases 
until the resulting crater is a camulflet when the scaled depth of burst is greater than 
about 1.2 m/kg1/3.  For detonations in soil, a similar graph along with the coefficients for 




Figure 40: Crater Scaled Diameter and Depth as a Function of Scaled Explosive Depth of Burst 
(Created Based on Image in [117]) 
 
      The optimal scaled depth of burst of 0.6 to 0.8 m/kg1/3 results in a true depth of 
burst that is relative to the explosive and case weight as can be seen from the depth of 
burst equation and energy absorbed in the fracturing of the case described by the 
modified Fano equation.  For a given case weight, as the amount of explosive is 
increased, the equivalent weight of the explosive increase and the true optimal depth of 
bust increases in depth.  This relationship is summarized for a case-mass to charge ratio 
of 5 in a steel case and increasing explosive weights in Table 8.  The highlighted areas 
show the optimal scaled depth of burst (0.6 to 0.8 m/kg1/3) and the top line of the table 
shows the true depth of burst for that explosive weight.  This graph shows that for a 1.5 lb 
explosive charge encased in a 7.5 lb container (case-mass to charge ratio of five) the 
optimal depth of burst is 18-23 inches below the surface.   
 96 
Table 8: Optimal Depth of Burst for a Steel Shell with Case Mass to Charge Ratio of 5 
 
In most cases, a delay fuse timer will control the depth of burst.   The detonation 
of the fuse is delayed from the initial impact by several fractions of a second to allow the 
shell to penetrate to the desired depth assuming that the shell is able to penetrate to that 
depth.  The fuse delay is normally controlled by time and not depth and normally has 
some variability to it.  Therefore in this work, the fuse deploy was modeled as a uniform 
distribution centered at the optimal depth for the given explosive weight and with end 
points two inches above and below that depth.  During the simulations, the depth of 
penetration was initially calculated without regard to the fuse (assumed infinite time 
fuse).  This was then compared to a random draw for the fuse depth [U(d-2,d+2)] where d 
is the optimal depth.  If the penetration equations showed that the round was able to 
penetrate beyond that depth, then the round detonated at the depth specified by the 
random draw.  If the penetration equations showed that the round was not able to 
penetrate to the optimal depth, then the round detonated at the depth specified by the 
penetration equations.   
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6.2.4.2. Cratering From Explosions on or Above the Surface of Concrete 
A surface-burst explosion is an explosion where the depth of penetration is zero.  
This would occur from a point-detonating fuse or a fuse that detonates the main explosive 
as soon as it makes contact with a solid surface.  A point-detonating fuse is the easiest 
and most inexpensive type of fuse.  Many TBMs and CMs will use this type of fuse.   
The size of the crater that a surface burst munition would crater can be calculated from 
Figure 40.  Here, the scaled depth of burst is zero. Because point-detonating fuses are the 
least expensive and least complicated of the fuse types, they are used in a variety of 
weapons used in a variety of roles.  The crater that point detonating fuses make will be 
larger than an airburst munition of the same explosive weight, but less than that of one 
with a time-delay penetrating type of fuse.   
An above surface explosion is caused from a proximity charge.  These charges 
have a device that senses how far above the surface the munitions is at and then initiates 
the detonation at a pre-determined altitude above the surface.  The main types of 
proximity fuses used in ground attack munitions have either a radar altimeter or a 
barometric altimeter.  The radar altimeter activates after the munition reaches apogee or 
when it is released from the carrier vehicle for sub-munition type of munition.  It sends 
out an electro-magnetic pulse and then receives the reflected pulse that bounces off the 
surface.  From the time delay between the sent signal and the received signal, the radar 
altimeter can determine its altitude above the ground.  The barometric altimeter uses the 
increasing barometric pressure compared to a reference pressure (the pre-set static 
atmospheric pressure at the surface) to determine its altitude.  With either type of fuse, 
the weapon detonates at a certain height above the ground. 
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An above surface burst will produce a very shallow and wide crater as seen in 
Figure 37.  The main purpose of an above surface burst is to damage material and 
personnel with blast waves and fragmentation.   As the altitude increases, the depth of the 
crater decreases. The size of the crater that an above surface detonation causes can again 
be calculated from Figure 40, but for an above surface detonation, the scaled depth of 
burst will be negative.  From Figure 40, it is evident that a scaled depth of burst of above 
-0.2 kg/m3 will result in a crater depth and radius of zero.   
6.2.4.3. Cratering from Explosions Below Concrete 
The polynomials plotted in Figure 40 allow the author to calculate the actual 
diameter and depth of a crater from a detonation on top of or within a concrete layer.  For 
detonations that occur below a concrete layer, a different method is used.  In a majority of 
cases in the work of this dissertation, the explosives detonated on or within the concrete 
due to the time-delayed fuse of the munition.  The only cases where the munitions 
detonated below the concrete was in some of the early screening tests where the concrete 
was very thin.  This section is shown mainly for completeness.    
The method for calculating the size of a crater from detonations below a concrete 
layer was derived by Ross and Rosengren [118] and is elaborated on by Driels [62].  In 
general, their method calculates the impulse force below the concrete resulting from a 
stress function created by the explosive charge.  It then calculates the critical impulse 
needed to shear a concrete plug directly above the explosive charge of a given radius.  
The size of the crater can be found by slowly increasing the radius of the plug until the 




Figure 41: Method for Calculating Crater Size From Detonation Below Concrete (Adopted From 
Image in [62]) 
 
The critical impulse needed to shear the concrete can be found from the following 
equation [62, 118]: 
𝐼!" =
2 2
3 ℎ 1− 𝑞 𝜌! + 𝑞𝜌! 1− 𝑞 𝜎! + 𝑞𝜎!  
Where Icr is the critical impulse, h is the concrete thickness, q is the volumetric 
percent rebar in the concrete, ρr and ρc are the densities of the rebar and concrete, and σr 
and σc are the tensile strengths of the rebar and concrete.  The concrete thickness and 
volumetric percentage rebar were variables that were previously used in the penetration 
equations.  The tensile strength of the concrete and rebar and the density of the rebar are 
new.  The penetration equations used the compressive strength of the concrete.  Concrete 
compressive strength estimations can be calculated from the equations found in [119] or 
estimated from general numbers found in [120].  The tensile strength for concrete can be 
estimated from the compressive strength from the equations derived by Oluokun [121]: 
𝑓!" = 1.38 𝑓!! !.!" 
Where fct is the concrete tensile strength and fc’ is the concrete compressive strength.   
Continuing with other properties in the critical impulse formula, concrete density can be 
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estimated from [122].  The density of standard rebar types is found in [123] and the 
tensile strengths of rebar can be found from [124].   
 The critical impulse is the amount of impulse needed to shear a concrete 
cylindrical plug from the overall concrete layer. The detonation below the plug produces 
an impulse stress function that peaks directly above the explosive and decays radially 
outward as shown in Figure 41.  The method for calculating the amount of impulse that 
results from this stress function at a given radius on the concrete face away from the point 














Where I is the impulse imparted, h is the concrete thickness, r is the radius of the plug, P0 
is the peak incident overpressure when the wave arrives at the plug surface, db is the 
depth of the center of mass of the explosive, ta is the arrival time of the blast wave and tp 
is the positive pressure duration.  This equation is a modification of the Friedlander’s 
equation [108].  The peak detonation pressure can be found for various explosive 
compounds from [125] in table 1.2 or estimated from [126].   
6.2.5. Runway Damage Effects Model: Runway Availability Sub-Model 
The last several sections outlined the process used to determine the crater size that 
resulted from either a runway penetrating type of munition of a unitary type munition 
where the fuse type was either a point-detonating fuse or a proximity fuse.  The next step 
is to determine the effect of creating a series of craters on a runway, or in other words, 
how many useable strips of runway remain after an attack that causes multiple craters on 
a runway.   
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6.2.5.1. Minimum Operating Strip (MOS) 
Aircraft typically do not need the entire width and length of a runway to takeoff 
and land.  The smallest strip of runway that an aircraft needs to either takeoff or land is 
called a minimum operating strip (MOS).  A MOS is rectangular in shape and its 
dimensions are different for different aircraft, operating conditions, and loading [127, 
128].  Typically the landing distance is longer than the takeoff distance for a given 
airplane, but both are dependent on the stall speed, which is dependent on the aircraft 
weight, and the pavement conditions (wet, dry, ice, etc.).  A MOS sized for the takeoff 
distance would include the distance to accelerate from a standstill to the lift off velocity.  
This lift off velocity is typically about ten percent over the stall speed [129].  A MOS that 
is sized for landing would include the distance from touchdown, which typically occurs 
slightly above stall speed, to the point at which the aircraft fully stops.  In some cases, the 
takeoff MOS may also be sized to allow for accelerate-stop.  This is the total distance for 
the aircraft to accelerate from a stand still to decision speed, called V1, and then apply 
full breaking force until it comes to a stand still.  For most Air Force fighter aircraft, with 
the exception of the A-10, the MOS will typically be at least 3,000 ft [130] but depending 
on conditions it could be larger.  The A-10 has a slower stall speed and could have a 
MOS as small as 1,500 ft [175]. 
Whichever MOS is used, the MOS must be completely clear or all craters and 
debris for its full length and width and the MOS must completely lie within the bounds of 
the runway.  The MOS, however, does not have to start or end at the beginning or end of 
the runway.  Any area of the runway that is completely clear of craters over the full area 
of the MOS can be used.  The immediate goal following and attack is to have the 
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requisite number of MOSs of a given size opened as soon as possible.  Again, the size of 
the MOS is dependent on the aircraft, its load, and the conditions.  The number of MOSs 
are dependent on the number of near simultaneous launches or landings that are required 
at the airport.  After an attack, an airfield damage repair team will scout the full length of 
the runway looking for available MOSs that can be immediately used.  They will also 
look for areas where an MOS could be quickly formed by repairing the fewest or the 
smallest craters [106, 128, 131].   If a repair is needed to a crater site, the repair could 
consist of simply refilling the crater hole with cement for small craters or filling in the 
hole and placing a large repair sheet on top for larger craters [106, 132]. An example of 
MOSs along a runway following an attack that produced a certain number of craters of 
various sizes on the runway is shown below in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42: Craters and Minimum Operating Strips (MOSs) on a Runway 
 
6.2.5.2. Aim Point Distribution Across and Along the Runway 
When an enemy force is targeting the runway with a set of accurate weapons, they 
will attempt to disperse those weapons along the length of the runway in order to close as 
many MOSs as possible.  But, when targeting with a relatively inaccurate weapon they 
will spread those aim points out much less in an attempt to aim more at the center of the 
runway.  In this work, it is assumed that for CMs there are eight aim points along the 
length of the runway and three aim points at each of these eight across the width of the 
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runway.  Each of these aim points is evenly distributed across the length and width. This 
is illustrated below in Figure 43.  For less accurate TBMs, it is assumed that there are 
three aim points along the length of the runway and these aim points are all at the center-
line of the runway.  When shooting at the runway with multiple weapons, the aim points 
are randomly chosen without replacement until the number of weapons exceeds the 
number of aim points that have not yet been targeted.  Once that happens, all aim points 
are coded as available and the process continues selecting random aim points without 
replacement.   
 
Figure 43: Aim Point Distribution Along the Runway and Across the Runway 
 
6.2.5.3. Unguided Weapons’ Impact Error 
While the enemy force may equally distribute the weapons along and across the 
runway, the weapons do not necessary hit their exact target.  The accuracy of a ballistic 
or cruise missile is quantified by its circular error probable (CEP).  The CEP is the radius 
of a circle, centered at the aim point, in which 50% of the weapons are expected to land 
[62].  The impact error can also be broken down into range and deflection errors.  The 
range-direction is normally parallel to the gun-line, or a line drawn from the launch point 
to the aim point.  The deflection-direction is perpendicular to the gun-target line.  A 
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weapon shot at an aim point can miss in both the range and deflection direction.  The 
range error probable (REP) or the deflection error probable (DEP) is the distance from 
the aim point to a pair of equidistant parallel lines in which 50% of the impacts will occur 
[62].  The definition CEP, REP, and DEP are shown below in graphical form. 
 
Figure 44: Circular, Range, and Deflection Error Probable (CEP, REP, DEP) 
 
In testing, the CEP is normally calculated from the observed REP and DEP.  Most 
weapons will miss in a fashion that forms a normal distribution of impact points around 
the aim point [62].  In testing, this normality assumption can be verified with the Chi-
squared test [133].  If the weapon is not biased to miss in any given direction, then the 
mean of the impact points will be the aim point.  Thus, the range or deflection error can 
be described as N(0,σr) or N(0,σd) where N stands for the normal distribution and N(µ,σ) 
is the mean and standard deviation of that normal distribution.  For a given test, an 




𝑛 − 1  
where n is the number of observations, xn is the range or deflection error of the nth 
observation, and µ is the mean range of deflection error of those observations.  Because 
the range and deflection errors are normally distributed, and by definition, 50% of the 
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impacts lie within the REP or DEP perimeter, the REP and DEP can be found with the 
standard normal tables. Referring to Figure 45, the REP or DEP enclose 25% of the area 
to each side of the mean in the normal distribution.  Using a single tail normal 
distribution table, this means that 75% of the area under the normal distribution lies to the 
left of the right most REP or DEP line.  The 75% area z-score is 0.6745.  Therefore, the 
REP and DEP can then be calculated as [62]: 
𝑅𝐸𝑃 = 0.6745𝜎!   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐷𝐸𝑃 = 0.6745𝜎!    
 
Figure 45: Normal Distribution for REP or DEP 
 
When the range and deflection errors are combined they create a two dimensional 
error. Both range and deflection errors are normally distributed and two perpendicular 
normal distributions are described by the bivariate distribution.  The probability density 
function (PDF) of the bivariate distribution is given as: 
𝑓 𝑥, 𝑦 =
1

















where µ is the mean of either x or y, σ is the standard deviation, and p is the correlation 
between x and y given as Vxy/(σxσy) where Vxy is the covariance.  If x and y are 
independent, meaning that the weapon is equally likely to miss in both the range and 
deflection direction, then the covariance is zero and the bivariate distribution PDF 












In addition to being uncorrelated, a further special case of the bivariate 
distribution is if the means or both variables are equal to zero and the standard deviations 
are equal.  This occurs when the weapon is equally likely to miss in either range or 
deflection, meaning the REP and DEP is uncorrelated, the REP and DEP both have a 
mean of zero, meaning the weapon is not biased in one direction over another and the 
weapon misses an equal amount in both range and deflection, meaning the standard 
deviations are equal.  When this happens, the impact distribution can be described by the 
Rayleigh distribution [62].  It is important to note that even though the range and 
deflection errors are normally distributed with equal variance and each with a mean of 
zero (N(0,σ)), the radius, given by r=(x2+y2)0.5, is Rayleigh distributed [62].  The PDF of 






where r is the radius to the impact point from the aim point and σ is the standard 
deviation (equal in both range and deflection). The cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of the Rayleigh distribution is given as: 
𝐹 𝑟 = 1− 𝑒𝑥𝑝
−𝑟!
2𝜎!  
Referring back to the definition of CEP, the CEP is the radius where we expect 
50% of the weapons to fall within.  So, for a Rayleigh distributed impact set, the CEP is 
found from the standard deviation of the impacts using the CDF. The probability of an 
impact landing within a given radius band is found with the CDF as [62]:   
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so setting r1 to zero and r2 to the CEP and P(r<CEP) to 50% (0.5), the CDF of the 
Rayleigh distribution reduces to [62]:   
𝐶𝐸𝑃 = 1.1774𝜎 
This form of the CEP is easier to work with in simulation, because it is easiest to 
calculate a miss distance in both x and y (range and deflection) and use those for 
calculating the impact point as shown in Figure 46.  Most literature sources will report 
the error of a weapon in the form of a CEP.  Likewise, many weapons satisfy the 
Rayleigh assumptions, so the standard deviation of the range and deflection (x and y) 
error are equal and each error can be described by the normal distribution N(o,σ) [62].  
For a given CEP, this standard deviation is found with the above. 
 
Figure 46: Impact Point Calculation Method 
 
6.2.5.4. Guided Weapons’ Impact Error 
Guided weapons typically have a suite of sensors on board to identify where the 
weapon is relative to its pre-programmed flight path.  These sensors could consist of a 
global position system (GPS), an inertial navigation system, a terrestrial navigation 
system, a look ahead and look down terrain following radar, or a combination of these.  It 
will have some sort of guidance algorithm that will actuate control surfaces in order to 
correct for any deviations from its planned flight path.  Most guided weapons will also 
have a terminal guidance sensor that hones in on its intended target.  These sensors could 
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be radar based, electro optical or infrared based, or a combination of these.  A special 
class of guided weapons is anti-radiation weapons.  These weapons sense the 
electromagnetic energy that radars radiate and hone in on the source.   
The final result of a guided weapons flight and terminal guidance phase will fall 
into one of three categories: direct hit, near miss, or gross error [62].  A direct hit is when 
all guidance systems function as they are supposed to and the weapon hits the exact 
location that it was aimed at.  A gross error occurs when either the flight guidance system 
or the terminal guidance systems fail in a catastrophic manner and the weapon lands very 
far from its intended aim point.  Typically, any impact more than 4 standard deviations 
from the aim point is considered a gross error [62].   
A near miss occurs when the weapon’s flight or terminal guidance system is 
functioning properly, but environmental conditions or the target geometry prevent the 
weapon from fully correcting its course and it lands near its intended aim point.  Most 
weapons’ near miss patterns exhibit a normal distribution, N(0,σ) [62].  Each of these 
outcomes will have a probability associated with them that is based on testing or 
modeling and simulation.  Because the outcome from the engagement with a guided 
weapon must fall into one of these three categories, their sum must add to one [62]: 
𝑃!"#$%& !!" + 𝑃!"#$ !"## + 𝑃!"#$$ !""#" = 1 
Typically, most CEP number for guided weapons are reported for their near 
misses with the gross error and a number of the direct hits removed [62].  Thus, from a 
testing perspective, after a set of samples, the standard deviation is calculated for the 
entire data set and any sample that is more than 4σ from the mean is removed and 
considered a gross error.  The probability of a gross error is calculated as the total number 
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of points removed from the data set (because they were >4σ) divided by the total sample 
set.  Next, a chi-squared test is performed on the remaining data (direct hits and near 
misses).  If the chi-squared test fails because the direct hits bin creates too much kurtosis, 
some of the direct hits are removed and the test repeated.  Also any points that now fall 
outside the 4σ limit are removed and counted as gross errors.  This process is repeated 
until the remaining data set is approximately Gaussian.  As more and more direct hits are 
removed, the chi-squared test would improve and then begin to degrade.  The optimal 
point of the chi-squared test is generally used in order to determine the number of direct 
hits to remove [62].  From this normal distribution a standard deviation, σ, can be 
calculated and from that standard deviation, using the Rayleigh distribution described in 
the previous section, the CEP is calculated as [62]: 
 𝐶𝐸𝑃 = 1.1774𝜎 
The above equation can be used to calculate the standard deviation from a known 
CEP of a weapon.  In simulation, in order to determine the impact location of a guided 
weapon relative to its aim point, a random draw is conducted relative to the uniform 
distribution, U(0,1) to determine the guidance outcome: direct hit, near miss, or gross 
error.   Referring to Figure 47, if the U(0,1) draw is less than the probability of a gross 
error, then the weapon will impact at +/- 4σ in both range and deflection from the aim 
point.  If the U(0,1) draw is greater than the probability of a gross error but less than the 
probability of a gross error plus the probability of a near miss, then two more random 
draws from the N(0,σ) are conducted to determine the error in range and deflection.  If 
the U(0,1) random draw is greater than the probability of a gross error plus the 
probability of a near miss, then the result is a direct hit [62].   
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Figure 47: Guidance Results for a Guided Weapon 
 
6.2.5.5. Runway Penetrating Sub-munitions’ Impact Pattern 
Calculations for the mean impact point for both unguided and guided weapons 
relative to their aim points has been previously discussed.  For unitary munitions, the 
impact would occur at this location and the crater size determined as explained in the 
cratering section for a depth of burial (DOB) of zero.  For runway penetrating 
submunitions, the previous two sections describe how to calculate the mean impact point 
of the cluster.  Next, it is necessary to investigate the individual impact point of each 
penetration munitions relative to this mean impact point. 
A submunition is released from its carrier vehicle at a predetermined point in that 
carrier vehicle’s flight.  This is typically based on altitude and speed sensed via a 
barometric or radar altimeter, but it could also be based on data from a terminal type 
senor described in the last section.  The submunition can be expelled from the carrier 
vehicle via a push mechanism, an explosive charge, or centrifugal force for rotating 
carrier vehicles.  Whatever the mechanism that is used to expel the submunition, its initial 
flight conditions (speed, altitude, rotation, etc.) upon release are a function of the carrier 
vehicle’s flight conditions.  In other words, its initial speed will be the carrier vehicle’s 
speed plus the exit velocity.  Its initial pitch will be that of the carrier vehicles plus the 
additional pitch provided from the exit mechanism.   
Most weapons are designed to provide various amounts of additional energy to 
each submunition such that the submunitions are carried to the ground and land in a 
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uniformly distributed manner [134].  Because the submunitions land in a uniform 
distribution about the main impact point, all that is needed to calculate their impact 
location is the maximum distance they can land from the mean impact point.  Then a 
uniform random draw can determine how far between the mean impact location and this 
maximum distance each penetrator lands relative to the mean impact location.   
In order to determine the maximum spread possible for a submunition, the 6DOF 
flight model described earlier is used, with a specified the release altitude and speed of 
the carrier vehicle, and at the maximum possible release angle.  Referring back to Figure 
22, the penetrator’s initial speed and angle is dependent on the release altitude and the 
range from the launch point to the impact point.  Therefore, for a given range and release 
altitude, the initial speed is that of the carrier vehicle at the release altitude and the initial 
pitch is that of the carrier vehicle plus the maximum possible pitch that can be imparted 
from the release mechanism.  Using these initial conditions, the 6-DOF model can then 
propagate the submunition to the ground.  Its impact point, relative to that of a 
submunition with a zero release angle, determines the maximum spread of the uniformly 
distributed impacts.   
Most weapons will exhibit a circular uniform impact pattern on the ground.  For 
these weapons the impact of each weapon is determined with radial coordinates as 
described by Figure 48. Here, the angular distance between each weapon is 360 degrees 
divided by the number of penetrators.  The radial distance is based on a uniform 
distribution and is equal to the max spread distance times U(0,1).  For those weapons that 
exhibit a square impact pattern.  The range and deflection distance from the mean impact 
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point for each weapon is found from the uniform distribution from -1 to 1: the range or 
deflection error is the max spread times U(-1,1).  
 
Figure 48: Circular Uniform Submunition Impact Pattern 
 
6.2.5.6. Runway Minimum Operating Strip (MOS) Selection Algorithm 
The last several sections explained how to calculate the impact locations for 
unguided and guided weapons and how to calculate the impact location for submunition 
types of weapons.  Once the impact locations are known, the first several sections in this 
chapter explain how to calculate their crater size based on either a surface burst explosion 
or from that a penetrating type munitions.  For a given attack with a series of different 
weapons, these methods are applied to each weapon to determine the resulting crater 
pattern on the runway.  Once the pattern is known (location and size of each crater) the 
final step is to determine how many minimum operating strips (MOSs) remain on the 
undamaged portions of the runway. 
The most logical search pattern is to start at one end of the runway and work 
along the length to the opposite end.  So, for a cratering pattern such as that shown in 
Figure 49, the MOS search starts at the bottom left of the runway and progresses initially, 
bottom to top and then left to right. 
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Figure 49: Sample Crater Pattern on a Runway 
 
At the start location, the program places a MOS rectangle of the given size at the 
lower left corner of the runway.  The program then looks inside the MOS to determine if 
there are any craters or preexisting MOSs that lie within the bounds of the proposed 
MOS.  If there are not any craters or other portions of another MOS, then that MOS 
location is good and the program moves to the top of that MOS and repeats the process.  
If there are craters within the proposed MOS location, the program finds the top of each 
crater and moves to the top of the crater furthest from the bottom edge of proposed MOS 
location and repeats the process.  If there is a preexisting MOS that falls within the 
boundaries of the proposed MOS, the program moves to the top of the preexisting MOS 
and repeats the process.  If there are both craters and MOSs within the proposed MOS 
location, the program moves to either the top of the crater furthest from the bottom of the 
proposed MOS location or the top of the preexisting MOS, whichever is further away 
from the bottom of the proposed MOS location.  This process is repeated until the 
program reaches the top edge of the runway.   
Once at the top edge of the runway, the program must select how far to move in 
the horizontal direction along the length of the runway.  The program looks at all craters 
and preexisting MOSs that it found during its vertical search.  It then finds the right edge 
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of each crater and preexisting MOS.  The program then moves to the right edge of the 
crater or preexisting MOS that is closest to the current proposed MOS start location and 
repeats the vertical process.  The reason the program only moves to the next closest crater 
or MOS location is because other MOSs may be able to be stacked above or below that 
location.  This process of searching vertically and then horizontally continues until the 
program reaches the far end of the runway. Once complete, the MOSs are counted.   
This method produces a set of MOSs that are anchored at the lower left corner of 
an available space.  The MOSs could move up or right until they encounter another MOS 
or crater as illustrated below in Figure 50.  However, there is not enough room either 
above or to the right of the MOSs to place another entire MOS of the given size.   
 
Figure 50: Sample Results from MOS Selection Program 
 
6.3. Runway Damage Effects Model Surrogate Model 
Using the methods descried in sections 6.2-6.2.4, a MATLAB code was created to 
calculate the impact location and crater size for an attack from TBMs and CMs.  The 
program then uses the MOS selection algorithm described in section 6.2.5 to determine 
the number of MOSs of a given size remained following the attack.  On the author’s two 
core 3.0 GHz computer, the 6-DOF flight model takes an average of 30 minutes to 
propagate rounds to the ground.  The runway cratering model and MOS selection 
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program takes 2-10 minute to run depending on the number of munitions and craters.  In 
addition, the runway availability model is stochastic, so many Mote Carlo runs are 
required to create meaningful distributions.   
These run times are too long for direct use in later sections of this dissertation.  
These later sections will examine the effectiveness of an AMD laydown based on the 
number of MOSs that remain.  In essence the effectiveness is based on the outcome or the 
effects of the attack.  Therefore, the calculations and determination of the number of 
MOSs available had to be sped up.  This increase in speed is realized with surrogate 
models, also known as metamodels.  Metamodels (also known as surrogate models) are 
models of a model. The process of design of experiments and the creation of these 
metamodels is described in appendix B and C. This section will describe the process of 
creating the specific metamodel of the airfield effects model. 
6.3.1. Spread and Crater Size Surrogate Models for TBMs and CMs 
The airfield effects metamodel requires two separate surrogate models: one for 
the maximum spread of the submunitions and a second that predicts the crater depth from 
each submunition.  The maximum spread metamodel will predict the radius of the 
submunition impacts assuming that all submunitions were ejected at the maximum 
allowable release angle.  As stated earlier, observed cluster munitions impact patterns 
appear uniformly distributed [63].  Once this maximum distance is known, a uniform 
random number can be drawn for each submunition to determine its impact radius.  This 
impact radius is then used with other factors to predict penetration distance and the 
minimum and maximum possible size of the crater.  The process of creating these 
metamodels is summarized in Figure 51.   
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Figure 51: Airfield Attack Effects TBM Metamodel Setup 
 
Each metamodel requires two data sets as explained in appendix C, a training and 
validation set and a test set.  The rule of thumb for the smallest number of test points, or 
runs, in the training and validation set is at least 10 runs per design variable and at least 
20% of the training set for the validation set [135, 136].  In both the spread and cratering 
metamodel, more design points than the ten per rule of thumb were used to help ensure a 
good model fit and ensures a smaller degree of error.  This was needed because these 
predictive models will be used later with other predictive models of the surface-to-air 
engagements and any prediction errors will compound together.   
The training and test sets for each model were created in JMP using the Latin 
hypercube design.  This design was chosen because it helps to spread the points in the 
design space, but ensures that the set can be projected into a smaller dimensional space 
without overlap of the points [137-140].  This was especially valuable in the cratering 
metamodel since the same design set was used to predict the minimum and maximum 
crater size and there was no guarantee that the two models would use the same design 
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variables.   In both cases the validation set was also created in JMP using the augment 
design feature.  This allowed additional points to be populated into the original design 
ensuring that those validation points were spread as far from the training points and each 
other as possible.  Because the points end up being spread through the design space, if 
they show a good validation fit then that increases confidence in the predictive ability of 
the metamodel.   
6.3.1.1. TBM Max Spread Metamodel Results 
The maximum spread metamodel predicts the maximum radius that could result 
from a submunition released at the given release altitude and speed at the maximum 
possible release angle of five degrees.  The simulation uses the flight propagation model 
from EADSIM (see section 6.2.1) to fly the TEL from the launch point to the release 
point and then releases two submunitions at the given release altitude: one at a release 
angle of zero degrees and one at the maximum angle of five degrees.  It then propagates 
each to the ground in a six degree-of-freedom model (see section 6.2.2).  After that, it 
measures the distance between the two impact points.  The input variables for the 
maximum spread model are the TEL launcher distance and the release altitude.  The 
launcher distance plays a role in the TBM angle at release as well as the release speed.  
The release altitude is important because the submunitions will spread more at a higher 
release altitude.  A summary of the inputs and outputs from this analysis is shown below 
in Figure 52. 
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Figure 52: TBM Max Spread Model DOE Inputs and Outputs Diagram 
 
In Figure 52, the black circles are the model fit set and the red stars are the 
validation points (these were excluded from the fitting process and used later to validate 
the fit).   The results are also summarized in histogram format in Figure 53. 
 
 
Figure 53: TBM Max Spread Model DOE Input and Outputs Histogram 
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The maximum spread observed was 1,885 ft and the minimum spread was 631 
feet.  This means that the spread varied over a range of about 1,254 feet.  Figure 53 also 
highlights the intuitive fact that the largest spread resulted from the highest release 
angles.  Using these outputs, two metamodels of the maximum spread radius were 
created: a response surface (RSM) and a neural net with 20 hidden nodes each with a 
hyperbolic tangent activation function (NN20).  Both of these models were evaluated 
with the techniques described in appendix C. The actual v. predicted graph for these two 
models is shown below along with their associated R2 and root mean squared error 
(RMSE).   
 
 
Figure 54: TBM Max Spread Metamodel Actual by Predicted 
 
Each model was very good at predicting the maximum spread.  Each had an R2 
over 0.99 and each had low RMSEs.  The residual plot of each, shown below in Figure 




Figure 55: TBM Max Spread Metamodel Residuals 
 
A good model must not only predict well, but it should also be unbiased.  In order 
to ensure that the model was unbiased, a histogram of the residuals was also plotted and 
the histogram tested verse the normal distribution using the Sharprio-Wilk test for 
normality. These results are shown below. 
 
Figure 56: Histogram of Residuals and Normal Quantile Plot for TBM Max Spread Models 
  
Table 9: Shaprio-Wilk Test Results for TBM Max Spread Model Residuals 
Shaprio-Wilk Test P-Value 
Response Surface Eqn 0.0336 
Neural Net 0.8279 
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The response surface equation appears to deviate more from the normal 
distribution than the neural net.  This is confirmed by the Sharprio-Wilk p-value less than 
0.05 for the response surface model.  Therefore, the neural net was chosen as the best 
metamodel for the max spread distance of the TBM.  This model will be used in future 
sections to help predict the impact point for each submunission as explained earlier in 
section 6.2.5.5. 
6.3.1.2. TBM Crater Size Metamodel Results 
The cratering model for the TBMs used all parts of the process explained in 
sections 6.2 through 6.2.4.3.  The TBM was initially propagated to the release point using 
the EADSIM flight program.  At the given release altitude, a penetrator was ejected at the 
given release angle and propagated to the ground using the six degree of freedom model.  
Once it impacted, the penetration equations used the impact velocity and angle to 
determine the penetration depth.  Once the round exploded, the cratering model predicted 
the min and max crater size that would result from an explosion at that depth.   Because 
the cratering model used all these other models the input set was the set for all the inputs 
of all the models.  There were 15 input variables in the cratering metamodel.  These were 
described in various parts in sections 6.2 through 6.2.5 and are summarized in Table 10 







Table 10: DOE Inputs for TBM Cratering Metamodel 
Input Min Max Units 
Penetrator Release Altitude 10,000 30,000 ft 
Number of Penetrators 10 40 number 
Launcher Range 50 300 km 
Penetrator Release Angle 0 5 degree 
Delay Fuse Max Depth 6 36 in 
Explosive Weight 1 15 lb 
Runway Width 50 1000 ft 
Concrete Thickness 12 42 in 
Percent Rebar 0 5 % 
Concrete Compressive Strength 2,000 3,500 psi 
Density of Concrete 125 175 lbf/ft3 
Tensile Strength of Rebar 70,000 90,000 psi 
Rock Thickness 6 24 in 
Rock Unconfined Compressive Strength 3,000 4,000 psi 
Rock Quality 0.5 0.9 none 
 
These fifteen factors were used in JMP to produce a 200-design point training and 
fitting set and a 50-point validation set.  The training set was a Latin hypercube design 
and the validation set was produced from a space filling augmentation to ensure that it 
sampled evenly throughout the design space and away from any points already in the 
training and fit set.  The same training and validation set were used to create both the 
minimum and maximum crater size prediction model.  The Latin hypercube design was 
used because the same factors may not play a role in both the min and max size models 
and the Latin hypercube can project into smaller dimensional spaces without loss of 
points.  A summary of the training set and validation set is shown in Figure 57, along 






































The first step after the DOE run was to validate the assumptions identified about 
the use of the Sandia equation and the six-degree of freedom model from sections 6.2.2 
and 6.2.3.4.  The impact speed should be less than 4,000 feet per second and the impact 
angle less than 89.5 degrees.  To validate these two assumptions, all results from both the 
training set and validation set were plotted in a histogram. This histogram is shown in 
Figure 58.  From the data below each histogram it can be seen that the maximum impact 
speed was 2,159 feet per second and the maximum impact angle was 87.4 degrees.  Both 
of these values are less than the maximum allowable values.   
Figure 58 also shows the results for the minimum and maximum crater diameter 
size.  It should be noted that both the minimum and maximum distributions show a range 
of about 10.5 feet from their respective minimum to maximum values.  The maximum 
crater diameter ranged from 5.62 feet to 16.53 feet (10.91 foot range), and the minimum 
crater diameter ranged from 4.07 feet to 14.20 feet (10.13 foot range).   The results for 
both the training and validation sets are also plotted against each input factor in Figure 
59.  In Figure 59 the black dots are the training set and the red stars are the validation set.  
The results show that the cater size is dominated by the max depth setting and the 

































































































For both the minimum and maximum crater size, multiple models were created 
and compared to each other in order to select the best one.  Starting with the minimum 
crater size, the following models were created: a response surface model, a response 
surface model of a box-cox transform, three different neural net models with 7, 10, and 
15 hidden nodes, each with a hyperbolic tangent activation function, a neural net with 10 
hidden nodes for the box-cox transform, and finally, a Gaussian kriging model.   
The results of fitting all these models are shown in Figure 60.  This figure shows 
the actual v. predicted plots for both the training and validation data sets along with each 
models root mean squared error (RMSE) and R2 value.  The training data set models are 
shown on the left and the validation set data models are shown on the right.  When 
selecting a model, the ability to predict is the most important characteristic.  Therefore, 
the actual v. predicted, RMSE, and R2 values of the validation set should be considered 
above those of the training set since the validation set was not used to create the model.  
The validation set is a test of the models predictive power.   A summary of the RMSE of 













































































Table 11: Error for Each Model of the Minimum Crater Size Using the Validation Set 
Model RMSE %Error 
RSM 0.72 7.11 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 0.74 7.30 
RSM (Stepwise) 0.58 5.72 
RSM (Stepwise Xform) 0.46 4.54 
NN (10 Node) 0.84 7.99 
NN (10 Node with Xform) 0.64 6.32 
NN (15 Node) 0.92 9.08 
NN (7 Node) 0.61 6.02 
NN (10 Node with Stepwise) 0.92 9.08 
Gaussian Kriging (Process) 0.42 4.15 
 
Table 11 shows that the Gaussian kriging model performed the best in terms of 
prediction capability, but the residuals also must be considered in the model selection.  
While the response surface models must have random distributions of the error, the 
neural nets and kriging models do not necessarily have to have this feature, but it is 
desirable.  A plot of the residuals for each model is shown below in Figure 61 and the 
summary statistics for each model is organized in Table 12.  The table shows the statistics 
for the training set on top (model fit error) and the validation set on the bottom (model 
representation error).  Most models showed an increase in the residuals at a crater size 
around 10 feet.  Overall, the Gaussian kriging model, the model with the lowest RSME of 
the validation set, did not have a poor residual plot.  This is confirmed in the residual 
histogram and normal quantile plot of Figure 62.  The main deviations from normal were 
the results of two points. 
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Figure 61: Residuals of Minimum Crater Size Models for Training and Validation Sets 
  
 



















RSM 1.44E-16 0.316 -0.985 1.273 0.0037 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 5.04E-3 0.303 -0.993 1.583 0.0001 
RSM (Stepwise) 1.42E-16 0.393 -1.570 1.900 0.001 
RSM (Stepwise Xform) 8.75E-3 0.453 -1.523 2.711 0.001 
NN (10 Node) -1.12E-2 0.448 -1.909 1.329 0.002 
NN (10 Node with Xform) -2.54E-2 0.397 -2.257 1.035 0.001 
NN (15 Node) -2.56E-3 0.452 -1.833 1.614 0.002 
NN (7 Node) -1..41E-3 0.515 -1.753 1.446 0.622 
NN (10 Node) -2.12E-2 0.455 -2.556 2.411 0.001 
















RSM 9.70E-2 0.747 -2.055 1.932 0.512 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) -1.14E-2 0.758 -3.276 2.425 0.001 
RSM (Stepwise) 8.94E-2 0.575 -1.104 1.942 0.002 
RSM (Stepwise Xform) 4.08E-2 0.462 -2.049 1.462 0.001 
NN (10 Node) 6.00E-2 0.834 -1.517 2.675 0.420 
NN (10 Node with Xform) -1.65E-1 0.639 -2.079 1.989 0.070 
NN (15 Node) 4.40E-2 0.928 -2.625 1.589 0.018 
NN (7 Node) 7.36E-2 0.919 -2.204 2.446 0.103 
NN (10 Node) 4.14E-2 0.624 -1.691 1.337 0.010 
Gaussian Process 7.7E-2 0.600 -1.123 2.539 0.001 
 
The maximum crater size metamodel was prepared the same way as the minimum 
crater size model.  For the maximum crater size, the following models were created: 
Response surface equations, a response surface equation with a stepwise regression that 
only chose certain factors, a response surface equation of the Box-Cox transform, two 
different neural nets one with 10 and the other with 7 hidden nodes with a hyperbolic 
tangent activation function, a neural net with 7 hidden nodes on the Box-Cox transformed 
results, and finally, a Gaussian kriging model.   
The results of fitting all these models are shown in Figure 63.  This figure shows 
the actual v. predicted plots for both the training and validation data sets along with each 
models root mean squared error (RMSE) and R2 value.  Just as in the minimum crater 
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size section, the training data set models are shown on the left and the validation set data 
models are shown on the right.  The prediction capability of the model is demonstrated by 
the validation set so those results should be weighted more than the training set.  A 








































































Table 13: Error for Each Model of the Maximum Crater Size Using the Validation Set 
Model RMSE %Error 
RSM 0.70 6.41 
RSM (Stepwise) 0.48 4.40 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 0.97 8.89 
NN (10 Node) 0.80 7.33 
NN (10 Node with Xform) 0.60 5.50 
NN (7 Node) 0.81 7.42 
NN (7 Node with Stepwise) 0.55 5.04 
Gaussian Process 0.40 3.67 
 
Table 13 shows that the Gaussian kriging model performed the best in terms of 
prediction capability, but the response surface equation also performed well.  In order to 
determine which to use, the residuals are to be considered. A plot of the residuals for each 
model is shown below in Figure 64 and the summary statistics for each model’s residuals 
is organized in Table 14. The residual histogram and normal quantile plot for both the 
Gaussian Kriging model (left) and the Response Surface Model (right) are shown in 
Figure 62.  The normal quantile plot shows a strong non-linear shape for the kriging 
model while the response surface is more linear.  This indicates that the response surface 
model has a more normal distribution of the residuals. Overall, the prediction capability 
of the response surface model and kriging model are similar, but the more even 
distribution of the errors of the response surface model indicates that it is a better 







Figure 65: Histogram and Normal Quantile Plot of Gaussian kriging and Response Surface Model 




Figure 64: Residuals of Maximum Crater Size Models for Training and Validation Sets 
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Table 14: Residual Summary Statistics for Maximum Crater Size Models  
Model 
Residuals 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
SW P-
Value 










RSM -8.0E-16 0.309 -0.984 1.238 0.002 
RSM (Stepwise) 4.93E-16 0.391 -1.434 2.061 0.001 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 3.20E-3 0.248 -0.870 1.109 0.001 
NN (10 Node) -5.60E-3 0.391 -1.372 1.346 0.001 
NN (10 Node with Xform) -1.01E-2 0.410 -1.491 1.649 0.001 
NN (7 Node) -8.01E-3 0.564 -1.559 -1.506 0.718 
NN (7 Node with Stepwise) -1.03E-2 0.365 -1.207 1.259 0.019 
















RSM 8.59E-2 0.724 -2.036 1.885 0.459 
RSM (Stepwise) 9.57E-2 0.482 -1.314 1.119 0.043 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) -5.83E-2 1.075 -5.614 2.730 0.001 
NN (10 Node) -9.55E-2 0.810 -2.647 2.384 0.140 
NN (10 Node with Xform) 4.44E-2 0.598 -1.358 1.469 0.831 
NN (7 Node) 2.02E-1 0.801 -1.626 1.659 0.217 
NN (7 Node with Stepwise) -9.35E-2 0.548 -1.637 0.925 0.702 
Gaussian Process -1.70E-3 0.402 -2.051 0.954 0.001 
 
6.3.2. Airfield Damage Effects Surrogate Models for CMs 
The damage effects model creation for cruise missile (CMs) was done in a similar 
manner than that of the theater ballistic missile (TBMs) models explained the in the last 
few sections.  The CM metamodel also requires two separate surrogate models: one for 
the maximum spread of the submunitions and a second that predicts the crater depth from 
each submunition.  The maximum spread metamodel will predict the radius of the 
submunition impacts.  Then using a uniform distribution the actual impact location for 
each submunition can be calculated between that of a zero release angle and that of a 
release angle at the maximum value.  This impact radius is then used with other factors to 
predict penetration distance and the minimum and maximum possible size of the crater.   
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For the training and test sets for both the max spread and crater size models, a 
Latin hyper cube design created in JMP, was used.  Just as in the TBM models explained 
in the last section, the Latin hypercube design helps to spread the points in the design 
space, but ensures that the set can be projected into a smaller dimensional space without 
overlap of the points [137-140], since the same design set was used to predict the 
minimum and maximum crater size and there was no guarantee that the two models 
would use the same design variables.  Again, just as in the TBM models, the validation 
sets were also created in JMP using the augment design feature.  This allowed additional 
points to be populated into the original design ensuring that those validation points were 
spread as far from the training points and each other as possible.   
6.3.2.1. CM Max Spread Metamodel Results 
The maximum spread metamodel predicts the maximum radius that could result 
from a submunition released from the cruise missile at the given release altitude and 
speed at the maximum possible release angle of ten degrees.  Unlike the TBM max 
spread model, this simulation did not need the flight propagation model from EADSIM.  
Instead, it was assumed that the CM traveled to the release point and then pitched down 
at a 45-degree angle.  At this nose down orientation it then released two submunitions at 
the given release altitude: one at a release angle of zero degrees and one at the maximum 
angle of ten degrees.  It then propagated each to the ground in a six degree-of-freedom 
model (see section 6.2.2).  Finally, it measured the distance between the two impact 
points.  The input variables for the maximum spread model were the cruise missile speed 
and the release altitude.  The release altitude varied from 20 feet above ground to 500 feet 
above ground and the cruise speed varied from 100 meters per second to 500 meters per 
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second.  A summary of the inputs and outputs from this analysis is shown below in 
Figure 66.   
 
Figure 66: CM Max Spread Model DOE Inputs and Outputs Diagram 
 
In Figure 66, the black circles are the training points and the red stars are the 
validation points.  In order to ensure a good fit, thirty times the number of inputs (sixty 
total) were used in the training set and 40 points (40%) were used in the validation set.  




Figure 67: CM Max Spread Model DOE Inputs and Outputs Histogram 
 
The maximum spread observed was 95.2 ft and the minimum spread was 1.9 feet.  
This means that the spread varied over a range of about 93 feet.  Figure 67 also highlights 
that the largest spread was from a high release altitude at a speed around 350 mps (about 
mach 1).  Using these outputs, five metamodels of the maximum spread radius were 
created: a response surface model (RSM), a response surface model of the Box-Cox 
transform, two neural nets, one with 5 hidden nodes and another with 10 hidden nodes 
each with a hyperbolic tangent activation function, and a Gaussian kirging model.  All of 
these models were evaluated with the techniques described in appendix C. The actual v. 
predicted graph for these two models is shown below along with their associated R2 and 























In Figure 68, the training set is shown on the left and the validation set is shown 
on the right.  All models performed well, but the best models in terms of their RMSE and 
R2 values were the neural net with 10 nodes and the Gaussian kriging model.  The RMSE 














































Table 15: Error for Each Model of the Maximum Spread for CMs Using the Validation Set 
Model RMSE %Error 
RSM 6.59 7.06 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 6.96 7.46 
NN (5 Node) 0.96 1.03 
NN (10 Node) 0.55 0.59 
Gaussian kriging 0.60 0.43 
 
 A plot of the residuals for the best performing models, the two neural nets and the 
Gaussian kriging model, is shown below in Figure 70.  Each model shows a fairly 
random distribution of the error.  The histogram of the residuals and the normal quantile 
plot for the two best modes, the neural net with 10 nodes and the Gaussian kriging 
models is shown in Figure 69 and a summary of the residual statistics is shown in Table 
17.  Both of the models show a good distribution of the residuals, but the neural net 
seems just a little more linear.  This is confirmed by the Sharprio-Wilk test in Table 16.  
Therefore, the neural net with 10 nodes was chosen as the model for the CM max spread. 
Table 16: Shaprio-Wilk Test for CM Max Spread Models' Residuals 
Shaprio-Wilk Test P-Value 
NN 10 Node 0.4924 









Figure 70: Residuals of Training and Validation Set for CM Max Spread Models 
 
Table 17: Residual Summary Statistics for CM Max Spread Models  
Model 
Residuals 












RSM 2.61E-15 5.76 -12.44 18.28 0.2642 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 2.16E-1 6.14 -14.11 23.57 0.0040 
NN (5 Node) -3.35E-3 0.61 -1.20 1.25 0.1136 
NN (10 Node) 4.95E-4 0.39 -0.78 0.95 0.3608 

















RSM 2.58E-2 6.51 -13.43 14.12 0.7742 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 2.39E-1 6.89 -18.48 17.10 0.6249 
NN (5 Node) -6.65E-2 0.95 -3.78 1.37 0.0014 
NN (10 Node) -6.66E-2 0.54 -1.59 1.19 0.4924 
Gaussian kriging -1.14E-1 0.59 -2.47 0.74 0.0002 
 
6.3.2.2. CM Crater Size Metamodel Results 
Unlike the TBM crater size model, the CM crater size model did not use the EADSIM 
flight propagation model.  Instead, it was assumed that the CM arrived to their target at 
the altitude designated in the DOE and then pitched nose down at a 45 degree angle 
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before releasing the runway penetrators at the release angle specified in the DOE.  The 
penetrators were then propagated to the ground using the six-degree of freedom model.  
Once the penetrators impacted, the penetration equations used the impact velocity and 
angle to determine the penetration depth.  The round then tunneled to the minimum of the 
penetration depth calculated in the penetration equations or the penetration depth set in 
the DOE.  It then exploded and the cratering model predicted the min and max crater size 
that would result from an explosion at that depth.    
Because the CMs were traveling at a much slower speed than the TBMs, there was no 
way for the CM penetrators to tunnel through both the concrete and the rock layer.  
Therefore, in the CM input DOE, the inputs having to do with the rock layer were 
neglected.  Additionally, it was assumed that the number of penetrators was fixed in the 
smaller confines of the CM and the max release angle increased to 10 degrees to spread 
the penetrators out more at the lower release altitudes.  This meant that there were 10 
input variables in the cratering metamodel.  These were described in various parts in 
sections 6.2 through 6.2.5 and are summarized in Table 18.   
Table 18: DOE Inputs for CM Cratering Metamodel 
Input Min Max Units 
Penetrator Release Altitude 10 500 ft 
Penetrator Release Angle 0 10 degree 
Delay Fuse Max Depth 6 36 in 
Explosive Weight 1 10 lb 
Runway Width 50 1000 ft 
Concrete Thickness 12 42 in 
Percent Rebar 0 5 % 
Concrete Compressive Strength 2,000 3,500 psi 
Density of Concrete 125 175 lbf/ft3 
Tensile Strength of Rebar 70,000 90,000 psi 
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These ten factors were used in JMP to produce a 220-design point training and 
fitting set and a 55-point validation set.  The training set was a Latin hypercube design 
and the validation set was produced from a space filling augmentation to ensure that it 
sampled evenly throughout the design space and away from any points already in the 
training and fit set. A summary of the training set and validation set is shown in Figure 71 























































Just as in the TBM case, the first step after the DOE run was to validate the 
assumptions identified about the use of the Sandia equation and the six-degree of 
freedom model from sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.4 restated here as: the impact speed should 
be less than 4,000 feet per second and the impact angle less than 89.5 degrees.  To 
validate these two assumptions, all results from both the training set and validation set 
were plotted in a histogram, shown in Figure 72.  From the data below each histogram, it 
can be seen that the maximum impact speed was 1,619 feet per second and the maximum 
impact angle was 62.3 degrees.  Both of these values are less than the maximum 
allowable values.   
Figure 72 also shows the results for the minimum and maximum crater diameter 
size. The maximum crater diameter ranged from 2.19 feet to 7.60 feet (5.41 foot range), 
and the minimum crater diameter ranged from 1.42 feet to 5.59 feet (7.17 foot range).   
The results for both the training and validation sets are also plotted against each input 
factor in Figure 73.  The black dots are the training set and the red stars are the validation 
set.  The results show that the cater size is dominated by the maximum depth setting, the 
explosive weight, and the speed of the CM.  The other factors play a much smaller role in 





































































Just as in the TBM case, for both the minimum and maximum crater size, multiple 
models were created and compared to each other in order to select the best one.  Starting 
with the minimum crater size, the following models were created: a response surface 
model, a response surface model of a box-cox transform, a response surface model with a 
stepwise regression, three different neural net models with 5, 10, and 15 hidden nodes 
each with a hyperbolic tangent activation function (the neural net with 15 nodes was done 
on only the factors identified in the stepwise regression), and finally, two Gaussian 
kriging models, one on all factors and the second on only the factors identified in the 
stepwise regression.   
The results of fitting all these models are shown in Figure 74.  This figure shows 
the actual v. predicted plots for both the training and validation data sets along with each 
models root mean squared error (RMSE) and R2 value.  The training data set models are 
shown on the left and the validation set data models are shown on the right.  When 
selection a model, the ability to predict is the most important characteristic.  Therefore, 
the actual vs. predicted, RMSE, and R2 values of the validation set should be considered 
above those of the training set since the validation set was not used to create the model.  
The validation set is a test of the models predictive power.   A summary of the RMSE of 


















































Table 19: Error for Each Model of the Minimum Crater Size for CMs Using the Validation Set 
Model RMSE %Error 
RSM 0.37 8.87 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 0.37 8.87 
RSM (Stepwise) 0.36 8.63 
RSM (Stepwise Xform) 0.35 8.39 
NN (5 Node) 0.15 3.60 
NN (10 Node) 0.11 2.64 
NN (15 Node with Stepwise) 0.11 2.64 
Gaussian kriging 0.13 3.12 
Gaussian kriging (with Stepwise) 0.13 3.12 
 
 
Table 19 shows that the Neural Nets and the Gaussian kriging model performed 
the best in terms of prediction capability, but the residuals also must be considered in the 
model selection.  A plot of the residuals for each model is shown below in Figure 75, and 
the summary statistics for each model is organized in Table 20.  The table shows the 
statistics for the training set on top (model fit error) and the validation set on the bottom 
(model representation error).  
Overall, each of the neural net models’ and each of the Gaussian models’ 
residuals look good.  The models with the smallest error are the neural net 10 node and 
neural net 15 node.  The residual histogram and normal quantile plot of these two models 
is shown in Figure 76.  Both models exhibit a fairly linear plot on the normal quantile 
plot.  In general, a neural net with more hidden nodes will perform better than a neural 
net with less hidden nodes, all else being equal.  So in this case, the neural net with 15 












Table 20: Summary Statistics for Residuals of CM Minimum Crater Size Models  
Model 
Residuals 












RSM -6.06E-18 0.170 -0.90 0.44 0.0001 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 2.43E-3 0.167 -0.82 0.50 0.0001 
RSM (Stepwise) 4.24E-17 0.187 -1.03 0.47 0.0001 
RSM (Stepwise Xform) 3.15E-3 0.191 -0.94 0.52 0.0001 
NN (5 Node) -9.59E-4 0.047 -0.18 0.16 0.0001 
NN (10 Node) 8.24E-3 0.041 -0.12 0.21 0.0001 
NN (15 Node with Stepwise) -8.14E-4 0.055 -0.19 0.18 0.0321 
Gaussian kriging -1.36E-13 0.049 -0.20 0.18 0.0001 
















RSM -1.02E-1 0.391 -1.29 1.00 0.0368 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) -9.29E-2 0.342 -1.07 0.80 0.2364 
RSM (Stepwise) -5.18E-2 0.371 -1.29 0.83 0.0137 
RSM (Stepwise Xform) -3.93E-2 0.316 -1.01 0.59 0.0693 
NN (5 Node) -1.61E-2 0.144 -0.46 0.40 0.0005 
NN (10 Node) 1.65E-2 0.108 -0.17 0.40 0.0017 
NN (15 Node with Stepwise) -1.08E-2 0.11 -0.35 0.28 0.0170 
Gaussian Process 1.30E-2 0.13 -0.21 0.64 0.0001 
Gaussian Process (with Stepwise) 1.13E-2 0.13 -0.21 0.64 0.0001 
 
 
The maximum crater size metamodel was prepared the same way as the minimum 
crater size model.  For the maximum crater size, the following models were created: 
Response surface model, a response surface model with a stepwise regression that only 
chose certain factors, a response surface equation of the Box-Cox transform, two 
different neural nets of all factors: one with 7 and the other with 10 hidden nodes with a 
hyperbolic tangent activation function, two different neural nets on only the factors 
identified in the stepwise regression: one with 7 hidden nodes and the other with 10 
hidden nodes, and finally, a Gaussian kriging model.   
The results of fitting all these models are shown in Figure 77.  This figure shows 
the actual v. predicted plots for both the training and validation data sets along with each 
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model’s root mean squared error (RMSE) and R2 value.  Just as in the minimum crater 
size section, the training data set models are shown on the left and the validation set data 
models are shown on the right.  The prediction capability of the model is demonstrated by 
the validation set so those results should be weighted more than the training set.  A 
















































Table 21: Error for Each Model of the Maximum Crater Size for CMs Using the Validation Set 
Model RMSE %Error 
RSM 0.37 6.84 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 0.36 6.65 
RSM (Stepwise) 0.37 6.84 
NN (7 Node) 0.12 2.22 
NN (10 Node) 0.13 2.40 
NN (10 Node with Stepwise) 0.09 1.66 
NN (15 Node with Stepwise) 0.10 1.85 
Gaussian Process 0.17 3.14 
 
 
Table 21 shows that the Neural Net models performed the best in terms of 
prediction capability.  Again, the residuals also must be considered in the model 
selection.  A plot of the residuals for each model is shown below in Figure 78 and the 
summary statistics for each model is organized in Table 22.  The table shows the statistics 
for the training set on top (model fit error) and the validation set on the bottom (model 
representation error).  
Overall, each of the neural net models’ residuals looks randomly distributed.  The 
models with the smallest error were the neural net 10 node and neural net 15 node.  The 
residual histogram and normal quantile plot of these two models is shown in Figure 79.  
Both models exhibit a fairly linear plot on the normal quantile plot.  Just as in the 
minimum crater size, generally the neural net with more hidden nodes will be a better 
predictor. So, the neural net with 15 nodes was chosen as the CM maximum crater size 
model.   
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Table 22: Summary Statistics for CM Maximum Crater Size Residuals  
Model 
Residuals 












RSM 3.61E-16 0.169 -0.93 0.46 0.0001 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) 5.76E-4 0.169 -0.91 0.47 0.0001 
RSM (Stepwise) -1.64E-16 0.186 -1.01 0.53 0.0001 
NN (7 Node) -3.98E-3 0.042 -0.18 0.12 0.0001 
NN (10 Node) 3.08E-3 0.048 -0.26 0.26 0.0001 
NN (10 Node with Stepwise) -2.97E-3 0.032 -0.13 0.11 0.0001 
NN (15 Node with Stepwise) -4.84E-5 0.039 -0.24 0.22 0.0001 
















RSM -1.10E-1 0.391 -1.32 0.93 0.0304 
RSM (Box-Cox Xform) -1.08E-1 0.381 -1.26 0.91 0.0531 
RSM (Stepwise) -5.84E-2 0.390 -1.38 0.88 0.0118 
NN (7 Node) -3.31E-2 0.119 -0.46 0.20 0.0001 
NN (10 Node) -2.11E-2 0.130 -0.30 0.20 0.1008 
NN (10 Node with Stepwise) -1.23E-2 0.087 -0.21 0.19 0.5822 
NN (15 Node with Stepwise) -1.53E-2 0.097 -0.31 0.15 0.0520 
Gaussian kriging 1.87E-2 0.170 -0.25 0.84 0.0001 
 
 
6.3.3. Runway Cratering Simulation  
This next section describes how the surrogate models of the last section were used 
to develop an overall runway cratering and MOS availability model and how the number 
of required Monte Carlo simulations was calculated. These surrogate models were needed 
because the 6-DOF model that propagated the submunitions to the ground takes an 
average of 30-45 minutes per munition on a 3.0 GHz computer.  With missiles that have 
30 submunitions per missile and simulation runs with10 missiles inbound, the 
computations would require days for a single run.  This is prohibitive because due to the 
random nature of the impact and crater size, many Monte Carlo runs will be required in 
this next section.  The surrogate models from the last section will help to realize this 
required speed-up in computations. 
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The runway MOS availability model process was described earlier in section 
6.2.5.  That section outlined the process to determine the aim points along the runway for 
the CMs and TBMs, the process to determine the impact location relative to the aim point 
for both guided and unguided weapons, the process to determine the spread of 
submunitions around the mean impact points, and finally, the process to determine the 
number of MOSs available once the crater size for each impact was determined.  
Following the process from section 6.2.5, once the mean impact point was determined for 
submunition carrying missiles, the max spread metamodels shown in sections 6.3.1.1 (for 
TBMs) and 6.3.2.1 (for CMs) were used to determine the maximum possible circular 
radius that a submunition could land from the mean impact point.  Because observations 
show that submunitions typically land in a relatively uniform pattern [63], the impact 
location for each submunition is calculated by uniformly distributing the impact location 
radially around the mean impact point and uniformly between the mean impact point and 
the maximum spread radius.  This process was described in section 6.2.5.5.  For each 
impact the minimum and maximum crater size is then calculated from sections 6.3.1.2 for 
TBMs and 6.3.2.2 for CMs.  The actual crater size is then a uniform random draw 
between these two extremes.  Once each crater size is determined, the number of 
undamaged MOSs can be calculated with the procedure described in section 6.2.5.6. 
A MATLAB code was created to perform the steps listed above and the process 
repeated many times, in a Monte Carlo fashion, for each design point in a DOE.  This 
DOE was created using a Latin hypercube design with the variable values given in Table 
23 below.   
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A Latin Hypercube was used to ensure that the DOE maintained its sampling 
properties even if some of the variables were found to be unimportant for a given output 
and the DOE collapsed into a lower dimensional space.  This design is shown in Figure 
80.  
Table 23: Input DOE Values for Runway Cratering Model 
Input Min Max Units 
TBM 1 – Number 0 10 ea 
TBM 2 – Number 0 10 ea 
TBM 3 – Number 0 10 ea 
CM 1 – Number 0 10 ea 
CM 2 – Number 0 10 ea 
TBM Launch Distance 50 300 Km 
TBM Penetrator Release Altitude 10,000 30,000 ft 
























































Other variable values for elements described in section 6.2 were held constant.  
These are shown in Table 24 with their set values.  The variables in this table are set at 
the time of the airfield construction or missile design and cannot be changed.  These 
values for the airfield pavement were set based off US Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) airfield standards outlined in reference [141].  Values for the missile speed and 
pitch are based off reasonable inputs selected by the author.   
Table 24: Inputs Held Constant in Runway Cratering Model 
Inputs Held Constant Min Units 
Concrete Thickness 30 in 
Concrete Strength 3000 psi 
Percent Rebar 1 % 
Concrete Density 145 lbf/ft3 
Rebar Strength 90 Ksi 
Cruise Missile Speed 245 mps 
Cruise Missile Pitch Angle at Release 45 deg 
Min Operating Strip (MOS) Width 100 ft 
Min Operating Strip (MOS) Length 2000 ft 
Runway Width 200 ft 
Runway Length 10000 ft 
Cruise Missile Speed at Release 245 Mps 
Cruise Missile Pitch Angle at Release - 45 deg 
Number of Aim Points 8 ea 
 
6.3.3.1. Enemy Missile Parameters 
In this simulation, two distinct types of TBMs and two distinct types of CMs were 
used.  TBM1 and TBM2 are variants of each other that have the same flight profile, but 
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TBM1 is a unitary warhead and TBM2 has a submunition warhead.  TBM3 has different 
design and missile parameters.  Likewise, CM1 and CM2 were two different missiles 
with different flight profiles.  Critical design inputs for each of these missiles are listed 
below in Table 25 for the TBMs and Table 26 for the CMs. 
Table 25: TBM Missile Design Parameters 






(m2) Dry Fuel 
TBM 1/2 2600 2447 400 150 150 1.8 
TBM 3 2000 2500 290 150 150 0.7 
 
Table 26: CM Missile Design Parameters 
Missile Max G Load 





(m2) Empty Fuel 
CM 1 10 1200 600 950 20.4 1.1 
CM 2 15 1565 935 1300 16 0.5 
 
These design parameters allowed the missiles to operate over a wide range of 
distances and altitudes.  The critical flight envelope values for these missiles are shown 
below in Table 27 and Table 28. 
Table 27: TBM Critical Flight Profile Values 
Missile Apogee Max Range Range (km) Altitude (km) Range (km) Impact Time (s) 
TBM1/2 246.3 124.2 497.2 376 
TBM3 154.7 91.8 306.3 311 
 
Table 28: CM Critical Flight Profile Values 
Missile Speed (kts) Cruise Min Max Altitude (m) Speed (kts) 
CM 1 115 600 300 500 
CM 2 115 950 300 625 
 
On board each of these missiles are different styles of warheads.  TBM 1 and 2 
are both the same missile body but TBM1 carries a unitary warhead and TBM 2 carries a 
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submunition warhead with runway penetrating munitions.  TBM 3 is a different missile 
body and carries a unitary warhead.  Weapon parameters for the unitary weapons are 
shown in Table 29 and for the submunition weapons in Table 30.  TBM missile explosive 
parameters for unitary warheads were based on values found in the following references 
[23, 142].   
Table 29: Unitary Warhead Parameters 
Missile Explosive Weight (lbs) 




TBM 1 365 5 1 
TBM 3 100 5 1 
CM 2 60 5 1 
 
Table 30: Runway Penetrating Submunitions Parameters 
Missile 
Submunitions 
Number Explosive Weight (lbs) 






TBM 2 70 3 5 24-28 10,000-30,000 
CM 1 40 1.5 5 18-22 50-500 
 
 The guidance system on the missile body helps to guide the warhead to the correct 
target.  There are two types of guidance systems, precision and non-precision.  The 
differences between these guidance systems as well as the methodology used to calculate 
the probability of hit and hit location relative to the aim point were explained in sections 
6.2.5.3 and 6.2.5.4.  For this work, the guidance system parameters were developed by 
the author to approximate reasonable values.  These are listed below in Table 31.  TBM1 
and TBM2 represent legacy inaccurate, but large warhead weapons.  TBM3 represents an 
upgraded precision guided missile that is small to minimize its radar cross section.  
Likewise, CM1 is an advanced fast, small, and accurate CM while CM2 is a slower, 
legacy model.  In Table 31, each missile guidance type and CEP is explained.  The 
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probability of direct hit is the chance that the missile impacts its intended aim point with 
no error.  The probability of failure is the chance that there is a catastrophic fault in the 
guidance system and the missile misses by more than four standard deviations (as 
explained in section 6.2.5.4).  The remaining probability after the probabilities of direct 
hit and failure are accounted for is the probability of a near miss.  The method for 
calculating the impact point of a near miss is outlined in section 6.2.5.4.   
Table 31: Missile Guidance Parameters 





TBM1 / 2 Nonprecision 200 NA NA 
TBM 3 Nonprecision 50 NA NA 
CM 1 Precision 20 50% 5% 
CM 2 Precision 20 70% 3% 
 
6.3.3.2. Number Monte Carlo Iterations  
The complete code for the runway cratering simulation and MOS availability was 
written in MATLAB using the methodology and weapon parameters described in section 
6.3.3.  In this simulation, there are many parameters that are based on random draws 
including the impact location of each weapon and submunition and the size of the crater.  
This meant that every time the simulation was run, different results were obtained 
depending on the random numbers that were drawn.  If these results are placed in bins of 
increasing number of MOSs available, as in the case of Figure 82, then a distribution of 
outputs can be estimated.  This begs the question of how many simulations are necessary 
in order to be satisfied with the resulting distribution.  During the first couple of 
iterations, the resulting distribution not only grows and takes shape, but it also shifts 
along the x-axis (number line) as the average of the results changes.  It is possible to 
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calculate the number of iterations required such that the observed average value of the 
number of MOSs available is within 10% of the true mean with a 95% confidence [143, 
144]. The procedure for calculating this is iterative.  First, make a certain number of 
iterations to develop an initial mean and confidence interval half-length given by: 




where n is the number of iterations, t is the student-t statistic for the given 
confidence level, α.  This is then used in the following equations. The first is to calculate 
the relative error, i.e. a percent error of the true and estimated value, and the second is the 
absolute error, i.e. the difference between the true and estimated value.  Typically, 
relative error is used for mean values greater than 1 and absolute error for mean values 
between 0 and 1.   
δ(n,α) / X(n) ≤ γ ' = γ / (1+γ )   For relative error 
δ(n,α) ≤ γ ' = γ / (1+γ )    For absolute error 
If the above statement is true, then the appropriate number of iterations have been 
completed.  If not, the user should complete another Monte Carlo iteration and check 
again.  This process continues until the statement is true or a specified maximum number 
of iterations are completed.  
Initially, it is important to determine the correct initial number of iterations to 
complete.  For many simulations, the mean and standard deviations used in the above 
equations will vary dramatically over the first few iterations.  In order to investigate this, 
the author ran 1,000 iterations for three test cases and observed the fluctuation of the 
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calculation for the minimum number of iterations to ensure that true mean was within 
10% of the actual mean with a 95% confidence.  These test cases were: 
1) Small Attack: 2x TBM2 and 2x CM2 
2) Medium Attack: 6x TBM1, 6x TBM2, 3x TBM3, 6x CM1, 6x CM2 
3) Large Attack: 12x TBM1, 12x TBM2, 12x TBM3, 28x CM1, 28x CM2 
For all cases, the number of iterations required stabilized around 300 iterations, 
but was the largest for case 3, the large attack.  The results from case 3 are shown below 
in Figure 81. This means that during each iteration of the DOE described in section 
6.3.3.1, the simulation will be run for 300 iterations before the number of actual iterations 
required to be within 10% of the true mean with a 95% confidence level is calculated.   
 
Figure 81: Case 3 - Number of Iterations Required for Large Attack, So that the Average Number of 
MOSs is Within 10% of the True Mean With 95% Confidence 
 
 For the above case, the number of MOSs available from each iteration are shown 
in a histogram below in Figure 82.  These results make intuitive sense for a large attack 
where most cases result in zero MOSs available because most of the runway is damaged 
from the large number of missiles, but in rare cases there are a few MOSs available due 
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to bad targeting and guidance in the missiles.  This figure also demonstrates how a 
distribution can be created for a given number of Monte Carlo runs around a single 
design point.   This will be elaborated on further in the next section. 
 
Figure 82: Case 3 - Number of Minimum Operating Stripe (MOS) Available from Large Attack 
After 1,000 Iterations. 
 
6.3.3.3. Output Distribution Selection 
Figure 82 demonstrates how for a fixed set of input values, a simulation that 
depends on random number draws will result in different values.  In this simulation, each 
Monte Carlo run resulted in a different number of whole number MOSs available.  
Because there was only whole number of possible results, a discrete distribution is 
needed to describe the resulting output.  The most common discrete distributions are the 
binomial, geometric, and the Poisson distribution.  These are explained below and tested 
for the sample population.   
 169 
Two other common discrete distributions, the hypergeometric and negative 
binomial distribution were not considered due to their nature.  The hypergeometric 
distribution describes the probability of selecting a given number of successes from a set 
population of n where the total number of successes is known [202, 203].  In this case, 
the total number of successes (MOSs being available) is not known for every case.  The 
negative binomial distribution describes the number of trials necessary in a Bernoulli trial 
such that a certain number of successes are observed.  This is the opposite of the binomial 
distribution where the number of trials is set and the distribution describes the number of 
successes.  In this model, the number of possible MOSs is set by the runway area and 
MOS area, so the negative binomial distribution is not appropriate.   
6.3.3.4. Binomial Distribution 
The binomial distribution describes the number of successes in a given number of 
independent Bernoulli (success – fail) trials where each has a probability success of p.  A 
process can be described by a binomial distribution if the following four criteria are met 
[145, 146]:  
1: The number of observations n is fixed. 
2: Each observation is independent. 
3: Each observation represents one of two outcomes ("success" or "failure"). 
4: The probability of "success" p is the same for each outcome. 
In the case of the Runway Availability program, there is a fixed set of MOSs that 
can exist based on the size of the runway and the MOS (each MOS has the same size).  
Each MOS on the runway will be either available or not available after the attack 
depending if it contains cratering within its bounds.  The trials are independent because 
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the existence of craters in one MOS does not mean that another MOS will also have 
craters.   
The binomial distribution has a probability mass function described by the 




!(1− 𝑝)!!!!   𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ (0,1,2… ,𝑛𝑛)
0                                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
This probability mass function is shown below in Figure 83 for different values of p 
(probability of success) and nn (number of observations). 
 
Figure 83: Effects of Different Parameters on the Binomial PMF 
 
6.3.3.5. Geometric Distribution 
The geometric distribution describes the number of trials until the first observed 
success for a given number of independent Bernoulli (success – fail) trials where each has 
a probability success of p [145, 146].  The distribution has one parameter, p, which 
describes the probability of success in the Bernoulli trials.  The PMF is given as: 
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𝑝 𝑥 = 𝑝(1− 𝑝)
!   𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ (0,1,2… ,𝑛𝑛)
0                                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
6.3.3.6. Poisson Distribution 
The Poisson distribution describes the number of occurrences of an event within a 
particular interval of time, or the number of items within a batch of random size.  In this 
case, it describes the number of available MOSs from a set of all available MOSs.  The 
PMF is given as: 
𝑝 𝑥 =
𝑒!!𝜆!
𝑥!    𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ (0,1,2… ,𝑛𝑛)
0                                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
6.3.3.7. Sensitivity of the Binomial Distribution to Parameters 
During the fitting process, the value of nn is set by the number of possible 
successes.  For the runway cratering case, nn is the number of possible MOSs that can fit 
onto the undamaged runway. For an aircraft destruction case, it is the number of aircraft 
present at the time of the attack.  Thus, nn is set by the scenario and the fitting process is 
primarily concerned with the value of p, the probability of success.  This then begs the 
question of how sensitive is p to a starting value of nn.  A test case for this is shown 
below in Figure 84.  Here, a small change (5%) in the value of p is plotted for two 
different levels of nn for both a case of a low p value (.05) and a case of a higher p value 
(0.7).  As can be seen in the figure, when nn is small (nn=5), the distributions for both the 
high and low value of p changes slightly but does not shift position.  The location of the 
maximum value of the PMF does not change when p is increased by 5%.  This is not the 
case for the bottom two graphs in the figure when nn is 30.  Here, the same 5% increase 
in p causes a greater change in shape (especially in the low number of trials in the left 
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graph) and it also causes the entire PMF to shift right.  In the bottom left graphs, a p 
value of 0.05 has a maximum PMF at a value of 1, while a value of p of 0.1 has its 
maximum PMF at 4. This same shift is seen in the lower right hand graph where the case 
of p=0.7 has a maximum PMF at 21 and the case of p=0.75 has a maximum PMF at 24. 
 
 
Figure 84: Parameter Sensitivity of Binomial Distribution 
 
6.3.3.8. Maximum Likelihood Estimate 
The first step in fitting all the design points for the DOE with one of the discrete 
distributions (binomial, geometric, or Poisson) was to determine which distribution was 
appropriate for each response.  The appropriate distribution would be the one that fit the 
“best” for the most number of test cases.  The best fit is the one that results in the lowest 
residual sum squared error (RSS).  This is expressed as: 





The first term in the above equation is the observed output and the second is the 
estimated output from the distribution.  Thus, the shape parameters of the distribution 
must first be established. This was accomplished with method of maximum likelihood 
estimate (MLE).  This method finds the unknown parameter of the distribution, θ, in 
order to maximize the likelihood function, L(θ).  The likelihood function is given by: 
𝐿 𝜃 = 𝑓 𝑥!,𝜃 𝑓 𝑥!,𝜃 … 𝑓(𝑥!,𝜃) 
where f(xn,θ) is the output of the distribution at xn given the shape parameter is θ.  The 
method of MLE finds the value of θ to maximize the likelihood function.  This 
effectively means that it finds an estimate of the unknown shape parameter such that it 
maximizes the likelihood of observing the given values.   
6.3.3.9. Distribution Selection for the Runway Availability Model  
The shape parameters for each of the discrete distribution, binomial, geometric, 
and Poisson, were estimated using the MLE for the observed 200 DOE cases.  The RSS 
was then calculated for each case against the 200 DOE trials.  The results of this analysis 
are summarized below in Table 32.  This table shows the number and percent of the 200 
DOE cases where the RSS was lowest for the given distribution.  This table shows that 
the binomial distribution resulted in the lowest RSS for all 200 DOE cases.   
Table 32: Maximum Likelihood Results for Runway Availability Models 
Distribution Number of Cases with Lowest RSS Percent of Cases with Lowest RSS 
Binomial 200 100% 
Geometric 0 0 





6.3.3.10. Testing the Goodness of Fit: The P-P and Q-Q Plot 
In statistics, how well a specified distribution fits the observed data can be 
visualized with the quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot and the probability-probability (P-P) 
plots.  These plots are useful to compare how closely a specified cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) fits the CDF of the observed values [143].  Because most distributions 
have an S-shaped pattern, it can be difficult to assess how close the two CDFs match each 
other.  The P-P and Q-Q plot differences between the two CDFs on a straight line in a 
way that is much easier to inspect. 
The Q-Q plot is a graph of a given quantile of the empirical CDF plotted against 
the same quantile of the theoretical CDF.  If the two CDFs are from the same theoretical 
distribution, then the plotted line should have an intercept of 0 and a slope of 1.  If there 
are differences in the quantiles, then the plots will deviate from this straight line.  
Similarly, a P-P plot is a plot of a given probability of one CDF versus the same 
probability of the second distribution.  Again, if the two distributions are approximately 
the same, the graph of the points will fall along a line of y=x.  The definition of the P-P 
and Q-Q plot is illustrated in Figure 85. 
 
Figure 85: P-P and Q-Q Plot Description  
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6.3.3.11. Testing the Goodness of Fit: Chi-Square Test 
For discrete data such as is used in this study, the methods to statistically test the 
goodness of fit are limited.  The Kolomogrov-Smirnov Test is probably the most widely 
used test, but this can only be used or continuous distributions.  Another common test, the 
Anderson-Darling Test is only good for a subset of continuous distributions [143].  The 
best test for discrete distributions is the oldest hypothesis test, the Chi-Square test.   This 
test is a formal comparison of the theoretical and observed histogram [143].  First, the 
range of data is divided into k adjacent intervals: [a0,a1), [a1,a2), … ,[ak-1,ak). Then the 
number of observations that fall into each of these bins is summed.  Next, the expected 
proportion of the Xj that are expected to fall into each bin is calculated.  For discrete 
distributions, this is found as follows [143, 146]: 
 𝑛𝑝! = 𝑝(𝑥!)!!!!!!!!!!  
where p-hat is the probability mass function of the fitted distribution.  This is then used to 
calculate the test statistic: 








The p-value is then found by comparing this test statistic to chi-squared tables or 
curves.  In this test the null hypothesis is that the tests come from the same distribution 
and the alternative hypothesis is that they are not from the same distribution.  The value 
of χ2 is compared to the test statistic χα,k-1 where α is the significance and k is the number 
of observations.   It is also important to note that to use the chi-squared test, the 
observations should be independent from the distribution shape parameters.  This means 
that it is only valid to compare the validation points to the expected distribution defined 
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by the model created with the test points.  This is because the validation points were kept 
completely separate from any model fitting process. 
6.3.3.12. Binomial Fitting Program 
The purpose of this work is to produce predictive models for the shape parameters 
of distributions given only an input vector.  In order to ensure a good fit of the predicted 
data, the prediction models need to be trained with existing data.  To ensure a high 
quality prediction, the training data should be as accurate as possible.  That means for any 
given input vector, the fitted values of the beta distribution should be adjusted until the 
fitted distribution matches as close as possible to the actual distribution.  This is 
especially true given the large number of observations that this work is making for each 
input vector (see section 6.3.3.2).   
To facilitate this high accuracy matching, a MATLAB program was created to 
adjust the shape parameter of the beta distribution (p-value) using a combination of the 
Augmented LaGrange Method and Sequential Unconstrained Minimization (SUMT) 
[147].  This program minimized the differences between the actual and observed CDFs 
similar to the work by AbouRizk [148].  In essence, the program tried to reduce the 
deviations from the line y=x in both the Q-Q and P-P plots.  Formally, the objective 
function that was minimized was: 
 
Subject to:  0<p<1 
where F-hat is the CDF created from a bin(p,nn) distribution, nn is the total possible 
successes, n is the number of observations, Fq is the actual and estimated quantitles, and 
















Fp is the actual and estimated probabilities (see section 0).  The structure of the program 
followed the flow charts given in Vanderplaats book [147].   
1. Calculate nn from the equation: floor (Area Runway/Area of one MOS) 
2. Estimate p with most likely estimators (MLE) as a start point. 
3. Use Augmented Lagrange Multiple Method (ALM) to minimize constrained 
problem and form a series of Sequential Unconstrained Minimizations. 
-- For each unconstrained minimization, use Broyden-Fleetcher-
Goldfarb-Shanno (BFSG) method. 
-- For each one-dimensional search within BFSG: 
1. Find bounds on minimum 
2. Refine bounds with golden section method 
3. Use polynomial approximation to find 1-D minimum. 
  -- Repeat BFSG until converged: 
- Small absolute change in pseudo-objective function. 
- Small relative change in pseudo-objective function. 
- Kuhn-Tucker (KT) Conditions met. 
4.   Repeat ALM method until the convergence criteria outlined above are met. 
This program is fast running.  On a 3.0 GHz computer it takes about 2 minutes per 
design point.  This program was used to fit all binomial distributions in the following 
sections. 
To test the program and ensure that it was fitting the binomial distribution 
correctly, a series of tests were conducted using distributions generated with known 
parameters and with a known working program (MATLABs binornd program).  A total 
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of nine tests were conducted using a low, medium and high setting for each the 
probability of success (p) and the number of trails (nn).   
Each trial was tested both visually and with a chi-squared test.  The visual tests 
included plotting both the PMF and CMF from the distribution generated with set 
parameters and a distribution generated with the parameters fitted with the binomial 
fitting program.  Using the CMF, a P-P and Q-Q plot was also generated.  To pass these 
visual tests, the estimated parameters (p and nn) should be about the same, the PMFs and 
CDFs should overlap to a high degree and the P-P and Q-Q plots should lie on a 45-
degree line.  The Chi-squared test was conducted with a 99% confidence level using 
1,000 randomly generated points.  To pass this test, the test had to fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the distributions were from the same overall distribution.  The results of 
these nine tests are shown below in Figure 86 for a p value of 0.2, Figure 87 for a p-value 
of 0.5 and Figure 88 for a p value of 0.9. 
 








Figure 88: Binomial Fitting Program Test for P=0.9 
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6.3.3.13. Runway Cratering Metamodel Fit 
The goal of this section is to create a metamodel able to predict the shape 
parameters of the output distributions from the Runway Cratering Program described in 
the previous sections.  As explained in section 6.3.3.4, the binomial distribution is a good 
discrete distribution to describe the MOS available program. Each MOS that exists on the 
runway is either available or not available at the end of the attack and each MOS is 
independent of the other.   
The shape parameter, p-value, for each distribution was calculated using the 
program described in section 6.3.3.12 for the number of Monte Carlo runs prescribed by 
the process in section 6.3.3.2.  In the binomial distribution fitting process, the number of 
possible successes, nn, was based on the runway and MOS parameters.  The total number 
of possible MOSs that could exist on the runway is given by:  
 nn = Number of MOSs that could exist = floor (Runway Area / MOS area) 
With the runway and MOS parameters given in Table 24, the total number of 
possible MOSs is 10.  Using this number of possible MOSs, the fitting program adjusted 
the p-value of the binomial distribution until the divergences in the P-P and Q-Q plot 
were minimized.  These p-values are summarized in Figure 89.  This figure shows that 
the p-value parameter does not have any strong trends in any set of the variables or any 
controlling variables.   
A neural net model, described in appendix C, was used to predict the probability 
of success (P-value) of any MOS becoming non-available.  Determining the optimal 
number of hidden nodes in a neural net is an area of active research and is typically 
chosen from a rule-of-thumb [149, 150].  In this work, the number of nodes in the hidden 
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layer was determined by gradually adding nodes until a divergence between the test and 
verification set’s R2 values was observed.  Additionally, because the data being estimated 
was noisy since it was produced for a set of observations of a random process, multiple 
networks were built and the results averaged together.   
During this process, each time a net is built, the points are randomly cast into a 
training and validation set.  In order to ensure that a group of points remained completely 
independent, initially 20% of the points were randomly chosen and cast into an Overall 
Validation set.  This set was withheld from all the training.  The remaining 80% of the 
points were then used in the fitting process.  The 20% of initial validation points were 
then used to test the generalized prediction capability of the neural net. This process was 






























Using the process described above of adding hidden nodes until a divergence is 
observed between the training and validation sets, a hidden layer size of 10 nodes was 
chosen for the p-value prediction NN model.  Additionally, a square-root transformation 
was used to stabilize the variance [151].  Due to the large amount of noise, 5 nets were 
developed and the average number of predicted MOSs was carried forward.  The results 
are shown below in Figure 90 and the residual distributions are shown in Figure 91.  Note 
that the Validation set shown in the table on the bottom right represents the original 20% 
of the Overall Validation points that were reserved from the fitting process.  This is 
different than the validation set shown in the graph in the upper right, which was the 
validation set from the 80% of the points used in fitting. 
 




Figure 91: Residual Distribution from Probability of MOS not Being Available (P-value) 
   
In general, the NN produced a good prediction of the binomial p-value.  For the 
Overall Validation points, the model has a general root mean squared error (RMSE) of 
0.0078.  This means that the average error in the p-value, the percent chance that any one 
MOS is available has a prediction error of 1%.  The maximum observed prediction error 
was 5.7%, but as seen in Figure 91, this rarely occurred and 95% of the DOE points had 
an error less than 2.5% for the binomial p-value.   
The predicted p-value was then used to generate random points from the associate 
binomial distribution.  This distribution was compared to the observed distribution using 
the chi-squared test.  The number of points in the random distribution was the same as the 
number of points in the observed distribution.  When all the distributions are compared, 
100% of the validation distributions pass the test with a confidence level of 99%.  This 
means that the chi-squared test fails to reject the null hypothesis, that the two 



































































































This helps to answer research question number 3.  This question asked if the 
metamodels would be as accurate as the true models.  The hypothesis was that the 
metamodels would maintain enough accuracy such that over 95% of the validation points 
would pass the chi-squared test with a 99% confidence level.  This was shown to be true 
for the MOS model. 
As an additional check, the author produced plots of the actual v. predicted PMFs, 
CMFs, Q-Q and P-P plots for both the training and Overall Validation sets.  These points 
were chosen at random from within each set.  While not an exhaustive test of the 
prediction capability, they do offer an additional sanity check of the results.  These results 
are seen below in Figure 92 and Figure 93 for the test cases, and Figure 94 and Figure 95 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6.4. Airfield Damage Simulation 
The previous several sections outlined the process to predict the damage done to a 
runway and the number of undamaged MOSs that would remain after an enemy missile 
attack.  This section will examine the damage done to the rest of the airfield to include 
the aircraft parked on ramps, hangar and repair infrastructure, and refuel points 
commonly called Petroleum, Oil, and Lubrication (POL) points.  These are shown as the 
highlighted areas in Figure 96. 
 
Figure 96: Enemy Goals for Attack on Airfield Portions Off Runway 
 
An attack on the runway has the goal of damaging it to an extent that takeoffs and 
landings are prevented until the runway is repaired.   This temporarily shuts down 
operations on the airfield.  The goal of an attack on the infrastructure to include the repair 
hangars or POL points is also to damage critical portions to temporarily shut down 
operations.  Destruction of POL points will shut down operations due to a lack of fuel or 
cause a bottleneck for aircraft trying to use the remaining undamaged POL points.  
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Likewise, destruction of critical repair assets slows or halts the repair and inspection of 
aircraft between missions.   
An attack on the aircraft parked on the ramp is different in that it will permanently 
remove those aircraft from the campaign.  While this is more advantageous than 
temporarily slowing or halting operations, it is more difficult to do because the aircraft 
are always operating and repositioning on the airfield.  The runway, POL points, and 
hangars are fixed locations that are easier to target. Additionally, the previous section 
showed the advantage of using runway-penetrating munitions to damage and crater the 
runway.  These munitions delay their explosion until they burrow into the concrete to a 
certain depth.  This limits the damage they cause on the surface from blast and 
fragmentation.  Thus, attacks on the airfield hangars, POL points, and aircraft should be 
done with unitary warheads with surface or proximity fuses.  Thus, in this study, damage 
caused from TBM2 or CM1, each carrying runway-penetrating submunitions will be 
neglected for surface targets.   
The methodology for the airfield attack simulation is very similar to the runway 
cratering simulation presented in section 6.2, especially in terms of determining where 
missiles impact relative to their aim points.  For any given airfield, the location of 
hangars and POL points remains relatively fixed.  These locations are recorded for use 
later.  The aircraft on the airfield, however, are mobile.  A smart airfield commander will 
maximize the distance between these aircraft so that a single missile has a reduced chance 
of damaging multiple aircraft.  This means that the first step in the simulation is to 
determine the location of the aircraft parked on the ramp.   Then determine the aim points 
relative to the targets on the airfield.  The enemy force will then apportion the attack to 
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each target set (hangars, POL, and aircraft).  During the attack, the impact location for 
each missile relative to the aim point is found in a similar manner to that explained in 
sections 6.2.5.3 and 6.2.5.4.  Finally, the damage that results from the blast and 
fragmentation of the missiles is calculated for nearby targets.  This process is summarized 
in Figure 97 below and explained in detail in the following sections.   
 
Figure 97: Airfield Damage Model Process 
 
6.4.1. Airfield Attack Simulation: Step 1 – Location of Assets 
As mentioned above, typically hangars and POL points are fixed locations.  The 
location (latitude and longitude) for these can be obtained from mapping software.  In 
addition, while the aircraft can be moved, the parking locations can be assumed to remain 
fixed.  These locations can be obtained from mapping software as well.  In this 
simulation, for a test case, a hypothetical airfield was created using latitude and longitude 
points in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.  This hypothetical airfield has eight POL 
points spaced 50 meters apart in two east-west rows of four.  It also has ten hangars each 
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spaced 100 meters between buildings arranged in two north-south rows.  For the aircraft 
parking, it was assumed the airfield supported three different types of aircraft, AC1, AC2, 
and AC3.  The parking for each aircraft type was arranged together and was 50 meters 
apart.  Aircraft type 1 was arranged in two rows of 15 parking spots angled parallel to the 
runway.  Aircraft type two was set further south of the parking for aircraft type 1 in a 
single row of 15 spots.  The parking for aircraft type 3 was set just north of the hangars in 
two east-west rows of six parking spots each.  This notional airfield is shown in Figure 
98. 
 
Figure 98: Notional Airfield with Asset Locations Marked 
 
 When selecting the location for aircraft to park in these parking locations, most 
airfield commanders will want to spread the aircraft as far apart as possible in order to 
minimize the damage to the aircraft.  Generally, however, aircraft of the same type are 
kept in their assigned parking locations in order to facilitate maintenance and inspections.  
Thus, when placing a given number of aircraft of each type on the airfield, the simulation 

























would randomly place the first aircraft into a parking location for its assigned type.  
Subsequent aircraft were then placed in parking locations for their type such that the 
minimum distance between all aircraft was maximized.  If an aircraft type had more 
aircraft present than assigned parking locations, it was assigned a parking spot of any 
type such that the minimum distance between all aircraft was maximized.   This is 
demonstrated in Figure 99 for six aircraft of type AC1, three aircraft of type AC2, and 
two aircraft of type AC3. 
 
Figure 99: Aircraft Distributed into Parking to Maximize the Minimum Distance Between Aircraft 
 
6.4.2. Airfield Attack Simulation: Step 2 – Location of Aim Points 
The second step in the process is to plot the aim points.  It can be assumed that the 
enemy force will have relatively good intelligence and will know the locations of 
hangars, POL points and all aircraft parking spots.  What they will not know is which 
parking spots are being used at the time of the attack.  This is mainly due to the delay in 
what is called the “kill chain.”  This is the total set of processes from the gathering of 
























intelligence to the release of the missile.  For even modern militaries with advanced 
communications and intelligence gathering equipment this can be several hours long.  
During this delay the aircraft can be moved and repositioned due to normal operations or 
due to deliberate attempts to confuse enemy targeting.   
Aim points are chosen to cover the POL points, hangars, and general parking 
locations, without consideration of aircraft locations.  In this work, aim points were 
generally distributed with 150 meters between aim points for aircraft parking locations, 
100 meters between aim points for POL targets, and for hangars there was one aim point 
per hangar.  This distribution was a compromise between number of target and the 
damage radius for each missile.  The damage radius will be explained further in the next 
section.  A plot of the aim points relative to the infrastructure and parking locations is 
shown below in Figure 100. 
 
Figure 100: Aim Points Plotted Relative to Targets on Airfield 

























6.4.3. Airfield Attack Simulation: Step 3 – Impact Locations 
The third step is to determine the impact location for each missile.  The attack is 
setup to shoot a proportion of the total number of each missile type at a given target set: 
aircraft, hangars, POL, or runway.  It was assumed that the missiles that leak through the 
defenses and impact the airfield maintain the same distribution.  This means that the 
missiles that are shot down are randomly distributed in the same proportion as what was 
originally shot.  Thus, for each leaker, a random draw was conducted against the initial 
target distribution to determine its aim point set: aircraft, hangars, POL, or runway.  Then 
a uniform random draw was conducted, without replacement, to determine the individual 
aim point for that missile within the aim point set. 
Once the individual aim point is chosen, it is possible to calculate the impact 
location relative to that aim point using the methods described in section 6.2.5.3 for 
unguided missiles or section 6.2.5.4 for guided missiles in reference [62] which 
summarizes the entire weaponeering process.  For unguided missiles the impact location 
is Rayleigh distributed according to the missile’s CEP [62].  This is described below in 
Figure 101.  This picture shows how the range and deflection error relative to the missiles 
flight path are both normally distributed with a mean of zero and equal standard 
deviations derived from the missile’s CEP. 
 
Figure 101: Impact Location Calculations Relative to Aim Point for Unguided Weapons 
 
For guided missiles, the impact point is located by first determining the accuracy 
of the guidance system.  A guided missiles can either directly impact the target, have 
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small errors that accumulate in the guidance logic that cause it to have a near miss, or the 
guidance system can experience a catastrophic error [62].  These probabilities for the 
missiles used in this study are summarized in Table 31 in section 6.2.5.4.  To determine 
the type of impact, a uniform random draw is conducted between 0 and 1.  This number 
is then compared to the probabilities found in Figure 102 below. 
 
Figure 102: Guided Missiles Type of Miss 
 
If the uniform draw falls into the probability of a direct hit region (Phit), then the 
impact location is the same as that of the aim point.  If the uniform draw falls into the 
probability of a near miss region (Pmiss), then the impact location relative to the aim point 
is calculated the same as in Figure 101 except that the range and deflection errors are 
each given by (error distance)=t*σ where t=N(0,1) and σ is the same as expressed in 
Figure 101.  If the uniform draw falls into the probability of a catastrophic error region 
(Perror) then the range and deflection errors are each given by (error distance)=4*σ.   
 The above process for both guided and unguided missiles is repeated for each 
individual leaker to determine its impact latitude and longitude.  These are then plotted 
with all existing targets on the airfield so that the damage can be calculated according to 
the process in the following section.  An example of this for an attack made up of four 
TBM1 missiles, two TBM3 missiles, and three CM2 missiles against the sample airfield 
with a missiles distribution of 60% aircraft, 20% POL, and 20% hangars is shown below 
in Figure 103. 
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Figure 103: Sample Results Showing Impact Locations Relative to Targets on an Airfield 
 
6.4.4. Airfield Attack Simulation: Step 4 – Damage from Impacts 
Determining the lethal area of a weapon is an area within weaponeering that has 
received much study and is well documented [58, 152-155].  Reference [62] is one of the 
definitive resources on the topic and devotes several chapters to the subject of weapon 
effectiveness.  Within the Department of Defense (DoD), the Army Material Research 
and Analysis Activity (AMSAA) is the proponent for weapons effectiveness.  They 
maintain a large database of weapon-target pairings that give the lethal area based on 
numerous parameters such as angle of fall and target orientation.  AMSAA also regularly 
updates the database with the Joint Weaponeering System (JWS), a computer system 
used to determine the probability of kill for different weapon attack patterns and munition 
types against arrays of targets.   













































POL RUPTURE = 2
POL DRAIN = 0
AC1 COG = 2
AC1 PTO-4 = 0
AC2 COG = 1
AC2 PTO-4 = 0
AC3 COG = 0
AC3 PTO-4 = 1
Hangar Destroy = 0
Hangar Damage = 1
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Because this area is so well researched, this work will make use of notional, and 
thus unclassified, lethal areas for all weapon-target pairs.  The notional lethal areas used 
in this work are summarized in Table 33.  Note that these are the catastrophic-kill-on 
ground (COG) radiuses.  The author only tracked these kills and not repairable damage 
that is sometimes tracked in other studies, i.e. prevent takeoff for four hours (PTO4).   
Table 33: Lethal Radius for Missile-Target Pairs 
Missile Lethal Radius (m) AC 1 AC 2 AC 3 POL Hangar 
TBM 1 80 100 30 30 15 
TBM 3 60 80 20 20 10 
CM 2 40 50 20 15 5 
 
 Given the impact location latitude and longitude found in the previous section, all 
nearby targets of a given category are checked against the lethal radiuses in the above 
table using the distance equations found in section 6.2.1.   Any target that falls within this 
lethal radius is considered destroyed.  This is shown in Figure 104 below.  The picture on 
the left shows the general locations of aircraft parking, infrastructure locations, and aim 
points. The picture on the right shows the impact location relative to the targets present at 
the time of the attack.  Finally, the summary below both pictures shows the number of 






Figure 104: Sample Results for Damage to Aircraft and Infrastructure for an Attack on an Airfield 
 
6.5. Airfield Damage Surrogate Model 
The airfield damage model described in the last section is stochastic.  Each run of the 
model will produce different numbers of aircraft and infrastructure destroyed even with 
the same inputs due to the large number of random draws involved in the model.  This 
means that if the model is run a large number of times using the same inputs (Monte 
Carlo simulation), a distribution of possible outputs can be created.  Just as in the runway 
cratering models described in section 6.3.3, the author wanted to create a predictive 
model that would accurately forecast the shape parameters for that resulting distribution 
given the vector of input parameters.   
6.5.1. Number of Iterations Required 
 The first step in this process is to determine the number of iterations for each 
Monte Carlo series given the inputs.  This was done similar to the method outlined in 













































POL RUPTURE = 0
POL DRAIN = 0
AC1 COG = 0
AC1 PTO-4 = 1
AC2 COG = 2
AC2 PTO-4 = 0
AC3 COG = 0
AC3 PTO-4 = 1
Hangar Destroy = 0
Hangar Damage = 0
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section 6.3.3.2.  The test cases used for the minimum number of Monte Carlo simulations 
in order to calculate the number of iterations required such that the estimated average is 
within 10% of the true average with a 95% confidence is summarized below.  These test 
cases all included the same number of fixed assets: ten POL points and eight hangar 
buildings and each case was run for 1,000 iterations. 








AC1 AC2 AC3 TBM1 TBM2 CM2 
1 Medium Medium 6 6 5 5 5 5 
2 Large Small 12 12 10 1 1 1 
3 Small Large 1 1 1 10 10 10 
 
  The largest number of iterations was required by case 2: Large number of aircraft 
and small attack size for the prediction of the number of aircraft destroyed.  These results 
are shown below in Figure 105.  In this figure, the graphs on the left show the 
calculations for the number of iterations required until the estimate of the average number 
of items destroyed is within 10% of the true mean with 95% confidence.  The graphs on 
the right show the difference between that estimate and the current number iterations.  
The graphs from top to bottom show the calculations for the number of aircraft destroyed, 
POL points destroyed, and hangars destroyed.   
Note that initially the number iterations required fluctuated rapidly, but in all 
cases, it stabilized after about 300 iterations.  Therefore, in the analysis in the next 
section, all Monte Carlo trials were run for at least 300 iterations before the number of 
iterations required was calculated.  This calculation was then made on subsequent 
iterations until the current number of iterations was greater than this calculated number.  
The histogram of results from the 1,000 Monte Carlo iterations is shown in Figure 106.  
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These results show how the binomial distribution will most likely be a good distribution 
to model the results of the simulation.   
 
Figure 105: Number of Iterations Required for the Mean to be Within 10% of the True Mean With 
95% Confidence for the Airfield Damage Simulation: Case 2 
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Case 1: Medium attack and a Medium Number of Aircraft and Case 3: Large 
attack and small number of aircraft showed a similar number of iterations required to 
ensure that the calculated mean was within 10% of the true mean with 95% confidence.  
These results are shown below in Figure 107 for case 3 and Figure 109 for case 1.  Here it 
is observed that the number of iterations required stabilized after about 175-200 
iterations.  The histograms of results are also shown in Figure 108 for case 3 and Figure 
110 for case 1.  These results show that the binomial distribution will be a good 
approximation of the results.   
 
Figure 107: Number of Iterations Required for the Mean to be Within 10% of the True Mean With 
95% Confidence for the Airfield Damage Simulation: Case 3 
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Figure 109: Number of Iterations Required for the Mean to be Within 10% of the True Mean With 
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Figure 110: Histograms of Results for Case 1 of Number of Iterations Required for Airfield Attack 
Simulation 
 
6.5.2. Airfield Damage Surrogate Model DOE 
The goal of the next several sections was to develop a predictive model for the 
shape parameters of the binomial distribution of the number of assets damaged in an 
attack of the hypothetical airfield described previously.  This simulation used the missiles 
previously described in 6.3.  These weapons are summarized below in Table 35.  Note 
that TBM2 and CM1 were only used in the runway cratering simulation and not this 
airfield damage simulation because they contained penetrating submunitions.   
















TBM	1 80 100 50 30 20 200 N NA NA 
TBM	3 60 80 35 20 10 50 N NA NA 
CM	2 40 50 25 15 8 20 Y 70 3 
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The DOE used to in this model was a Latin hypercube design that included 
constraints on some of the variables.  The Latin hypercube was used because of the 
multiple outputs being assessed from the single DOE runs.  The Latin hypercube 
maintains its spacing of points even when certain factors are excluded and the design 
collapses to a lower dimensional space.  There were eight variables used in the DOE and 
their ranges are summarized in Table 36 below.   
Table 36: Airfield Attack Simulation DOE Input Ranges 
Input Min Max Units 
TBM	1	–	Number 0 10 ea 
TBM	3	–	Number 0 10 ea 
CM	2	–	Number 0 10 ea 
Percent	-	Aircraft 0 100 % 
Percent	-	POL 0 100 % 
Number	of	AC1	Present 0 24 ea 
Number	of	AC2	Present 0 24 ea 
Number	of	AC3	Present 0 24 ea 
 
 In addition to the input variables shown in Table 36, an additional factor, the 
percentage of missile attacking the infrastructure, was calculated from these inputs and 
appended to each input vector.  This is calculated as 100-(Percent AC + Percent POL).  
The constraints added to the DOE ensured that the percentages always summed to 100% 
and that degenerate cases were avoided.  These constraints were: 
2. Percent AC + Percent POL <= 100 
3. (AC1 + AC2 + AC3) > 0 
4. (TBM1 + TBM3 + CM2) > 0 
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The DOE was constructed of 160 test points and 40 validation points. There were 
eight input factors, and to have a good sampling across the design space, 20 levels per 
factor were chosen for a total of 160 test points.  The DOE was then increased by 40 
points (25%) to ensure enough validation points were captured. The points were cast into 
either test or validation in a random fashion.  After initial tests of the DOE, poor fitting in 
some of the output modules suggested that additional sample points were needed.  Fifty 
additional points were augmented to the original DOE because of this.  The final DOE 
was then comprised of 200 test points and 50 (20%) validation points.  The input DOE is 
summarized in Figure 111 below.  
 
Figure 111: Airfield Attack Simulation Input DOE 
 
 
 Each DOE point from Figure 111 was simulated 300 times (as explained in 
section 6.5.1) before assessing the number of iterations required such that the calculated 
mean was within 10% of the true mean with 95% confidence.  This was done for each 
output: number of AC1, AC2, AC3 destroyed, number of POL points destroyed, and 
number of hangars destroyed.  The number of iterations required was the maximum of 
the calculated required iterations for each output variable.  
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 Once the simulation was complete, the outputs were cast into discrete histograms.  
Then, a binomial distribution was fit to each distribution for each output variable using 
the method described in section 6.3.3.12.  In the fitting program, the number of possible 
successes, nn, was given by the input DOE.  For aircraft types AC1, AC2 and AC3 this 
was the total number of aircraft of a given type that was present.  For the POL points the 
number of POL points in all simulations was fixed at eight and for the number of hangars 
that was also fixed at ten.   
The output scatter plots for each output variable are shown below.  Figure 112 - 
Figure 114 show the outputs distribution for the binomial distribution shape parameter 
and summary statistics for the number of aircraft type AC1, AC2, and AC3 destroyed.  
Figure 115 shows these same parameters for the number of POL points destroyed and 
Figure 116 shows the parameters for the number of hangars destroyed.  In these 
diagrams, the black points are the test cases and the red points are the validation cases. 
 
 
Figure 112: Output Scatterplot for Binomial Shape Parameter and Summary Statistics of Number of 





Figure 113: Output Scatterplot for Binomial Shape Parameter and Summary Statistics of Number of 





Figure 114: Output Scatterplot for Binomial Shape Parameter and Summary Statistics of Number of 





Figure 115: Output Scatterplot for Binomial Shape Parameter and Summary Statistics of Number of 




Figure 116: Output Scatterplot for Binomial Shape Parameter and Summary Statistics of Number of 
Hangars Destroyed in Airfield Attack Simulation 
 
 
 These scatterplots show that the controlling factor in most of the simulations was 
the percentage of missiles allocated to each target type (i.e. aircraft, POL, or 
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infrastructure) and the number of incoming missiles, especially TBM2.  For the aircraft 
targets, a dominant factor was also the number of that aircraft type that was present.  The 
next several sections will show the accuracy of the p-value estimate shown in the above 
scatterplots. 
6.5.3. Airfield Damage Surrogate Models 
The development procedure of the NN used in the airfield simulation followed a 
similar procedure as those in the runway cratering simulation.  Due to the noisiness of the 
data, several NN models were created for each output and then the predictions averaged 
together.  In order to ensure a set of points was completely withheld from the 
development of all models, 20% of the points were initially cast into an overall validation 
set.  The remaining 80% of the points were then used in each fitting but were randomly 
cast into a training, test, and validation set for each fitting of a particular NN.  The 
number of hidden nodes for a given NN was chosen by increasing the quantity of nodes 
until a divergence between the test and validation set’s R2 was observed.  Once all NN 
for a given output were created and the results averaged together, that output was 
compared to the actual observed distribution by randomly choosing the same number of 
observed points using the predicted binomial shape parameters.  The estimated 
distribution and observed distribution were then compared with a Chi-Squared test as 
explained in section 6.3.3.11.  The results of these models are shown in the next several 
sections. 
6.5.3.1. Distribution Selection for the Airfield Damage Models  
The selection of the appropriate discrete distribution (binomial, geometric, or 
Poisson) followed in a similar manner to that of the Runway Availability model in 
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section 6.3.3.9.  For each distribution, the shape parameters were estimated using the 
maximum likelihood estimation method (MLE) and then compared to the observed 
values to calculate the residual sum of squares (RSS).  These results are summarized in 
Table 37.  This table shows the number and percent of the 250 DOE points where the 
given distribution had the lowest RSS.  It is clear to see that the binomial distribution had 
the smallest RSS for all but one output, the number of aircraft type 2 (AC2) destroyed.  
However, the RSS for many cases was very close between the different distributions for 
many of the cases.  This means that multiple distributions would have fit those test points 
adequately.  To examine this further, the author conducted a second count.  This time the 
number of cases was counted where the given distribution had the lowest RSS or had a 
RSS that was within 5% of the RSS for the distribution with the lowest RSS.  The results 
of this analysis are shown in Table 37 and Table 38. 
Table 37: Maximum Likelihood Residual Sum of Squares Results for Airfield Attack Models 
Distribution AC1 AC2 AC3 POL Inf 
Binomial 224 49.6% 66 26.4% 122 48.8% 225 90.0% 216 86.4% 
Geometric 41 16.4% 77 30.8% 29 11.6% 8 3.2% 14 5.6% 
Poisson 85 34.0% 107 42.8% 99 39.6% 17 6.8% 20 8.0% 
Table shows number and percent of DOE points where the distribution had the lowest RSS 
 
Table 38: Maximum Likelihood Residual Sum of Squares or within 5% of lowest RSS for Airfield 
Attack Models 
Distribution AC1 AC2 AC3 POL Inf 
Binomial 250 100% 250 100% 250 100% 250 100% 250 100% 
Geometric 187 74.8% 213 85.2% 196 78.4% 71 28.4% 235 94.0% 
Poisson 238 95.2% 238 95.2% 245 98.0% 250 100% 250 100% 
Table shows number and percent of DOE points where the distribution had the lowest RSS 
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From Table 38, it can be seen that the binomial distribution was either the 
distribution that best fit the data (lowest RSS) or was a good enough fit (RSS within 5% 
of distribution with lowest RSS).  Having a single distribution for all the outputs 
simplified the analysis.  Therefore, the binomial distribution was used for all the outputs 
of the Airfield Attack models.   
6.5.3.2. Number of Aircraft Type 1 Destroyed 
A total of 30 NNs were built to estimate the shape parameter of the binomial 
distribution (p-value) and their results averaged together.   Each NN had 25 hidden nodes 
with a hyperbolic tangent activation function.  The output was also estimated with a 
square-root transform to stabilize the variance.  The results of the estimate of the p-value 
are shown below in Figure 117 and the residuals of the estimate are shown in Figure 118.  
The R2 value for both the test and validation sets was over 0.92 and the root-mean 
squared error (RMSE) was only about 2.5%.  Also, 100% of the overall validation points 
passed the chi-squared test indicating that the test could not reject the null hypothesis, 





Figure 117: Results of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of Aircraft Type 1 
Destroyed from Airfield Damage Model 
 
 
Figure 118: Residuals from Estimate of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of 
































































































6.5.3.3. Number of Aircraft Type 2 Destroyed 
The geometry of the NN used to estimate of the binomial shape factor for the 
number of aircraft type two destroyed was similar those used for aircraft type 1.  A total 
of 30 NNs were used and their results averaged together.  Each NN had 80 hidden nodes 
with a hyperbolic tangent activation function and a square-root transform was used to 
stabilize the variance.  The results are shown below in Figure 119 and the residuals of the 
binomial shape factor estimate are shown in Figure 120.  Just as in the case of aircraft 
type 1, the R2 value for both the test and validation sets was over 0.98 and root-mean 
squared error (RMSE) was only about 4%.  Also, the chi-squared test for aircraft type 2 
failed to reject the null hypothesis, that both distributions were the same, for over 98% of 
the overall validation points. 
 
Figure 119: Results of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of Aircraft Type 2 





Figure 120: Residuals from Estimate of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of 
Aircraft Type 2 Destroyed from Airfield Damage Model 
 
6.5.3.4. Number of Aircraft Type 3 Destroyed 
The geometry of the NN used to estimate the binomial shape factor for the 
number of aircraft type 3 destroyed was similar those used for aircraft types 1 and 2.  A 
total of 30 NNs were used and their results averaged together.  Each NN had 100 hidden 
nodes with a hyperbolic tangent activation function and a square-root transform was used 
to stabilize the variance.  The results are shown below in Figure 121 and the residuals of 
the binomial shape factor estimate are shown in Figure 122.  The  R2 value for both the 
test and validation sets was over 0.93 and the root-mean squared error (RMSE) was only 
about 3% for the training points and only 4% for the validation points.  Also, the chi-
squared test for aircraft type 3 failed to reject the null hypothesis, that both distributions 








































































































Figure 121: Results of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of Aircraft Type 3 




Figure 122: Residuals from Estimate of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of 






























































































6.5.3.5. Number of POL Points Destroyed 
The geometry of the NN used to estimate the binomial shape factor for the 
number of POL points destroyed differed from those used for the number of aircraft 
destroyed.   The main difference was the number of hidden nodes that could be used 
before a divergence was observed between the R2 value of the validation and test sets.  A 
total of 30 NNs were used and their results averaged together.  Each NN had 20 hidden 
nodes with a hyperbolic tangent activation function and a square-root transform was used 
to stabilize the variance.  The results are shown below in Figure 123 and the residuals of 
the binomial shape factor estimate are shown in Figure 124.  The R2 value for both the 
test and validation sets was over 0.99 and the root-mean squared error (RMSE) was only 
about 1% for both the training and validation points.  The max error foe both the training 
and validation sets was about 3.6%.  Also, the chi-squared test for the number of POL 
points destroyed failed to reject the null hypothesis, that both distributions were the same, 
for every one of the overall validation points. 
 219 
 
Figure 123: Results of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of POL Points Destroyed 
from Airfield Damage Model 
 
 
Figure 124: Residuals from Estimate of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of POL 







































































































6.5.3.6. Number of Hangar Buildings Destroyed 
The geometry of the NN used to estimate the binomial shape factor for the 
number of POL points destroyed was similar to that of the number of POL points 
destroyed.  A total of 30 NNs were used and their results averaged together.  Each NN 
had 30 hidden nodes with a hyperbolic tangent activation function and a square-root 
transform was used to stabilize the variance.  The results are shown below in Figure 125 
and the residuals of the binomial shape factor estimate are shown in Figure 126.  The R2 
value for both the test and validation sets was over 0.97 and the root-mean squared error 
(RMSE) and max error was less than 1% for both the training and validation points.  
Also, the chi-squared test for the number of buildings destroyed failed to reject the null 





Figure 125: Results of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of Hangar Buildings 
Destroyed from Airfield Damage Model 
 
 
Figure 126: Residuals from Estimate of the Binomial P-Value Neural Net Model for Number of 



































































































6.5.3.7. Airfield Damage Surrogate Models Assessment 
The NNs for all cases of the airfield damage model showed very good prediction 
capabilities.  All but the infrastructure model had R2 values for both the test and 
validation cases over 0.99 and the infrastructure had R2 values over 0.98.  This helped to 
keep the RMSE for the predicted probability of success (p-value) to between 1% and 4% 
error, even for the validation sets.  This contributed to the success of the chi-squared 
tests, where the test failed to reject the null hypothesis, that the distributions were 
sampled from the same overall distribution, in every case, except for 1.75% of the 
validation points in AC2 at 99% confidence level.  This helps to answer research question 
number 3.   This research question asked if the accuracy of the surrogate models would 
be as high as that of the actual model.  The hypothesis was that the more than 95% of the 
validation set of each model would pass the chi-squared test with a 99% confidence level.  
This was shown to be true for the airfield damage models. 
Just as in the runway cratering case, as an additional check, the author produced 
plots of the actual v. predicted PMFs, CMFs, Q-Q and P-P plots for both the training and 
validation sets.  These points were chosen a random from within each set.  While not an 
exhaustive test of the prediction capability, they do offer an additional check of the 
results.  These results are seen below in Figure 127 and Figure 128 for the test and 
validation cases of the number of AC1 destroyed (AC2 and AC3 showed similar results), 
Figure 129 and Figure 130 for the test and validation cases of the number of POL, and 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7. AIR DEFENSE SIMULATION MODEL 
“To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace.” 
          - George Washington 
 
The last chapter developed several models to describe the damage created from 
missiles that impact an airfield.  The current research, as explained in the literature 
review, is missing these models to describe the effect of missiles that are not destroyed by 
air defense assets, commonly called leakers.  This next section will look at Air Defense 
Artillery (ADA) simulations.  These simulations will determine the number of inbound 
threats that are destroyed and the number that are leakers.  To maintain the highest level 
of accuracy, this work will consider only high fidelity computer ADA simulations.  Many 
of these high fidelity simulations maintain their accuracy at the cost of a high complexity 
to setup, a large amount of time for runtime, and a large amount of storage and detail in 
the outputs.  These disadvantages make these platforms poor choices for design space 
exploration where many runs are required with different combinations of inputs in order 
to determine the optimum input combination.  This work will explore ways to overcome 
some of these disadvantages while still maintaining a relatively high accuracy simulation. 
7.1. Air Defense Model Selection 
The high fidelity model will provide the necessary accuracy and precision that 
should inform major policy and acquisition decisions.  This high level of detail, however, 
is offset by some marked disadvantages.  Typically these models will require large run 
times, storage requirements, and setup times due to the level of detail they are simulating.  
These disadvantages make them poor environments to do trade-off analysis and 
optimization due to the large number of simulation runs required.  For this reason, the 
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results from the high level model is carried forward to a faster running tradeoff 
environment that will maintain nearly the same level of fidelity, but allow trades and 
optimization. 
The main criteria needed for a high level model in a missile defense analysis 
primarily focuses on the radar and flight dynamic aspect of the model.  Missile defense 
systems are highly dependent on detection and tracking of threats through a radar system.  
Therefore, the high fidelity model must have a good radar model, as well as a good flight 
dynamics model.  Due to the nature of this study where systems, doctrine, and 
organizational structure will be varied, the model should allow these aspects to be 
changed relatively easily without much reprogramming between each change.  In 
addition, the program should run fairly quickly with a small storage requirement and 
should be available to the researcher at the smallest cost possible.  These criteria are 
summarized below: 
a. Accurate radar models 
b. High fidelity flight dynamics models 
c. Ease of adjustments of systems, tactics, and organization 
d. Availability 
e. Speed 
f. Ease of setup 
After initial research, the high fidelity simulation environments were narrowed to 
four possible programs: EADSIM, Netlogo, the Synthetic Theater Operations Research 
Model (STORM), and the Joint Integrated Contingency Model (JICM).  EADSIM, 
STORM, and JICM are used throughout the DoD for war-simulations ranging from 
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engagements to full campaigns.  Netlogo was developed and is primarily used throughout 
academia.  STORM and Netlogo are agent-based models.  JICM is fully deterministic, 
but has inputs from another model called the Combat Sample Generator (COSAGE), 
which is stochastic.  EADSIM is stochastic and has independent agents, but operates 
much more scripted than a fully agent based model.  Each of these tools is explained 
below with the exception of EADSIM.  EADSIM was discussed earlier section 2.4. 
7.1.1. Agent Based Models 
Agent based models are time-stepped simulations where each entity in the 
program is individually programmed to sense its immediate environment, not the entire 
environment, and make decisions based off those observations and the observations 
communicated to it from other agents [156].  This bottom-up approach is fundamentally 
different than the traditional top-down simulations and is extremely useful for observing 
emergent behavior or complex dynamics, which can evolve from agent interactions [157, 
158].  Naturally, this type of simulation is good for warfare modeling since each military 
unit naturally acts as an agent.  The main difficulty with these types of programs is the 
extensive time required to program the agents and their interaction rules.   
Netlogo is an agent based software environment maintained by Northwestern 
University.  It is an open-source program that is downloadable from a web site and has 
been used in a wide array of applications from military problems, to social dynamics 
problems, and biological simulations [159].  The code is written in Scala with some parts 
in Java [160].   The main advantage of Netlogo is its availability.  There is not a pre-
preprogrammed flight dynamics or radar model available, so these models would need to 
be programmed manually.  Additionally, the nature of agent-based simulation means that 
 232 
as doctrine or organization changed, the agent rule sets may need to be reprogrammed 
which may be cumbersome.   
STORM is another agent-based program that is used throughout the DoD.  The 
Air Force originally developed STORM in the 1990’s and fully implemented it in 2004.  
It is written primarily in C++ and today it is the primary campaign model for the Air 
Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.  STORM is a fully agent based simulation and primarily 
focuses on air-to-air, surface-to-air, and maritime engagements [161].   It does have a 
land-based model available, however, that has not been developed nearly as well as the 
air model.  The main advantages of STORM are that there is a fairly good radar and flight 
dynamics model built into the program.  The main disadvantages are its availability and 
the harder setup and adjustment problems as described with Netlogo.   
7.1.2. Non-Agent Based Models 
 The two models considered that are not fully agent-based are EADSIM and JICM.  
EADSIM does have some characteristics of an agent-based model in that certain elements 
can sense portions of the environment and make decisions.  However, much of the 
simulation is scripted around these elements.  JICM is a fully deterministic model in 
which all aspects are scripted in advance.    
 EADSIM is explained in the literature review section above.  The main 
advantages are its radar and flight dynamics models and its availability.  Since it is 
government owned, it is available to any US citizen with a legitimate modeling need.  Its 
main disadvantages are its long setup requirements and runtimes.  JICM was developed 
by the RAND Corporation and operates in a UNIX environment.  JICM is a high level 
campaign tool or a “many-on-many” simulation tool where individual elements are 
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division or brigade sized [162, 163].  The inputs to JICM come from COSAGE which is a 
stochastic “few-on-few” tool.  The inputs to COSAGE come from individual actual 
material engagement tests conducted by the Army Material System Analysis Activity 
(AMSAA).  JICM is the primary campaign tool of the Army due to its fast running nature 
and the ability to rapidly simulate the effects of environmental variables, such as terrain 
and weather, as well as force size variables.  The main advantages of JICM are its ease of 
adjustments, run speed, and availability.  The main weaknesses of JICM lie in its 
detection and flight dynamics models.   
7.1.3. Model Selection 
 After investigating each model, they were all compared against each other for 
each criterion listed above.  The comparison of each model is subjective, but is based on 
the author’s direct experience and research for all four models. The results of this 
comparison are shown in Figure 133.   
 
Figure 133: High Fidelity Model Selection 
 
EADSIM proved to be the best high fidelity model mainly due to its robust radar 
and flight dynamics model.  It also scored relatively high for availability, speed, and ease 
of setup.  It scored in the middle of all models for ease of adjustment.  Other models were 
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better in some categories, but overall EADSIM was fairly good across all categories. 
With the high fidelity model selected, the next step is to determine a suitable lower 
fidelity model that will allow the required tradeoffs between systems, organization, and 
doctrine. 
7.2. Air Defense Model Setup 
EADSIM, like many other high fidelity simulations, requires a high number of 
inputs due to the complexity of its calculations.  This next section will address the basic 
setup of both the friendly (blue) and enemy (red) forces.  In order to maintain an open 
classification and to speed up the setup process, the scenario used in this work was 
adapted from the “Demo300” scenario that is shipped with all EADSIM setup disks.  
This demo has unclassified versions of many ADA and missile systems and is meant to 
show the capabilities of EADSIM.  All systems used in this work are modified versions 
of the systems in Demo300 using the values expressed in the sections below.  These 
values for various inputs are not meant to represent any known system, but instead are 
round-number inputs within acceptable and possible ranges in order to make the 
simulation work as intended.  All inputs were fabricated by the author and do not 
represent any real system. 
7.2.1. Blue ADA Forces Setup 
The friendly defensive ADA forces are known as the blue forces.  The blue ADA 
forces in this work will be made up of three different systems: an Upper Tier (UT) 
system, a Lower Tier (LT) system, and a Point (PT) system.  The UT system has a single 
interceptor type that has the largest range and can engage TBM threats only.  The LT 
system is the most versatile.  It has three different interceptor types: Interceptor A, B, and 
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C and can engage both TBMs and CMs/UASs.  The PT system has only one interceptor 
type and can engage only CMs/UASs.   
Engagements in EADSIM are geometry dependent.  Both the detection and 
engagement subroutines take into account the angles between systems as well as the cross 
range, down range, and altitude between systems [65].  This geometry dependency is 
strongest for closer engagements then for further ones.  Therefore, the PT and LT system 
were setup with explicit launchers.  This means that the radar, control station, and 
launchers were each their own platform with communication links between them.  
Because the UT system engagements were much further away, it was setup as an implicit 
system with the radar and launchers in a single platform.   
The launchers for the LT and PT system were arrayed around the central launcher, 
each facing outward with overlapping coverage.  All three systems were aligned around a 
protected airfield.  The radar for the PT system is a 360-degree radar while the PT and 
UT system each has a phased-array radar that has only a 120-degree field of view (FOV). 
Because the PT is 360-degrees and can only engage CMs, it was arrayed in front of the 
airfield relative to the attack.  The LT and UT systems were each placed behind the 
airfield to ensure that the airfield was within their 120-degree radar coverage.  A screen-
shot of the ADA setup is shown below in Figure 134.  Additionally, a screen-shot of a 
test engagement is shown in Figure 135. 
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Figure 134: Blue Force ADA Setup (Screen Shot from EADSIM Scenario Generation) 
 
 
Figure 135: Screen Shot from EADSIM Test Scenario Playback 
 
7.2.2. Blue ADA Weapon and System Characteristics and Setup 
Each of the systems, UT, LT, and PT, described above has its own unique 
interceptors available to it.  Each interceptor has a different range and altitude-operating 
band.  These bands overlap each other in order to ensure mutual coverage.  The weapon 
systems show a progression of technology just as real-world systems would.  The UT 
system is the newest and most advanced, since a deployable exo-atmospheric TBM 
defense system is a relatively new addition to most of the world’s militaries.  The LT 
system is a relatively older system and has been through a progression of upgrades.  This 
gives it three different interceptors with increasing levels of capability and different 
specializations.  The PT system is the oldest system and relies on infrared acquisition 
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with radar cuing as opposed to radar guidance.  Finally, for the cost of each interceptor, 
this work will use a relative cost index number.  This is mainly because the systems are 
fictional, but also because cost figures for military equipment is difficult to obtain.  In 
this work, all costs will be relative to the most capable LT interceptor, Interceptor A. 
The UT system is the first layer of defense against incoming TBMs.  It is 
designed to engage only TBMs and not CMs.  Because the engagements take place very 
far away from the radar, and reflected radar energy is inversely proportional to the radius 
to the target raised to the fourth power, the interceptor must use an active seeker.  The 
ground-based radar provides in flight updates to the missile but the internal interceptor 
seeker conducts the intercept.  Additionally, because of the far distances, the radar must 
use much more of its resources in terms of power and dwell time to map the incoming 
targets and provide updates to the outgoing missile.  This limits the number of missiles to 
which the radar can simultaneously provide updates.  Thus, the maximum number of 
simultaneous interceptors allowed in flight was set to six.  Additionally, the active seeker, 
large size and fuel requirements, and the relative newness of the UT interceptor make it 
extremely expensive.  Thus, the cost for each interceptor will be four times that of the LT 
Interceptor A. 
The LT system has a suit of interceptors that are optimized for different 
engagements.  Each LT interceptor has overlapping altitude and range coverage with 
each other.  All of the interceptors can engage both TBMs and CMs, but Inceptor B is 
optimized primarily for CMs.  The least capable, but least expensive interceptor is 
Interceptor C.  This interceptor uses a semi-active seeker that receives reflected energy 
from the main ground-based radar.  It is designed to engage both TBMs and CM/UAVs.  
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Due to the relative age of the seeker, hardware, and software of the missile, the radar 
system can only guide up to five simultaneous interceptors in flight at a time.  Its age, 
however, makes it a relatively affordable interceptor that costs only 40% compared to the 
LT Interceptor A.   
Interceptor B for the LT system is an upgraded version of Interceptor C.  It still 
uses a semi-active seeker, but with improved hardware.  These improvements allow the 
radar to guide twice as many interceptors in flight as compared to Interceptor C, but the 
cost is greater at 70% of the cost of Interceptor A.  Additionally it was optimized for 
ABT targets as opposed to TBMs thus its average velocity is slower, but it is more 
maneuverable resulting in a greater probability of kill (Pk) against ABT targets.  Finally, 
LT Interceptor A is the most advanced LT interceptor with a combined active and semi-
active seeker.  This means that the LT system can support a greater number of 
interceptors in flight at once.  It also has a more advanced propulsion system that enables 
it to reach a higher average velocity.  LT Interceptor A and the UT Interceptor have 
overlapping altitude coverage against TBMs. 
The PT interceptor is designed only to engage ABT targets.  It has a relatively low 
maximum range because it uses an infrared seeker system.  The system is cued to an 
engagement by a radar system, but the missile seeker must acquire the target before 
launch.  Additionally, because it is optimized to engage ABTs it has a relatively low 
average velocity, but is extremely maneuverable.  Its smaller size also makes it extremely 
affordable at only 20% that of LT Interceptor A.  The PT interceptor overlaps in range 
coverage with all the LT interceptors.  All of these values are summarized in Table 39 
and Table 40 below. 
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Seeker Target Set Relative Cost 
Lower 
Interceptor A 12 12 1,400 Active TBM/CM 1.0 
Interceptor B 8 10 1,000 Semi-Active TBM/CM 0.7 
Interceptor C 4 5 1,200 Semi-Active TBM/CM 0.4 
Upper UT Interceptor 8 6 2,000 Active TBM 4.0 
Point Pt  Interceptor 10 NA 900 Infrared CM 0.2 
 
Table 40: Blue Interceptor Range and Altitude Operating Bands 
Interceptor TBM CM 
Missile 
Range (m) Altitude (m) Range (m) Altitude (m) 
min max min max min max min max 
Lower 
Interceptor A 1,000 30,000 2,000 30,000 500 60,000 50 20,000 
Interceptor B 1,000 25,000 2,000 25,000 500 80,000 50 20,000 
Interceptor C 1,000 20,000 2,000 20,000 500 60,000 50 20,000 
Upper UT Interceptor 1,000 60,000 25,000 60,000 NA NA NA NA 
Point Pt Interceptor NA NA NA NA 100 20,000 0 30,000 
 
7.2.3. Blue ADA Weapon System Probability of Kill 
The probability of kill (Pk) for a single engagement is a single number that 
represents a complicated kill-chain.  In order to destroy an incoming missile with an 
ADA interceptor, the radar must detect the threat, have enough detection updates to 
create a track, develop a fire solution, and launch the interceptor.  That interceptor must 
hit the target.  If it hits the target, it must do so in a manner to disable the incoming 
missile.  These linked probabilities can be expressed as: 
𝑃! = 𝑃!𝑃!|!𝑃!"|!𝑃!|!"𝑃!|!𝑃!|! 
where  
PD = Probability of Detection 
PT|D = Probability of track given detection 
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PFS|T = Probability of fire solution given track 
PL|FS = Probability of launch given fire solution 
PH|L = Probability of hit given launch 
PK|H = Probability of kill given hit 
 
In EADSIM, the detection algorithm explicitly calculates the probability of 
detection.  Multiple detections within a given time then lead to the establishment of a 
track.  This track must then be maintained with additional detections within a given time 
span within the predicted location to lead to a fire solution.  The rest of the kill chain, 
however, is calculated implicitly from a set of three-dimensional Pk lookup tables. These 
tables are expressing the probability of launch, hit, and kill in a single number.  They give 
the probability of kill for a given interceptor-missile combination for the intercept down-
range, cross-range, and altitude from the launch point.   
Most ADA interceptors are designed to operate efficiently within a given altitude 
and range band.  If the engagement occurs at too close of an altitude or range the 
interceptor may not have enough time to maneuver to the optimal position prior to 
impact.  If the engagement occurs too far in either range or altitude, the ground-based 
radar may not be able to provide enough guidance input due to the reduced effectiveness 
of the radar at extended ranges.  In practice, the three-dimensional tables are produced 
from a combination of hardware in the loop simulations and actual system-on-system test 
engagements.  These tables are typically classified and not available to the public.   
In this work, the optimal engagement bands will be simulated with a simplified 
formula.  Each interceptor was assigned a Pk at the minimum altitude/range of the 
system, given above in Table 40.  It was also assigned a Pk at the optimal operating 
altitude/range and an altitude/range set where this band began and ended.  Finally, each 
interceptor was also assigned a Pk at the maximum operating altitude/range, given in 
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Table 40.  For engagements that occurred within the optimal band between the minimum 
and maximum altitude/range, the Pk was the optimal Pk.  These values are given below 
in Table 41 and Table 42. 
Table 41: Probability of Kill Values for Interceptor-TBM-Altitude Combinations 
Probability of Kill (Pk) for TBMs 
Tier Missile 





















Int A 60 50 80 70 60 55 10,000 25,000 
Int B 50 40 60 50 30 20 10,000 20,000 
Int C 40 40 60 60 35 25 50,000 15,000 
Upper Upper 60 60 85 85 80 80 30,000 50,000 
 
Table 42: Probability of Kill Values for Interceptor-CM-Range Combinations 
Probability of Kill (Pk) for CMs 
Tier Missile 








CM1 CM2 CM1 CM2 CM1 CM2 
Lower 
Int A 65 75 80 75 65 60 1,500 40,000 
Int B 70 75 85 80 80 60 1,500 60,000 
Int C 65 75 75 75 75 50 1,500 40,000 
Point Point 70 60 85 70 70 70 500 20,000 
 
For engagements that occurred between the minimum operating range/altitude 
and the minimum range/altitude of the optimal band, the Pk was calculated as a linearly 
increasing function that started at the Pk of the minimum range/altitude and ended at the 
Pk of the optimal engagement band.  For engagements that occurred beyond the 
maximum range/altitude of the optimal engagement band, the Pk was also calculated as a 
linearly decreasing function that started at the Pk of the optimal band and ended at the Pk 
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of the maximum engagement range/altitude.  Engagements that occurred before the 
minimum operating range/altitude or after the maximum range/altitude, had a Pk of zero.  
The Pk calculations are best illustrated in Figure 136 below. 
 
Figure 136: Pk Calculation Method 
 
7.2.4. Blue ADA Radar Characteristics 
The blue ADA radar systems were designed to match the above weapon and 
system descriptions.  The UT and LT radar were each a phased-array type radar.  This 
radar system is optimal for tracking a multitude of threats and for giving radar updates for 
interceptors in flight since the detection beam is electronically steered.  This allows it to 
reposition at a much higher speed than a mechanically steered beam [164].  In radar 
systems, generally the lower the frequency, the greater the probability of detecting a 
smaller radar cross-section object.  This occurs with a reduction in the precision of the 
radar and an increased physical size.  Lower frequency radars are also more susceptible 
to clutter.  The higher the frequency of the radar, the greater the atmospheric attenuation, 
which reduces the range.  Higher frequency radars also have increased accuracy and 
smaller physical size of the radar system [164].   
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Because of these factors, the UT radar operated under the lowest frequency, 
because it faced only TBMs at a great distance.  This meant that it had to be very 
sensitive and did not have to worry about clutter as much as the other systems that were 
pointed closer to the horizon.  To combat the effects of atmospheric clutter, the signal-to-
noise (SNR) threshold was set at the highest of the three radar systems.  
The LT system was the most versatile radar that operated against both CM and 
TBMs.  To ensure that it had the sensitivity to detect threats against the ground clutter, it 
operated at the greatest frequency of the three radar systems but had the lowest SNR 
threshold.  The PT operated in between these two other radar systems.   This data is 
summarized in Table 43. 
Table 43: Radar System Characteristics 
Radar System Frequency (GHz) Power (dbW) SNR Threshold (db) 
Point Defense (PT) 7.5 45 10 
Lower Tier (LT) 10 50 5 
Upper Tier (UT) 5 35 15 
 
Radar systems are also susceptible to terrain.  The terrain plays a much larger role 
for CM engagements than for TBM engagements due to the engagement angles.  To 
ensure that each system was placed in an optimal position, a set of line-of-site (LOS) 
checks was conducted for each TBM.  During these checks, the position of the radar was 
adjusted within an area of about 200-meter radius from the original location in order to 
find the position that resulted in the greatest uninterrupted LOS.  A screen shot of these 
LOS checks is shown below in Figure 137.  For these checks, the LOS is plotted in 5-
degree increments at three different altitudes above ground level (AGL) shown in 
different colors.  The lines terminate at the point where the radar’s LOS is obscured by 
terrain.  In many cases, this occurs at the radar’s horizon due to the curvature of the 
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Earth.  Once an optimal location was found, the radar was assigned this location in the 
simulations.  In this figure, the 360-degree field-of-view (FOV) for the PT system is 
evident verses the 120-degree FOV of the LT and UT systems.   
 
Figure 137: Line-of-Site (LOS) Checks for Radars 
 
7.2.5. Red Forces Setup 
In this fictional scenario, the enemy forces, known as the red forces, are arrayed 
to the North of the blue forces and are targeting the airfield with a variety of TBMs and 
CMs.  The flight, guidance, and warhead characteristics of these missiles have been 
described in previous sections (Table 23, Table 25, Table 26, Table 27, Table 28, Table 
29, Table 30, and Table 31).  This section will explain the setup of these missiles within 
the scenario.   
In practice, TBMs operate with a set of Ballistic Missile Operations Areas 
(BMOAs).  This is because the TBMs must be launched from a limited number of 
Transporter, Erector, and Launch (TEL) vehicles.  Because the TELs are a high value 
asset, when not in use they are hidden in hide sites to prevent their detection and 
destruction.  Upon a launch order, the TELs move to a site where the TBMs are mated to 
the TEL.  This is also where the TEL operators receive their target and all necessary data 
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for the launch.  The TEL and TBM is then driven from the hide site to a launch site. 
These launch sites are generally pre-surveyed locations that are open areas and relatively 
flat.  Once at the launch site, the TEL erects the TBM, performs all the pre-launch 
checks, and aligns the internal gyros.  Once set, the TBM is launched towards the target, 
and the TEL returns to a hide site to start the process again.   
The nature of the above process limits a TBM unit to operate with a designated 
BMOA.  In this scenario, the classes of TBMs used, TBM1, TBM2, and TBM3, operated 
each from two BMOAs.  TBM1 and TBM2 are longer range TBMs, so their BMOAs are 
further away then the BMOAs of TBM3.  These BMOAs are shown below in Figure 138.  
This graphic shows the location of the center of each BMOA relative to the target 
airfield.  Each of these BMOAs is 100km in diameter and the TBMs were launched from 
a random location within the BMOA (uniformly distributed angle and radial distance 
from center of BMOA).  Since each missile had two different BMOAs, each BMOA had 
an equal chance of boing used for each missile. 
 
Figure 138: Ballistic Missile Operating Areas Used in Simulation 
 
The number of incoming TBMs and CMs that are destroyed is strongly correlated 
to the time between the incoming missiles.  ADA systems have very limited time 
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windows to engage the fast moving TBMs.  Thus, the blue ADA forces are saturated 
easier with missiles spaced closely together.  This means that the red forces try to launch 
their TBMs and CMs in such a way that they all approach the target at the same time.  
This is a difficult operation since different missiles have different flight characteristics, 
different distances to travel, and different atmospheric conditions they fly through.  This 
means that there is usually a small delay between incoming missiles.  This delay is 
variable and depends on the skill of the operators and the level of advancement in the 
control and guidance systems.  Intelligence reports can generally estimate the likely time 
between incoming missiles.   
For this work, the assumed average rate of the incoming TBMs and CMs was one 
per second.  Because the time is variable, the actual time between each individual missile 
was estimated with the exponential distribution.  The exponential distribution describes 
the inter-arrival time of a memory-less process [146]. In this application, this means that 
the time between any two missiles is independent of the time between previous missiles.  
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the exponential distribution is shown 
below for three different values of average arrival times, one second between events, 
three seconds between events, and five seconds between events.  For any given set of 
incoming TBMs, the launch time between any two TBMs was calculated using the 
following formula to ensure that the arrival times between any two TBMs followed the 
exponential distribution. 
𝑇!"#$%!! = max 𝑇!"#$!! − 𝑇!"#$!!! + 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑛𝑑 𝜆 ) 
where, 
Tlaunch-j is the launch time of the jth missile 
Max(Tflight) is the maximum time of flight for the set of missiles 
Tflight-j is the time of flight for the jth missile 
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exprnd(λ) is a random number from the exponential distribution with inter-arrival 
time given by λ 
 
In the above equation, the random number from the exponential distribution was 
rounded to the nearest whole second because the smallest time differential that EADSIM 
can operate with is one second [65]. 
 
Figure 139: Exponential Distribution Cumulative Density Function 
 
The CMs were assumed to be air launched CMs as opposed to ground launched 
CMs.  The launch characteristics and initial flight patterns do not matter in this scenario 
since this would occur beyond the radar horizon for all the radars in this scenario.  Once 
the CMs crested the radar horizon, they would all be in their cruise configuration no 
mater their launch origin.  Thus, in this scenario, the CMs were injected into the scenario 
at the cruise altitude and speed with an initial location dictated by the maximum time of 
flight for all TBMs in the scenario.  Once the launch location was randomly chosen from 
within the BMOAs, the maximum time of flight for all missiles was calculated.  Using 
this maximum time of flight, the launch distance for the CM could be calculated by the 
following formula: 
















𝐷!"#$%!! = max 𝑇!"#$!! + 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑛𝑑 𝜆 𝑉!"!        𝑖𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑑𝑑 
𝐷!"#$%!! = max 𝑇!"#$!! + 1 𝑉!"!        𝑖𝑓 𝑗 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 
where, 
Dlaunch-j is the launch distance of the jth cruise missile 
Max(Tflight) is the maximum time of flight for the set of ballistic missiles 
exprnd(λ) is a random number from the exponential distribution with inter-arrival 
time λ 
VCM-j is the cruise speed of the jth CM 
In the above equations, it is assumed that the CMs are launched from aircraft that 
each carry two cruise missiles and that the time between launching of subsequent missiles 
from the same aircraft is one second.  This is why one second is added to the times for the 
even missiles.  For the odd missiles, the aircraft must coordinate their shots and thus, they 
are subject to random variation.   
For detection characteristics, radar cross section (RCS) values were assigned 
based on average values for TBMs and CMs [165].  Since TBM1 and TBM2 are longer 
range TBMs in this scenario, it was assumed they were larger and thus have a larger 
RCS.  Additionally TBM1 and TBM2 were assumed to have separating warheads.  This 
means that they are more uniformly shaped and do not have a dominate scatter 
orientation.  They also reenter the atmosphere at very high speeds and thus have pulse-to-
pulse decorrelation as opposed to scan-to-scan decorrelation.  This makes TBM1 and 
TBM2 a swirling type 2 target (see appendix A for a description of swirling targets).  
TBM3 was assumed to have a non-separating warhead.  This gives the missile body a 
dominant scatter along the missile long-axis.  The missiles are still traveling fast and 
experiencing pulse-to-pulse decorrelation.  This makes TBM 3 a swirling type 4 target.  
The CMs each have a long axis giving them a dominant scatter orientation.  They are also 
traveling slow enough to have scan-to-scan decorrelation but not pulse-to-pulse 
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decorrelation at far distances.  This makes them a swirling type 4 target.  These values are 
summarized in Table 44 below. 
A relative cost calculation was used comparing all missiles to TBM1 just as in the 
blue interceptor costs.  TBM2 has a more expensive and complicated warhead, since it 
contains a set of individual runway penetrating munitions with a carrying mechanism that 
disperses the penetrators at a predetermined altitude.  In this work, it was assumed to be 
30% more expensive then the same missile with a unitary warhead (TBM1).  TBM3 is a 
smaller and faster TBM with a flatter trajectory.  Although it also has a unitary type 
warhead, its increased accuracy and flatter trajectory make it more advanced and thus 
more expensive.  In this work, it was assumed to the twice as expensive as TBM1.  CMs 
are generally orders of magnitude less expensive than TBMs [18]. Thus, CM1 with a 
unitary warhead was assumed to be 20 times less expensive than TBM1.  CM2 with a 
submunition warhead was assumed to be 10 times less expensive.  These values are 
summarized in Table 44 below. 
Table 44: Red Missile Radar Cross-Section and Cost 
Missile RCS (m2) Swerling Target Type Relative Cost 
TBM 1 2.0 2 1 
TBM 2 2.0 2 1.3 
TBM 3 1.6 4 2 
CM 1 1.3 4 0.05 
CM 2 1.0 4 0.1 
 
7.3. Air Defense Model Wrapper Function 
EADSIM runs by reading a set of input text files, running an executable, and 
writing results to a large file called the C3Ilog.  From this C3Ilog, the user can query the 
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output with a separate program within the EADSIM executable called the non-graphical 
post processor (NGPP).  This process is called a stats query.  This will generate text files 
that summarize important information [65]. When run with a pre-generated stats query, 
EADSIM and NGPP read text files and produce text files.  This makes it relatively easy 
to implement a “wrapper” function to run and populate a design of experiments table.  
From the design of experiments table, a predictive Neural Net (NN) model of the outputs 
can then be generated.  This process is summarized in the figure below. 
 
Figure 140: Simulation MetaModel Setup 
 
 A summary of Design of Experiments (DOE) and Neural Net (NN) models are 
covered in appendix B and C.  The wrapper function is the link between the DOE and the 
NN model.  The wrapper function reads inputs from the DOE table.  Then it must 
translate the input DOE values into necessary inputs for the EADSIM files.  For example, 
if for a particular run, the DOE specifies 8 TBM1 missiles are to be launched then the 
wrapper function must set 8 TBM1 platforms to “alive” and the rest of the TBM 1 
platforms to “dead.”   
Once the wrapper function has all the necessary inputs for the files, it then writes 
these input values to the appropriate locations in the input files while leaving the rest of 
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the input file unchanged.  When all input files are constructed, the wrapper function runs 
the EADSIM program by specifying the location of the new inputs files and specifying a 
location for the output files.  It then reads the outputs files, collects the necessary output 
values, and writes those values to the DOE table.  Finally, it deletes the input and output 
files to conserve disk space and moves to the next DOE line.  This process is summarized 
in Figure 141 below.  For this work, the wrapper function was implemented with 
MATLAB running on a Linux cluster, the DoD High Power Computer (HPC) network 
[166].  The HPC allowed the author to run up to 320 computer cores each day to execute 
the necessary runs.   
 
Figure 141: Wrapper Function Process 
 
7.4. Air Defense Model Screening Test 
EADSIM has a large input variable set.  The focus of this work is on optimization 
of the ADA doctrine, the rules for how the systems engage threats.  To develop the input 
DOE, the author leveraged his past knowledge of EADSIM and the EADSIM manuals to 
develop a set of input variables that best represented the variables that a real ADA system 
would have control over.  These included the beginning and ending engagement altitude 
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and ranges, shot doctrine (number of interceptors shot in volley at each threat), the 
priority of each weapon to each threat, and the number of launchers of each missile type.  
In addition, the red forces had control over the number of missiles of each type fired, the 
release altitude for the missiles that carried submunitions, and the percentage of each 









































The input DOE for this work contained thirty-seven input variables and measured 
ten output variables.  In an attempt to reduce the size of the input DOE, the author 
conducted a screening test.  This screening test identified those input variables that 
contributed the greatest to the variance of each output variable.  If there were input 
variables that caused little variance for all the output variables, then that input variable 
could be ignored with little effect on the output prediction NNs.   
To run this screening test, the author developed a resolution III DOE that tested 
the inputs at the extreme minimum and maximum values specified in the table above.  
The author then used the JMP software to create Pareto plots for each of the ten outputs.  
The Pareto plots show the relative contribution of each input variable to the variability of 
the output variable.  The plot orders the inputs from the one that causes the most 
variability to the one that causes the least variability.  It also shows a line with the 
cumulative variability.  An example of a Pareto Plot is shown below in Figure 142 for the 
number of LT B missiles fired during the screening test. The red vertical line is drawn at 
the 80% cumulative variability line.  This plot shows that all variables from the TBM 
release altitude (TBM_rel_alt) and above contribute to 80% of the cumulative variability 




Figure 142: Pareto Plot for Number of LT B Missile Fired 
 
Using the cumulative variability, all the input variables that cause 80% of the 
cumulative variability in each output were collected.  The summary of this analysis is 
shown below in Table 46.  This table shows that all thirty-seven input values were 
influential in the variability of at least one of the ten output variables.  This meant that all 
thirty-seven variables were included in subsequent analysis. 
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Table 46: ADA Simulation Screening Test Results 
Input / Output Leakers Launches TBM1 TBM2 TBM3 CM1 CM2 LT A LT B LT C PT UT 
Number of TBM1 x x x 
      
x 










Number of CM1 x 
  
x x x x x x 






x x x x 

















UT Min Altitude x x x 
    
x x x 




x x x x 











x x x x 
 LT B Min Altitude 
     
x x x x 







  LT C Min Altitude 
     
x x x 
  UT Shot Doctrine x x 
       
x 
LT Shot Doctrine v. TBM x x x x 
 
x x 
   LT Shot Doctrine v. CM 
   
x x 
     LT A Max Range 
   
x x x 
 
x x x 




x x x 
    LT B Max Range 
   
x x x x x x 







 LT C Max Range 
  
x x 
   
x 
  LT C Min Range 
   
x 
   
x 







 PT Min Range 
  





PT Shot Doctrine CM 






  LT Priority of A v. TBM 
 
x x x 
  
x x x 
 LT Priority of A v .CM 
    
x 
     LT Priority of B v. TBM 
 
x 
   
x x x x x 
LT Priority of B v. CM 
 
x 
        LT Priority of C v. TBM 




 LT Priority of C v. CM 
 
x 
        LT A Number of Launchers 
   
x 
  
x x x 
 LT B Number of Launchers 




LT C Number of Launchers 
   
x 
   
x x 
 PT Number of Launchers 
    
x 
   
x 
 UT Number of Launchers 
  
x 




Table shows input variables that were included in 80% cumulative variability for each output variable. 
 
7.5. Air Defense Model Neural Nets – Failed Tries 
This section will explain several failed attempts to model the ADA simulation 
using neural nets to predict the shape parameters of the output distributions.  The 
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previous section showed that all thirsty-seven input variables had significant 
contributions to the variability of at least one of the ten outputs.  Thus, all variables were 
included in the input DOE for modeling.  The modeling DOE was constructed with a 
Latin Hypercube design with the variable limits shown in Table 45 and included the 
following constraints: 
1) Minimum Range <= Maximum Range – 1000m for all interceptors 
2) Minimum Altitude <= Maximum Altitude – 5000m for all interceptors 
3) Number of LT launchers (LTA+LTB+LTC) <= 8. 
Initially, each variable was tested at 30 levels for a total of 1,140 design points.  
The design was then increased by 20% (360 points) to account for validation points.  This 
design is shown below in Figure 143. 
 
Figure 143: Input DOE for ADA Simulation Model 
 
The above DOE was used in the ADA simulation.  Like the damage effect 
simulations, the simulation was repeated until the number of runs was greater than the 
number of runs required to ensure that the estimated average was within 10% of the true 
average.  Using these output distributions, the author then tried to fit many different 
neural nets to predict the outputs.  First, shape parameters for the binomial, Poisson, and 
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geometric distribution were estimated with the most likely estimate (MLE).  This allowed 
the author to estimate the fit error of the estimated distributions in order to determine 
which of the three distributions best fit the data.  Once the correct distribution was 
determined, the optimization program described in section 6.3.3.12 was used to adjust the 
shape parameter values until the error of the P-P and Q-Q plot was minimized.  This will 
minimize the sum of squares of the error. Once the optimization was complete, the 
estimated shape factor was tested using the validation set of data.  In all cases the R2 of 
the fit was less than 0.8.   
In order to improve the fit, the author attempted many transforms of the data to 
include a log, square root, inverse, squared, and Box-Cox transform.  Typically the 
square root transform was best, but still failed to improve the fit better than an R2 of 0.8.  
The author also attempted to use a stacked neural net (NN).  This concept is shown in 
Figure 144.  A stacked NN uses the output estimates of some parameter from other NN as 
an additional set of inputs, beyond the original input vectors, in order to improve the fit of 
a given parameter.  In this case, the author created three NNs stacked on top of each 
other.  The first NN used the input matrix to estimate the average of each case.  Then in a 
feed-forward fashion, the input matrix was combined with the estimate of the average as 
the input for the second NN who estimated the standard deviation.  This output was then 
combined with the previous input as the full input for the third NN who estimated the 
shape parameter of the output distribution.  However, in a majority of the cases, this 




Figure 144: Stacked Neural Net Concept 
 
7.6. Air Defense Model – New Setup 
Attempting to model all outputs at once revealed that the interactions between each 
layer cause too much noise in the overall model.  To help solve this, a new setup was 
created that separated the systems into layers.  This allowed each layer to be modeled 
individually.  In the actual simulation, this layering also occurs.  A lower layer does not 
engage until the upper layer is complete.  By separating the simulation into layers, 
however, all but the active layer could be switched off in the simulation.  This prevented 
lower level layers from affecting the outputs of higher-level layers for modeling 
purposes.  In the final simulation, each part of each layer was recombined such that the 
leakers from one layer were passed as the input for the subsequent layers.  A diagram of 




Figure 145: ADA Simulation Shown as Layers 
  
 In Figure 145, TBMs are first engaged by the Upper Tier (UT) system.  The 
engagements begin at the UT system’s maximum altitude and continue until its minimum 
altitude.  Any TBMs that are not destroyed by the UT system are passed to the Lower-
Tier system (LT).  There is a delay before the LT systems can begin to engage the TBMs 
that allow for the system to track the results of any low-level engagements made by the 
UT just prior to handing off the targets.  To account for this, the LT maximum altitude 
was restricted to 5,000 meters below the UT minimum altitude.  This makes the LT 
maximum altitude a dependent variable on the UT minimum altitude.  The LT system 
engages the TBMs until its minimum altitude.  At that point, any TBMs that are not 
destroyed are passed to the damage model since there is no system below the LT for 
TBMs.   
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  Once the TBMs pass the LT system’s minimum altitude, the LT system then 
shifts to CM engagements.  It begins engaging CMs at its maximum range; however, this 
maximum range depends on the LT minimum altitude for TBMs.  Therefore, a function is 
required that translates the TBM’s altitude into range.  Because the TBMs and CMs are 
designed to arrive at the target simultaneously and the CMs travel at a constant cruise 
speed, it is possible to create this function from the TBMs flight profile. The profiles 
generated in section 6.2.1 map the TBMs’ flight by calculating the range to the target and 
altitude above the target for each second of flight.  Using this data, a best-fit, three-degree 
spline was created to predict the time to impact for any given altitude.  An example of 
this is shown below in Figure 146.  Because the CMs are traveling at a constant speed, it 
is then possible to calculate their distance from the target such that they arrive at the 
given time.  This calculated range is the maximum possible range for the LT 
engagements.  However, to account for the time to switch modes and acquire targets, the 
LT maximum engagement range was limited to 500 meters less than this calculated 
range.   
 
Figure 146: TBM Flight Profile to Predict the Time to Impact for a Given Altitude 
















Time = 298.6 - 0.000986*Alt + 3.982e-9*Alt² - 9.268e-14*Alt³
RMSE: 0.07




The LT system then engages the CMs until its minimum range.  At that point any 
surviving CMs are passed to the point defense (PT) system.  The PT system is then 
delayed from shooting for 500 meters to account for hand-off coordination.  This makes 
the PT system’s maximum range a function of the LT system’s minimum range minus 
500 meters.  The PT system then attacks until the CMs reach its minimum range.  Any 
CMs that survive were then passed to the damage calculations functions.   
7.7. Air Defense Model Neural Nets – New Setup 
A simulation was created using the setup explained in the previous section along 
with the missiles and interceptor parameters explained in section 7.2.  This setup 
demanded many different DOEs and predictive models to include one model to predict 
the number of leakers (# leakers), or threats not destroyed, for each blue interceptor and 
red missile combination.  In addition, the new simulation setup requires a model for the 
number interceptors shot (# Interceptor Shot) by the blue systems against either TBMs or 
CMs.  A summary of all the required predictive models for the simulation is explained 
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This simulation used a wrapper function similar to the one outlined in section 7.3 
in order to run the desired DOEs.  Due to the stochastic nature of the simulations, many 
simulation runs were required for each input vector (DOE line) of the DOE.  Similar to 
the previous sections for the stochastic damage effects models, each DOE was repeated 
until the estimated mean was within 10% of the true mean with 95% confidence (see 
section 6.3.3.2). 
Once the simulation was completed the results were compiled together.  The 
ADA simulation took approximately 1-5 minutes to run on a 3.0 GHz computer.  
Considering the many different models and DOEs explained in Table 47, runs within 
each DOE, and repetitions of each run, the run time required to create all these models 
was too long for a single computer.  Therefore, the Department of Defense (DoD) High 
Performance Computer (HPC) network was utilized to complete the simulations [166].  
The HPC allowed the use of between 108 and 320 computer cores per day in order to run 
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all the DOEs in a massively parallel fashion.  This work would have been exponentially 
slower without the use of the DoD HPC network.  Even with the large number of parallel 
computations, the execution of all the DOEs took several weeks to complete. 
After all computations were complete, a neural net (NN) fitting program was 
developed to predict the average of the response for each DOE input line.  Each of these 
NN models was created with a routine that slowly increased the size of the hidden layer 
and calculated the R2 of the k-fold cross-validation of the training set at each step.  This 
continued until the calculated R2 showed a decrease of 10% from its peak value.   
Once the number of hidden nodes was calculated, the net was trained on the full 
set of training data using both a pure linear and radial basis function as the activation 
function of the output nodes.  The final activation function was chosen based on the 
largest R2 of the training set.  The NNs were then trained five times over the training set 
and the final output was an average of these five outputs.  Once the network architecture 
was determined, the net was tested against the validation set (20% of the data chosen at 
random).  Because there were so many models, the full results of the fitting for each 






























TBM1	 0.039	 0.396	 0.987	 0.100	 0.622	 0.972	
TBM2	 0.031	 0.213	 0.991	 0.082	 0.533	 0.970	
TBM3	 0.053	 0.366	 0.979	 0.176	 1.086	 0.942	
CM1	 0.201	 1.594	 0.947	 0.422	 2.760	 0.898	
CM2	 0.109	 0.802	 0.976	 0.228	 0.821	 0.942	
LT_B	
TBM1	 0.017	 0.149	 0.994	 0.106	 0.037	 0.995	
TBM2	 0.017	 0.183	 0.992	 0.065	 0.627	 0.986	
TBM3	 0.035	 0.317	 0.989	 0.043	 0.261	 0.982	
CM1	 0.184	 1.334	 0.956	 0.224	 1.196	 0.935	
CM2	 0.147	 1.544	 0.969	 0.210	 0.775	 0.942	
LT_C	
TBM1	 0.009	 0.080	 0.997	 0.020	 0.186	 0.996	
TBM2	 0.005	 0.046	 0.999	 0.012	 0.065	 0.996	
TBM3	 0.010	 0.103	 0.997	 0.010	 0.119	 0.994	
CM1	 0.053	 0.399	 0.984	 0.119	 0.821	 0.973	
CM2	 0.023	 0.258	 0.994	 0.120	 0.813	 0.978	
UT	
TBM1	 0.029	 0.319	 0.992	 0.121	 1.080	 0.983	
TBM2	 0.170	 0.116	 0.993	 0.071	 0.647	 0.987	
TBM3	 0.021	 0.130	 0.993	 0.143	 1.417	 0.981	
PT	
CM1	 0.073	 0.502	 0.981	 0.157	 0.643	 0.951	







TBM-All	 0.056	 0.278	 0.955	 0.207	 1.083	 0.873	
CM-All	 0.318	 3.164	 0.962	 0.514	 2.737	 0.931	
LT_B	
TBM-All	 0.035	 0.223	 0.980	 0.076	 0.466	 0.953	
CM-All	 0.329	 2.784	 0.996	 0.396	 3.248	 0.995	
LT_C	
TBM-All	 0.026	 0.380	 0.986	 0.088	 0.585	 0.940	
CM-All	 0.072	 0.560	 0.984	 0.525	 3.331	 0.904	
UT	 TBM-All	 0.029	 0.489	 0.975	 0.033	 0.190	 0.951	




8.  OPTIMIZATION RESULTS  
“For since the fabric of the universe is most perfect and the work of a most wise Creator, 
nothing at all takes place in the universe in which some rule of maximum or minimum 
does not appear.” 
           - Leonhard Euler, Mathematician 
 
 The preceding sections outlined the ADA simulation and damage effects models 
and their associated predictive models that are needed for the proposed optimization 
methodology originally outlined in section 5.1 and shown again in Figure 147.  This next 
chapter will use these models within the proposed optimization methodology to show 
how the damage that results from an enemy attack can be reduced from adjusting the 
tactics used by the ADA system.  Should this reduction not be sufficient, it will also show 
how the damage can be further reduced by incorporating new systems into the ADA 
arsenal.   
 




8.1. Enemy Fire Plan Test Sets 
The first step in the optimization process is to develop an optimized enemy fire 
plan.  A fire plan is the number and type of missiles that will be shot at the airfield along 
with the flight parameters (cruise altitude, release altitude for submunitions, etc.) and the 
individual targets that each missile will seek (aircraft, runway, POL sites, etc.).  By 
starting with an optimized fire plan, the user is ensured that when the blue tactics are 
optimized, they are optimized against the worst possible threat.   
In order to scope this work, three different fire plans are used in this test case.  A 
small attack made up of 5 TBMs and 5 CMs impacting the target simultaneously.  These 
TBMs and CMs can be of any type (TBM1, TBM2, TBM3, or CM1 and CM2).  This 
represents the current capability of most enemy forces today.  The second fire plan is a 
medium sized attack made up of 15 TBMs and 15 CMs, of any type, impacting the target 
at the same time.  This represents the current state- of-the art capability of some modern 
missile forces, or the capability that could be obtainable in the next 10 years for most 
missile forces.  Finally, the last fire plan will be a large attack made up of 30 TBMs and 
30 CMs, or any type, impacting the target simultaneously.   This represents the future 
capability of many missile forces.   
8.2. Blue ADA Tactics for Base Case 
In order to optimize the red fire plan, the blue tactics has to be set.  These will 
later be optimized against the optimal red fire plan.  The base case for the blue tactics is 
characterized as “shoot early and shoot often.”  This strategy maximizes the use of far 
reaching systems over closer range/altitude systems.   The logic behind this tactics set is 
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to destroy more threats at a further distance so that there are more shot opportunities and 
thus, reducing the number of leakers.   
The blue ADA systems were explained in section 7.2.1, but are summarized again 
here.  The Upper Tier (UT) system is designed to engage TBMs only and is the furthest 
range shooter for TBMs.  Under, but overlapping, the engagement space for this system 
is the Lower Tier (LT) system.   The LT system is capable of engaging both TBMs and 
CMs with three different types of interceptors (interceptors A, B, and C).  For CMs, the 
LT system is the furthest range system.  In the base case, it is also the only CM 
engagement system.  Later, when a new system is introduced as a material solution it will 
be a Point Defense (PT) system that engages CMs only and shoots behind, but 
overlapping, the engagement space of the LT system.  A summary of the systems and 
tactics for the blue system is shown below in Table 49.   
In this table, all launchers start with their full complement of interceptors.  The 
shot doctrine is the number of interceptors that are shot in rapid succession at a single 
inbound threat. The UT system’s engagement space, defined by its maximum and 
minimum engagement altitude, was set to the largest possible value by setting the 
maximum and minimum altitudes to their limits.  This shrinks the engagement space for 
the LT system since it can only begin to engage targets 5,000 meters below the UT 
systems (see section 7.6).  The LT’s minimum altitude is set to an intermediate value to 
allow some engagement space for CMs, since the maximum engagement range for LT is 
a function of the minimum engagement altitude for LT (see section 7.6).  Finally, the 
priority interceptor, the interceptor the LT system will initially use against the given 
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threat, was set for the best, but most expensive, interceptor against TBMs and the least 
accurate and least expensive interceptor against CMs. 
Table 49: Base Case Blue ADA Values 
System Variable Set Value 
Upper Tier 
Number of Launchers 6 
Maximum Engagement Altitude 60,000 meters 
Minimum Engagement Altitude 25,000 meters 
Shot Doctrine 1 
Lower Tier 
Number of Interceptor A Launchers 2 
Number of Interceptor B Launchers 2 
Number of Interceptor C Launchers 4 
Maximum Engaging Altitude - TBMs 20,000 meters 
Minimum Engagement Altitude - TBMs 10,000 meters 
Maximum Engagement Range - CMs 5,000 meters 
Minimum Engagement Range - CMs 2,000 meters 
Shot Doctrine – TBMs 2 
Shot Doctrine - CMs 1 
Priority Interceptor – TBMs A 
Priority Interceptor – CMs C 
 
8.3. Optimization Program 
The optimization for both the red fire plan and the blue defense is a complex task.  
Because a large section of the multi-dimensional design space is being explored, there is 
no guarantee that the design space will be convex.  Many of the typical gradient based 
optimizers may not work if the design space is not convex [147].  Without knowing this 
about the design space, there is no guarantee that an optimum is the global optimum 
[147].  Therefore a stochastic optimizer is needed.   Good examples of stochastic 
optimizers are genetic algorithms and particle swarms.  Typically, a genetic algorithm 
works better for models with discrete values, while a particle swarm works better for 
continuous models [147].  In either case, it is important that the algorithm maintain the 
spread of the test points for as long as possible in order to identify the Pareto frontier, or 
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frontier of optimal points.  This is the set of all points that are not dominated in at least 
one dimension.  Dominated in this context means that no other point is better in a given 
dimension than the non-dominated point.   
This work used an optimization software called OptDef, made by a company 
called OptTek [167].  This software was selected due to the author’s extensive experience 
with this software’s capabilities.  The latest version of the OptDef software includes a 
basic integration layer that allows a user to run any program with the OptDef optimizer.  
The integration layer is similar to the wrapper function explained in section 7.3.  The user 
supplies the program input variables and ranges and output variables in a comma 
separated (.csv) file.  The OptDef program then uses its internal optimization routines to 
calculate the next needed design runs.  It writes these inputs to a file and calls the user’s 
integration program.  This integration program takes the OptDef supplied input file, 
writes the appropriate inputs to the correct location on the program’s inputs and then runs 
the program.  OptDef then reads the outputs and repeats the process.  The main interface 
for the OptDef program is shown below in Figure 148. 
    
 





8.4. Optimization of Red Fire Plan for Base Case 
The three test cases for the red fire plan, small, medium, and large, were each 
optimized independently.  The optimization criteria was to maximum the fraction 
(percentage) of aircraft destroyed, maximize the fraction of POL sites destroyed, and 
minimize the fraction of available MOSs that were destroyed.  This multi-objective 
optimization created a frontier of non-dominated solutions for each fire plan.  Each point 
on the frontier represents a combination of inputs that achieves a non-dominated solution 
in at least one of the optimization goals.  
Each fire plan included an identical setup for the input variables.  The only 
difference was that each included a constraint that ensured that the number of missiles in 
the fire plan matched the correct size (small, medium, and large).  Additionally, there was 
a constraint to ensure that the percent of missiles aimed at aircraft and POL sites did not 
exceed 100%.  The inputs and ranges for those inputs are shown below in Table 50. 
Table 50: Red Fire Plan Optimization Variables 
Input Variable Type Minimum Maximum 
Number of TBM1 Integer 0 20 
Number of TBM2 Integer 0 20 
Number of TBM3 Integer 0 20 
Number of CM1 Integer 0 20 
Number of CM2 Integer 0 20 
TBM1 – Percent Aimed At Airfield Float 0 100 
TBM2 – Percent Aimed At Airfield Float 0 100 
TBM3 – Percent Aimed At Airfield Float 0 100 
CM1 – Percent Aimed At Airfield Float 0 100 
CM2 – Percent Aimed At Airfield Float 0 100 
TBM Release Altitude for Submunitions Float 10,000 m 30,000 m 
CM Release Altitude for Submunitions Float 50 m 500 m 
Percent of Airfield Missiles Aimed at Aircraft Float 0 100 
Percent of Airfield Missiles Aimed at POL sites Float 0 100 
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The results of the optimization for the small, medium, and large fire plans are 
shown below in Figure 149, Figure 150, and Figure 151.  These images show the optimal 
frontier of non-dominated solutions.  The optimal frontier is further illustrated in Figure 
152, which shows all the test points for the large attack, to include the dominated test 
points, along with the optimal frontier of points.  All points in grey in Figure 152 are 
dominated in at least one output dimension be the points on the frontier.  The two 
horizontal axis are the fraction of aircraft destroyed and fraction of POL sites destroyed.  
The vertical axis is the fraction of MOSs available on the runway for use.  The red force 
is trying to maximize the fraction of aircraft and POL sites destroyed and minimize the 
fraction of MOSs available.  
  
 




Figure 150: Optimal Frontier for Medium-Sized Fire Plan 
 
 
Figure 151: Optimal Frontier for Large-Sized Fire Plan 
 
 
Figure 152: Large Fire Plan with Both Dominated and Frontier Test Points 
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8.5. Analysis of Optimized Red Fire Plan for Base Case 
Examining the optimal frontier for each enemy fire plan shows why the optimal 
points achieved greater damage than the non-optimal points. This also answers the first 
research question: Will a fire plan optimized to achieve a given effect (destruction of 
aircraft, POL sites, or runway) be the fire plan with the greatest number of leakers?  The 
hypothesis for this research question was such that: a fire plan weighted with CMs, as 
opposed to TBMs, will destroy more point targets such as POL sites and aircraft and a 
fire plan weighted with TBMs, as opposed to CMs, will destroy more area targets such as 
the runway.  These will not necessarily be the fire plans with the most leakers.  The 
analysis below will show that this hypothesis is mostly true; however, there is 
discrepancy for which targets are classified as point targets.   
The point targets in this scenario were originally thought to be the POL sites and 
the aircraft on the airfield.  The POL sites were fixed in place, but the aircraft changed 
position on every test iteration as explained in section 6.4.1.  This made a difference in 
the results.  The stationary POL targets were much more susceptible to the higher 
accuracy of the CMs.  The CMs have a CEP much smaller than that of the TBMs.  
Because the aim points are planned near the targets and the POL sites cannot move away 
from those aim points, any leakers that were aimed at the POL tended to destroy at least 
one POL site.  This is illustrated in Figure 153 using contour plots generated in JMP.  
The red area of the three fire plans shown in the images is the cases with greater numbers 
of the POL sites destroyed.  The x and y axis are the number of CM and TBM leakers 
respectively. 
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All three sized fire plans showed that the greatest number of POL sites destroyed 
occurred when the number of CM leakers was greatest.  A greater number of TBM 
leakers also helped to destroy more POL sites.  Meaning that in this case, the greatest 
number of leakers equated to the greatest damage.  This is why the greatest number of 
POL sites destroyed (darkest red color in the figure) is in the upper right.  However, in all 
three cases, a high number of CMs resulted in a greater number of POL sites destroyed 
for a given number of TBM leakers.  This is especially evident in the large attacks.  In a 
medium sized attack, the effect is the least pronounced.  In this attack a greater number of 
TBMs or CMs seems to result in a greater number of POL sites destroyed.   
 
Figure 153: POL Damage Analysis From Three Red Fire Plans 
   
 It was originally thought that the aircraft on the airfield were also point targets; 
however, their mobility makes them different from the POL sites.  Very few aircraft were 
destroyed in any of the optimal fire plans for the small sized attack, so that that attack is 
not addressed below.  The results for the medium and large sized attacks are shown in 
Figure 154.  In this figure, the red areas show the attacks with a larger number of aircraft 
destroyed.  The x and y axis are the number of CM and TBM leakers that impacted the 
airfield.  The largest number of aircraft destroyed came from fire plans that did not have 
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the largest number of leakers.  This was due to the increased blast radius of TBMs and 
the fact that the aircraft were actually an area target, which will be further explained 
below. 
 
Figure 154: Aircraft Damage Analysis for the Medium and Large-Sized Fire Plans 
 
 
The aim points for the red missiles were distributed evenly around the known 
parking locations on the airfield.  However, on each trial run, the first aircraft was 
randomly placed, but then each subsequent aircraft was placed to maximize the minimum 
distance between points.  This meant that for each trial run the aircraft were in new 
locations.  If an aircraft happened to be located near one of the randomly chosen targeted 
aim points, then there was a high probability that it was destroyed.  So, even if an aim 
point was hit accurately, such as would be the case with CMs since they have a smaller 
CEP, there might not be aircraft within the lethal radius of that aim point.  This resulted 
in TBMs, with their larger lethal area, being more effective.   
To further illustrate this point, the medium sized attack contour plot and its 
associated leaker distributions are shown in Figure 155.  From the distribution plot on the 
right side of this figure, it is evident that a large number of TBM1 and TBM3 leakers 
resulted in a greater number of aircraft destroyed.  TBM1 and TBM3 were the two TBMs 
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with unitary warheads.  This meant that they had the largest blast radius.  Note that CM1 
was also prevalent in these fire plans.  CM1 was the CM armed with runway penetrating 
munitions.  These munitions had no effect against aircraft.  The reason that the optimal 
fire plans included a larger number of CM1 missiles was that these fire plans were 
constructed with an equal number of CMs and TBMs.  Since the TBMs were more 
effective against aircraft rather than the CMs, the optimal solution included TBMs aimed 
at aircraft.  This meant that the CMs included in the fire plan were dedicated to the 
runway.  This helped achieve a balanced effect of destruction of aircraft and the runway.  
Overall, this meant that the fire plans with the greatest number of leakers did achieve a 
large number of aircraft destroyed, but so did raids that maximized just the number of 
TBM leakers alone as viewed in the upper portion of the contour plot on the left side of 
Figure 155. 
 
Figure 155: Damage Analysis of Attacks on Aircraft from Medium-Sized Raids 
 
 
This same logic holds for the larger fire plan.  From the contour plot on the left 
side of Figure 156, it is evident that the fire plans with the greatest number of leakers 
(upper right corner) are not the fire plans that resulted in the greatest damage to aircraft 
(dark red areas).  From the distributions on the right side of the figure it is again evident 
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that the greatest damage to aircraft occurred with fire plans that had a large number of 
TBM1 and TBM3 leakers.  With more leakers, a greater number of aim points could be 
targeted and because of the higher accuracy of the TBM3, the fire plans the included 
more TBM3 missiles achieve greater effects. 
 
Figure 156: Damage Analysis of Attacks on Aircraft from Large-Sized Raids 
 
 
 The runway in this scenario is 10,000 feet long and 500 feet wide.  This makes it 
an area target as opposed to a point target.  An area target is a target that covers a large 
amount of space, making it much more likely to be struck by a missile.  Missiles are 
aimed at the vicinity of the target area as opposed to individual targets.  This analysis also 
included a special class of munitions called runway-penetrating munitions.  These 
munitions are able to tunnel into the concrete of the runway before exploding in order to 
cause greater damage (see section 6.2).  Because of this, those missiles that carried the 
runway penetrating munitions (TBM2 and CM1) were more likely to cause greater 
damage to the runway.  This is especially evident in the large-sized attack as shown in 
Figure 157.  The most damage to the runways did not come from the raids with the 
largest number of leakers (upper right corner of the contour plot).  It came from raids 
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with the greatest number of TBM2 and CM1 missiles, the missiles that carried the 
runway penetrating munitions.   
 
Figure 157: Damage Analysis of Attacks on the Runway from Large-Sized Raids 
 
 
 The same trend is also seen in the medium-sized attack shown below in Figure 
158.   Again, the raids with the largest number of leakers did not result in the greatest 
damage to the runways.  Instead, the raids with the largest leakers of the missiles carrying 
the runway penetrating munitions (CM1 and TBM2) resulted in the greatest damage to 
the runway. 
 
Figure 158: Damage Analysis of Attacks on the Runway from Medium-Sized Raids 
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 Interestingly, this trend did not necessarily carry through to the small raids.  The 
analysis of these sized raids is shown in Figure 159.  The contour plot on the left side of 
this figure again suggests that the raids with the greatest number of leakers did not result 
in the most damage to the runway, However, an examination of the size of each axis will 
show that the overall change in the number of leakers for all raids was less than 1 missile 
and the change in the fraction of MOSs was less than 5% (less than one MOS).  This is 
because the small sized raid only included 5 CMs and 5 TBMs, so there were not many 
missiles to leak through the defenses. This makes is difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions about the cause of the changes since those changes were extremely small. 
 
Figure 159: Damage Analysis of Attacks on the Runway from Small-Sized Raids 
 
 
 This analysis of the optimal red fire plans for the base case answers the first 
research question.  The optimal fire plans for a given effect are not necessarily the fire 
plans with the greatest number of leakers.  Instead, the optimal fire plans are those fire 
plans that maximize the number of leakers of a particular type of munition that is itself 
optimized to achieve a certain effect.  If the desired effect is to destroy fixed-point targets 
such a POL sites, then the fire plans that maximize accuracy with a greater number of 
CMs are optimal. If that desired effect is to destroy mobile assets such as aircraft, then 
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fire plans that maximize the number of TBM leakers, especially TBM leakers with a 
smaller CEP, are the optimal.  Finally, if the desired effect is to destroy the runway, then 
the fire plans that maximize the number of leakers carrying submunitions are the optimal 
fire plans.  
8.6.  Optimization of Blue Tactics Only Against the Optimized Fire Plans 
The last section showed how the enemy fire plan could be optimized to maximize 
different effects such as destruction of aircraft, runways, or fuel sites.  No single fire plan 
was able to maximize all effects simultaneously.  The enemy force must tailor each strike 
package to achieve their desired effect.  Unfortunately, the ADA units do not know what 
this effect is beforehand.  Thus, the ADA tactics must be optimized to minimize the 
damage from any one of the optimal enemy fire plans. 
The main decision variables available to the ADA units are when to begin engaging 
each type of threat, how many interceptors to shoot at each missile, known as the shot 
doctrine, and which interceptor to target against which missile.  These decision variables 
and their associated ranges are listed in Table 51. 
Table 51: ADA Tactics Inputs Variables 
System Variable Value Range Units 
Upper Tier 
(UT) 
Maximum Engagement Altitude - TBM 25,000-60,000 meters 
Minimum Engagement Altitude - TBM 25,000-60,000 meters 
Shot Doctrine - TBM 1 or 2 each 
Lower Tier 
(LT) 
Minimum Engagement Altitude - TBM 10,000-30,000 meters 
Minimum Engagement Range - TBM 2,000-80,000 meters 
Shot Doctrine - TBM 1 or 2 each 
Shot Doctrine – CM 1 or 2 each 
Priority Interceptor – TBM A, B, or C n/a 
 
Engagements against TBMs are altitude dependent and engagements against CMs 
are range dependent.  Within the simulation, a constraint was imposed for both the LT 
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and UT systems that caused the minimum engagement altitude to be less than the 
maximum engagement altitude by at least 5,000 meters.  This 5,000-meter buffer ensured 
that the engagement space was large enough that the simulation would shoot at least one 
interceptor. In a similar fashion the minimum engagement range was restricted to at least 
500 meters less than the maximum engagement range.   
The layered defense structure explained in section 7.6 caused the LT system’s 
maximum range and altitude to be dependent variables.  This is because the LT system 
could not begin to engage TBMs until those TBMs were below the UT system’s 
minimum altitude and the LT system could not engage CMs (maximum engagement 
range of CMs) until it stopped engaging TBMs (minimum engagement altitude of 
TBMs).  Thus, the LT system’s maximum altitude was calculated as the minimum of 
either the LT priority interceptor’s maximum altitude or the 5,000 meters less than the 
UT’s minimum engagement altitude.  The LT system’s maximum range was calculated 
using the TBM profile, CM cruise speed, and method explained in section 7.6. 
 These decision variables were tested and optimized using the OptDef software 
described in section 8.3. During the optimization for each set of blue decision variables, 
all fire plans on the optimal frontier were tested.  This meant that each test case of ADA 
decision variables was tested against several hundred optimal fire plans.  Once all fire 
plans were tested against the set of decision variables, the damage to the runway, fuel, or 
aircraft was averaged so that the output was the mean effect from all the optimal fire 
plans.  
 The results of this optimization are shown below in Figure 160, Figure 161, and 
Figure 162 for the small, medium, and large-sized attacks.  In each image, there are two 
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graphs.  In both graphs, the vertical axis is the average cost of the ADA interceptors shot 
using the relative costs explained in section 7.2.2.  All costs are relative to the LT 
interceptor type A, which has a cost of one unit.  The x and y-axis of the left graph of 
each figure shows the average fraction of MOSs available and the average number of 
POL sites destroyed.  The graphs on the right of each figure show the average number of 
MOSs again and the average number of aircraft destroyed.  In these simulations, the 
ADA defenses are trying to minimize cost, maximize the number of MOSs available, and 
minimize the number of fuel sites (POL) and aircraft (AC) destroyed.   
 The optimal frontier for the blue ADA systems against a small-sized optimal 
attack is shown below in Figure 160.  This simulation shows the results of 33,259 design 
points.  Each of these design points is a combination of the decision variables from Table 
51.  There are 1,327 optimal points on the frontier. 
 
Figure 160: Optimal Frontier for ADA Optimization Against a Small-Size Attack 
 
 
 The optimal frontier for the medium-sized attack is shown in Figure 161 and for a 
large-sized attack in Figure 162.  The optimization against the medium sized attack 
consisted of 41,217 test combinations of which 2,179 were on the optimal frontier.  For 
the optimization against the large attack, 36,719 combinations were tested and 1,327 
were on the optimal frontier.   
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Figure 162: Optimal Frontier for ADA Optimization Against a Large-Size Attack 
 
 
8.7.  Selection of an Alternative on the Optimal Frontier - TOPSIS 
Each point on the optimal frontiers described in the previous section represents a 
combination of blue tactics (i.e. altitudes to begin and end engagements, number of 
interceptors to shoot, which interceptors to shoot, etc.).  Each of these combinations is 
optimal in that it achieves a non-dominated solution meaning that at least one objective 
(lowest cost, lowest fraction of aircraft destroyed, lowest fraction of POL destroyed, or 
greatest fraction of MOSs available) is optimal.  The ADA systems can only execute one 
of these optimal sets of tactics.  Therefore, a single point (set of tactics) on the optimal 
frontier must be chosen.    
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The selection of the optimal set of tactics is a multi-objective problem.  The goal is to 
simultaneously maximize or minimize several objectives and the chosen set of tactics will 
represent a compromise between these goals. Each goal, however, is not equally 
important.  Some goals such as minimization of the number of aircraft destroyed might 
be more important than the cost of the interceptors fired or the amount of runway 
damaged since the runway is easily repaired.  Therefore a multi-attribute decision making 
(MADM) tool that includes a weighted goal matrix is needed.  The Technique for 
Ordered Preference by Similarity to the Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) fits all these criteria.   
 The idea for TOPSIS originated from Hwang and Yoon.  They proposed selection 
of the optimal solution based on the closeness to the ideal positive solution and the 
furthest from the ideal negative solution [168].  This idea forms the basis of TOPSIS 
which can be best summarized as a decision making tool that uses weighted criteria to 
measure the Euclidean distance of each alternative to the ideal positive and ideal negative 
solutions.  The selected alternative has the closest distance to the ideal positive solution 
and the furthest distance from the ideal negative solution.  The ideal positive solution is a 
fictitious solution that, for each criteria, contains the best value (maximum for criteria 
that are maximized or minimum for criteria that are minimized) from all the sets of 
alternatives.  The ideal negative solution contains the worst value from any alternative.  
In other words, both the positive and negative ideal solutions combine different values 
from different alternatives to form the hypothetically best possible alternative.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 163.  
 285 
 
Figure 163: TOPSIS Methodology 
 
 TOPSIS begins with an decision matrix (DM).  This is a MxN matrix made up of 
M criteria (Cm) with N alternatives (An).  In this context, the DM is made up of all the 
points on the optimal frontier.  This decision matrix is shown below with the weights (Wj) 
shown next to the associated criteria [169]. 
𝐷𝑀 =  
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 Each criteria will have its own scale based on the attributes of that criteria.  
Therefore, the first step of TOPSIS is to normalize the criteria to a scale of 0-1 in order to 
form the normalized decision matrix (NDM).  Without this step, the criteria with the 
largest scale or largest range would dominate the decision process.  Each criteria (row in 
the DM) is normalized by dividing the score (xij) by the root-sum of squares (RSS) for 
that criteria (row in the DM): 





This will form the NDM. 
𝑁𝐷𝑀 =  














𝑅!! 𝑅!! … 𝑅!"
 
The next step is to incorporate the weights for each criteria.  These weights can be 
formed from a survey of the decision makers from another MADM technique such as the 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) [169].  These weights should be normalized so that 
they sum to a total of one.  Using these normalized weights, the value of each alternative 
is found by: 
𝑉!" =𝑊! ∗ 𝑅!" 
 Incorporating the weights forms the value decision matrix (VDM).  Each 
alternative has been normalized and weighted.  The next step is to use the VDM to select 
the positive ideal solution (PIS) and the negative ideal solution (NIS).  This is done by 
selecting the best and worst value for each criteria from amongst all the alternatives 
[169]: 
𝑃𝐼𝑆 = 𝐴! = 𝑉!!,𝑉!!,… ,𝑉!!   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉!! = max 𝑉!" 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 , min 𝑉!" 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽′   
𝑁𝐼𝑆 = 𝐴! = 𝑉!!,𝑉!!,… ,𝑉!!   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉!! = min 𝑉!" 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 , max 𝑉!" 𝑖𝑓 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽′   
where J is the set of criteria that are to be maximized and J’ are the set of criteria to be 
minimized.   
 The final step in the TOPSIS methodology is to calculate the Euclidean distance 
between each alternative and the PIS and NIS.  Here S+ is the distance to the PIS and S- is 
the distance to the NIS [169]. 
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𝑆!! = 𝑉!! − 𝑉!"
!!
!!!
   𝑖 = 1,2,…𝑚 
𝑆!! = 𝑉!! − 𝑉!"
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!!!
   𝑖 = 1,2,…𝑚 
 The relative closeness (C) to the PIS of each alternative is then found by the 





 Once the relative closeness for all alternatives has been calculated, these closeness 
values are rank ordered from largest to smallest for comparison.  The alternative with the 
largest value of relative closeness is the best alternative.   
8.8.  Selection of the Optimal Set of Blue Tactics - TOPSIS 
The previous section explained the TOPSIS methodology for selecting an 
alternative based upon weighted criteria.  This methodology was used to select the set of 
ADA tactics that would achieve the best compromise of all the criteria based upon the 
weight matrix. There were four criteria in this selection, the fraction of aircraft destroyed, 
the fraction of POL sites destroyed, and the fraction of MOSs available on the runway, 
and the cost of the blue interceptors fired against incoming missiles.  All criteria were to 
be minimized except the fraction of MOSs available, which was to be maximized.   
The weights for these criteria are expressed below in Table 52. The fraction of 
available MOSs was weighted the lowest mainly because only a small number of MOSs 
are required to support most operations and many airfields now have rapid runway repair 
kits that can repair damaged MOSs in a very short amount of time [106, 170].  This 
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criterion was the basis of comparison for the other three.  The aircraft are the most 
expensive and critical asset on the airfield.  Therefore, they were weighted as five times 
more important than preventing damage to the runway.  The next most important criteria 
was the fraction of POL sites destroyed.  There are a limited number of these fuel sites 
and if too many are destroyed then operations on the airfield could be hindered until the 
sites are repaired.  Defending the POL sites was weighted as three times more important 
than defense of the runway.  Finally, the cost of the blue interceptors was the next most 
important criteria since a long-term conflict would require a defense that conserves 
resources.  Reducing the cost of the defense was weighted as twice as important as 
defense of the runway.  
  Table 52: Decision Matrix for ADA Tactics Optimization 







Weight 5 3 1 2 
Normalized Weight 0.455 0.273 0.090 0.182 
Direction of Optimization Min Min Max Min 
 
Using the weigh matrix with the TOPSIS methodology resulted in a set of 
optimized tactics for each sized attack.  This optimized tactics set is shown below in 
Table 53 and graphically depicted in Figure 164 and Figure 165.  The maximum altitude 
and maximum range are starred because these are calculated values and not true decision 
variables.  The maximum altitude for the LT system is the smaller of either 5,000 meters 
below the UT system’s minimum altitude or the LT system interceptor’s maximum 
capable altitude.  The maximum range for the LT system is calculated based on the 
equation in Figure 146. 
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Max*	 Min	 Max*	 Min	 CM	 TBM	 CM	 TBM	 Max	 Min	
Small	 20,000	 9,090	 4,552	 500	 1	 1	 C	 C	 53,711	 38,129	 1	
Med	 25,000	 12,236	 6,172	 500	 1	 1	 C	 B	 53,090	 34,886	 1	
Large	 30,000	 24,830	 11,923	 500	 1	 1	 C	 A	 57,677	 43,677	 1	
 
 The TBM engagements are altitude dependent.  Figure 164 below shows the 
engagement altitudes of the UT and LT system for the base case and the optimized 
engagements altitudes for the three attack sizes. In addition, each interceptor’s full 
engagement space and probability of kill (pk) is also plotted for reference (see section 
7.2.3 for a description of the weapon pk values).  The dark band within the pk diagram is 
the engagement window for each interceptor.  This is the area between the maximum and 
minimum engagement altitude.  In the base case, the UT system uses its interceptor’s full 
engagement space.  This crowds out the LT system, which must begin engagement well 
within its operating envelope.   
 
Figure 164: TBM Engagement Altitudes for Optimized Tactics 
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For the optimized cases, the UT systems all begin their attacks at an altitude 
where the pk value is greatest.  This is shown as the dotted line in each of the three attack 
size cases.  The lower limit of the engagement space is also well within the UT 
interceptor’s envelope.  This caused the number of possible engagements for the UT 
interceptor to remain at one.  This is likely due to the high cost of the UT interceptor.   
In all three cases, the optimized tactics have the LT interceptor beginning its 
engagements at the very top of its engagement envelope.  This is because the CM 
engagements cannot begin until after the TBM engagements (see Figure 165 for CM 
engagement space).  The medium attack case had the largest engagement window for the 
LT system.  For the large attack, the interceptor used was interceptor A.  This interceptor 
can have 12 interceptors in flight at once and travels the fastest of the three LT 
interceptors.  This large number meant that the engagement space could be smaller since 
the interceptors would reach their targets faster and a larger number interceptors could be 
used in that space.  This gave more engagement space for defense against the CMs (see 
Figure 165).   
For the medium attack case, the interceptor used was interceptor B.  With 15 
missiles inbound and only 16 interceptor B missiles on the rails, the LT system was 
saturated.  This meant that all interceptors had to be used.  Interceptor B is limited to 10 
in flight at once and travels 40% slower than interceptor A, so it required a larger 
engagement window to complete all its interceptors.  This left only a small window for 
CM intercepts.   
In the small-sized attack size case, there were more than enough LT interceptor C 
missiles to address the five inbound threats of each type.  Interceptor C can also have five 
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interceptors in flight and the engagements occurred at a lower altitude since the LT 
interceptor C has the smallest engagement envelope.  Also, interceptor C traveled at a 
speed between that of A and B (20% slower than interceptor A). This meant that the time 
from launch to intercept was very short so one or two intercepts could occur in the small 
window.  This left more time for the CM engagements. 
 
Figure 165: CM Engagement Ranges for Optimized Tactics 
 
The results of these new tactics are shown below in Figure 166.  In this figure, the 
yellow bars show the predicted average outcomes of the base case for each the evaluation 
criteria for each the three attack sizes.  Three of the criteria are minimization criteria, 
fraction of aircraft destroyed, fraction of POL sites destroyed, and cost of the blue 
interceptors shot.  The fraction of MOSs available is a maximization criterion.  The blue 
bars show the predicted average outcomes using the prediction calculations.  The largest 
difference between the base case and the optimized case occurs for the small attack size.  
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In the medium and large attack size, there is a large decrease in the average cost of the 
defense, but there is only a small improvement in the other criteria.   
 
Figure 166: Predicted Average Outcomes for Base and Tactics Optimized Cases 
 
8.9.  Test the Optimal Set of Blue Tactics in High Fidelity Models 
The optimization in the previous section used predictive models that estimated the 
average outcome of the high fidelity models.  In order to validate the results, the base 
case and optimized case must be tested in the higher fidelity models.  For both the base 
case and the optimized case, the inputs were coded into the EADSIM input files using a 
wrapper function similar to that described in section 7.3.  For each sized fire plan, the 
optimized set of tactics was tested against all the fire plans on the red optimal frontier.  
The leakers from these simulations were then passed to the runway cratering and airfield 
effects models described in sections 6.2 and 6.4.  Each of these simulations is stochastic, 
so this process was repeated 10-20 times. Because each sized attack contained 500-1,500 
optimized fire plans on the optimal frontier, this meant that the process observed 5,000-
30,000 results from the high fidelity simulations.  The results of this test are shown below 
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in Figure 167.  In this figure the red line is a cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
the stochastic outcomes of the base case.  The blue line is the CDF of the outcomes for 
the optimized case.   
 
Figure 167: Simulation Results of the Base Case and Tactics Only Optimization 
 
The results confirm those seen with the average outcome in Figure 166.  The only 
major change from the predicted averages to the actual CDFs was that the small attack 
did not realize the reduction in damage to aircraft, POL sites, or the runway that was 
predicted from the TOPSIS results.  Instead, the actual simulation results showed that the 
amount of damage was the same for both the base case and the optimized case.  The 
small case, however, did realize the cost savings that was predicted by the TOPSIS 
results.  For the medium and large-sized attack cases, there was a small improvement in 
the fraction of aircraft and POL destroyed and a large improvement in the cost of the 
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defense.  Looking at the number of MOSs available, the medium-sized attack showed 
only a small improvement and the large-sized attack actually showed a reduction in the 
amount of runway available.  This is the opposite of what the optimization was supposed 
to achieve; however, this is not surprising since that criteria was weighted the least.  
Even though the optimized tactics appear to improve the defenses, the results are 
stochastic, so the improvement could be due to random chance.  To show that this is not 
the case, a statistical test, the Student’s T-Test of the means, can be preformed.  
The Student’s T-Test is a hypothesis test to determine if two sample means are 
different [133].  In the most formal sense, Student’s original T-Test assumed equal 
variance among the test samples.  The more general test is called the Welch’s T-Test, 
where the sample variances are not necessarily equal; however, most sources refer to all 
forms of the hypothesis test as the Student’s T-Test [171].  This general form typically 
falls under the header: Equal or Unequal sample sizes, unequal variances and is the most 








    

















       
 
In these two equations:  
 t= t-statistic to test if the populations means are different 
 Xn= Sample mean of sample group n 
Sn = Standard deviation of group n 
nn = Number of samples in group n 
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This t-statistic calculated above is then compared to standard t-test probability 
tables.  These tables tell the P-value needed to confirm the hypothesis for a given number 
of degree of freedom, df, number of tails, and confidence interval.  The confidence 
interval is how confident the researcher desires the prediction to be.  Typically, this is 
0.05 or 0.01 meaning 95% or 99% confident respectively.  In this case, a 95% confidence 
test (p=0.05) was preformed.  A two-tail test means that the mean of the test sample could 
be above or below the control sample. A one-tailed test means that the test sample’s mean 
will be only above or below the control’s mean.  The t-statistic is then compared to the P-
value.  If the t-test statistic is greater than the P-value then the researcher rejects the null 
hypothesis, that the two means are the same, and finds evidence that the two sample 
means are from two different populations with different means, with the confidence used 
to select the P-value.   
The results of the t-test are shown below in Table 54. In this table, all tests 
rejected the null hypothesis, that the two means were the same, except for the small-sized 
raid for the fraction of POL sites destroyed and the fraction of MOSs available.  These 
values are shown in red.  This validates that the optimized cases did improve the 
outcomes for the medium and large attacks and the small attack only realize a reduction 
in the cost, but the same amount of damage to the airfield. 
Table 54: T-Test for Optimized Tactics vs Base Case 
P-value from T-test %AC %POL %MOS Cost 
Small 0.001 0.90 0.37 0 
Medium 3.4E-106 3.9E-78 4.0E-128 0 




8.10.  Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous section revealed that the small-sized attack did not see an 
improvement in the amount of damage to the airfield, but it did realize a reduction in the 
cost of the defense.  For the medium and large-sized attacks, there was an improvement 
in all areas except for the amount of undamaged runway following a large-sized attack.  
If the optimized tactics do not achieve the required results, then a material solution is 
required.  In order to determine the best material solution, a sensitivity analysis is 
required based on the now optimized tactics.  A sensitivity analysis will show what 
changes in the tactics yields the largest changes to the outcomes.  The new material 
solution could then be tailored to help facilitate this adjustment. 
The sensitivity analysis is a computationally intense activity that requires many 
function calls.  This would be inefficient and cumbersome to do with the high fidelity 
simulations.  Instead, it is better if the sensitivity analysis uses the predictive models.  
The input variables for the optimized tactics included both continuous and discrete 
variables.  For each continuous input variable, the analysis will examine the effects of 
increasing and decreasing the input variable by 10%, while holding all other variables 
constant [172].  If 10% above or below the optimal input causes the variable to exceed a 
limit, then the analysis will only go until that limit.  For discrete variables, each setting of 
the discrete variable is tested.   
The results of the small attack are shown below.  Figure 168 is the sensitivity of 
the UT input variables and Figure 169 is the sensitivity of the LT input variables.  In each 
figure, the outcomes are shown vertically (fraction of aircraft damages, fraction of POL 
destroyed, fraction of MOSs available, and cost of the defense).  The continuous 
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variables are shown in each column and the discrete variables are shown as different lines 
within each graph. 
 
Figure 168: Sensitivity of UT Variables for Small-Sized Attack 
 
 
Figure 169: Sensitivity of LT Variables for Small-Sized Attack 
  
 For the small-sized attack, all outputs are most sensitive to the UT maximum and 
minimum altitude. This indicates that the size of the UT engagement space is critical to 
 298 
maintain.  Most variables, other than cost, were insensitive to the shot doctrine of the UT 
system.  For the LT input variables, all outcomes were insensitive to the minimum range 
of the interceptors, but were highly sensitive to the shot doctrine, interceptor choice, and 
to a lesser degree the minimum altitude.  It is important to remember that the minimum 
altitude is linked to the maximum range for CM engagements, since CM engagements 
cannot start until after the TBM engagements.  This will be important when selecting a 
new system in the following steps.  The medium-sized attack showed similar trends.  The 
sensitivity of UT variables for the medium-sized attack are shown in Figure 170 and the 
sensitivity for the LT variables for the medium-sized attack are shown in Figure 171. 
  




Figure 171: Sensitivity of LT Variables for a Medium-Sized Attack 
 
The optimal solution for a medium sized attack is most sensitive to the UT maximum 
and minimum altitudes.  The outcomes for the medium-sized attack are also more 
sensitive to the shot doctrine used than were the outcomes for the small-sized attack.  The 
outcomes of the medium-sized attack were not very sensitive to the minimum range of 
the LT system.  They were slightly sensitive to the minimum altitude.  Additionally, all 
outcomes were highly sensitive to the choice of interceptor and shot doctrine.  Similar 
trends hold for the large-sized attack.  The results of the large-sized attack sensitivity 
analysis for the UT input variables is shown in Figure 172 and for the LT input variables 




Figure 172: Sensitivity of the UT Variables for a Large-Sized Attack 
 
 
Figure 173: Sensitivity of the LT Variables for a Large-Sized Attack  
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 The sensitivity of variables in the large-sized attack shows a similar trend to that 
of those same variables in the medium-sized attack.  The outcomes are highly sensitive to 
the UT shot doctrine and engagement altitudes.  The outcomes are also highly sensitive to 
the LT minimum altitude, shot doctrine, and interceptor choice.   
8.11.  Selection of a Material Solution 
  The initial optimization looked at changes to the tactics used by the blue systems.  
These changes in tactics caused a shift in the output CDFs of the simulation showing an 
increased likelihood of a more favorable outcome for each output variable except for the 
damage to the runway in the large attack case.  This was especially true for the medium 
and large sized attack, but the small-sized attack only showed marginal improvement.  
Should a commander decide that the optimized ADA tactics do not change the outcomes 
enough, a new material solution is needed.  The sensitivity analysis is an important step 
to determining how to close the capability gaps with a material solution.   
All attack sizes revealed that the outputs were sensitive the LT minimum altitude. 
This variable is key in the engagements because it controls both the LT TBM engagement 
window and the CM engagement window since the maximum range of the CM 
engagements is a function of the minimum altitude of the TBM engagements.  Although 
there is also a high sensitivity to the UT input variables, there are already two systems 
engaging TBMs. Therefore, the new point defense (PT) system will be investigated.  This 
PT system is capable of defending against CMs only.  By relieving the LT of the full 
responsibility of defeating the CMs, the LT system should be able to engage more TBMs.    
A summary of the PT system’s decision variables is shown below in Table 55.  The 
PT system has three launchers each with 10 interceptors each (30 interceptors total).  
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When integrated into the engagement que, the PT system will defend against CMs behind 
the LT system.  This means that the PT systems’ maximum range is dependent on the LT 
system’s minimum range.  In order to account to target coordination during the handoff 
from the LT system, the PT system’s maximum range is set to either 500 meters less than 
the LT system’s minimum range, or the maximum range of the PT interceptor (20,000m), 
whichever is less.  
Table 55: Point Defense System Input Variables 
System Variables Value Range Units 
Point Defense (PT) Minimum Engagement Range –CM 500-20,000 Meters Shot Doctrine - CM 1 or 2 each 
 
8.12.  Optimization of the Red Tactics with New Equipment 
The selection of a new material solution completes the first iteration of the design 
cycle of the new proposed methodology (see Figure 12).   Now, with the new ADA 
system organization that includes the PT system, the methodology starts again from the 
top.  The first step in this process is to optimize the red fire plans again so that they are 
now optimized to do the most damage, recognizing that the blue forces has a new ADA 
system. For the new base case, the PT system operated with the tactics described below 
in Table 56.  All other blue ADA system tactics were the same, as described in Table 49.   
Table 56: PT System Default Tactics for New Base Case 
System Variable Set Value 
Point Defense (PT) 
Number of Launchers 3 ea. 
Maximum Engagement Range 1500 meters 
Minimum Engagement Range 100 meters 
Shot Doctrine 1 interceptor 
 
The default maximum engagement range for the PT system is 500 meters less 
than the default minimum engagement range of the LT system.  The minimum 
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engagement range of the PT system is set to its lower limit in order to maximize the PT 
system’s engagement window.  Finally, the PT system shot doctrine is the same as the LT 
system’s shot doctrine against CMs.  
The optimization process for the new red fire plans was similar to that described 
for the base case in section 8.4.  The optimization software OptDef was used for the 
optimization (see section 8.3).  The resulting optimal frontier of red missile numbers and 
tactics for this optimization are shown below in Figure 174, Figure 175, and Figure 176.  
The shapes of the optimal frontiers are similar to those of the original base case, however, 
they are shifted on each axis indicating a small reduction in the amount of damage to the 
airfield due to the new PT system. 
 The new optimal frontier for the small sized attack is shown in Figure 174.  This 
frontier contains 832 points.  The optimization program tested 34,170 points to find this 
optimal frontier.  Similarly, the new optimal frontier for the medium-sized fire plan is 
shown in Figure 175. For the medium-sized fire plan, the frontier contains 851 points and 
the program tested 53,498 points.  Finally, the large-sized fire plan is shown in Figure 
176.  This frontier contains 769 points and the program tested 33,488 points. 
 




Figure 175: Optimal Frontier for Medium-Sized Attack with PT System Included 
 
 
Figure 176: Optimal Frontier for Large-Sized Attack with PT System Included 
  
8.13.  Optimization of the Blue Tactics with New Equipment 
With the new optimized fire plans, the blue tactics can once again be optimized, now 
with the PT system, in order to minimize the damage to the airfield at the lowest cost.  
This optimization was done in a similar manner to that explained in section 8.6, but 
included the PT system with the variable ranges explained in Table 55.   The optimization 
also had an added constraint that the minimum engagement range PT system had to be 
less than its maximum engagement range minus 500 meters.  The maximum engagement 
 305 
range was not a decision variable and was instead calculated as 500 meters less than the 
minimum engagement range of the LT system.   
Similar to the optimization of the tactics only case, for each set of blue decision 
variables, all optimal fire plans on the new frontier were tested for the given raid size.  
This meant that each test case of the ADA decision variables was tested against several 
hundred optimal fire plans.  Once all fire plans were tested against the set of decision 
variables, the damage to the runway, fuel, or aircraft was averaged, so that the output was 
the mean effect from all the optimal fire plans.  
 The results of this optimization are shown below in Figure 177, Figure 178, and 
Figure 179.  Just as in the tactics only optimization from section 8.6, there are two graphs 
in each image.  In both graphs, the vertical axis is the average cost of the ADA 
interceptors shot using the relative costs explained in section 7.2.2.  All costs are relative 
to the LT interceptor type A, which has a cost of one unit.  The x and y-axis of the left 
graph of each figure shows the average fraction of MOSs available and the average 
number of POL sites destroyed.  The graphs on the right of each figure show the average 
number of MOSs again and the average fraction of aircraft destroyed.  In these 
simulations, the ADA defenses are trying to minimize cost, maximize the number of 
MOSs available, and minimize the number of fuel sites (POL) and aircraft (AC) 
destroyed. For each sized fire plan, the new optimal frontier of points shows a different 
shape than those from the original base case.  This indicates that the tactics with the new 
system are different and that the new PT system caused a change in the amount of 
damage to the airfield. 
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 The optimal frontier for the blue ADA system’s tactics with the new PT system 
included against a small-sized optimal raid is shown in Figure 177.  This frontier has 
1,580 optimal tactics combinations and the program tested 58,029 design points.  The 
optimal frontier against the medium-sized raid is shown in Figure 178.  This frontier has 
978 points and the program tested 46,176 design points.   Finally, the optimal frontier 
against the large-sized attack is shown in Figure 179.  This frontier has 1,914 optimal 
points and the program tested 58,096 design points.   
 
 









Figure 179: Optimal Frontier for ADA Optimization with PT System Against a Large-Size Attack 
 
8.14.  Selection of the Optimal Set of Blue Tactics with PT System - TOPSIS 
Each point on the optimal frontiers, found in the previous section, represents a 
combination of tactics that minimized the damage to the airfield at the lowest cost.  In a 
similar manner to the optimization of tactics alone, TOPSIS was used to select the single 
set of tactics that now include the PT system, which represents the best compromise of all 
the criteria based upon the weight matrix. The PT system was introduced in order to close 
a capability gap that the original set of equipment and optimized tactics could not close 
alone.  These objectives have not changed so the weight matrix is the same as what was 
used in the original optimization (see Table 52).  
There were four criteria in this selection, the fraction of aircraft destroyed, the 
fraction of POL sites destroyed, and fraction of MOSs available on the runway, and the 
cost of the blue interceptors fired against incoming missiles.  All criteria were to be 
minimized except the fraction of MOSs available, which was to be maximized. The set of 
tactics selected for each raid size is summarized in Table 57 and shown graphically in 
Figure 181 for the decision variables relating to TBM engagements and in Figure 180 for 
the decision variables related to CM engagements.  In the table, the values with stars (*) 
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indicate a calculated value and not a true decision variable.  The LT maximum altitude 
was the minimum of either the maximum altitude for the LT interceptor or the UT 
minimum engagement altitude minus 5,000 meters.  The LT max range was based on the 
LT minimum altitude and given by the equation in Figure 146.  Finally, the PT system’s 
maximum range was the minimum of the PT system interceptor’s max range or the LT 
system’s minimum range minus 500 meters. 
Table 57: Optimized ADA Tactics with PT System Included 
System Lower Tier 
Attack Size Altitude Range Shot Doc Interceptor Max* Min Max* Min CM TBM CM TBM 
Small 20,000 8,951 4,487 3,882 1 1 C C 
Medium 30,000 24,390 11,712 11,113 1 1 C A 
Large 30,000 24,866 11,940 11,397 1 1 C A 
     
System Upper Tier PT Defense   
Attack Size Altitude Shot Doc Range Shot Doc   Max Min TBM Max* Min CM   
Small 47,150 42,150 1 3,382 100 2   
Medium 53,842 34,839 1 10,613 100 1   




Figure 180: TBM Engagement Altitudes for Optimized Tactics with PT System 
 
 




 The introduction of the PT system helped the ADA systems defeat CMs.  There 
was little change in the engagement windows for both UT and LT.  The one exception 
was with a medium sized attack, the optimized tactics changed from the LT type B 
interceptor to the LT type A interceptor.  Because the LT type A interceptor has a higher 
maximum altitude, the engagement altitude increased and the engagement window 
increased as well.   
The largest change in the tactics was in the LT system’s engagement window 
against CMs.  This makes sense since the PT system is a CM only system, so it can only 
help in the CM fight.  Just as in the original base case, the lower end of the CM 
engagement window was at the minimum range of the system, the PT system in this case 
as opposed to LT system.  In all three sizes of attacks, the LT CM engagement window 
was very small.  It was only large enough to take a few shots with the LT type C 
interceptor and not enough to engage all threats.  Instead, the PT system was the primary 
weapon used against the CMs.  This make sense since the Pk of the PT system is only 
slightly lower than the LT interceptor C system, but the PT system has twice as many 
available interceptors in the launchers.  Additionally, the PT interceptors are half the cost 
of the LT type C interceptors.   
The small size of the LT system’s engagement window against CMs indicates that 
it is not needed in the CM fight.  The overall program setup required that CMs were 
engaged by the LT system first, followed by the PT system (see section 7.6 and Figure 
140).  The PT system’s maximum range was a dependent variable calculated as the LT 
minimum range minus 500 meters.  In the same manner, the LT system’s maximum 
range was also a dependent variable and was a function of the LT system’s minimum 
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engagement altitude against TBMs.  These two dependencies coupled the CM and TBM 
engagements together.   
The PT system was not able to engage CMs until the LT system was complete 
and the LT system could not engage CMs until it was complete against TBMs.  Because 
the LT system’s engagement window was so small, it can be removed from the CM 
engagements.  This will decouple the TBM and CM engagements, meaning that they can 
take place simultaneously with different systems.  The UT and LT system will engage 
TBMs while the PT system engages CMs.    
Since the PT system is engaging CMs alone, it can begin those engagements at its 
maximum range.  Likewise, since the LT system does not have to transition from TBM 
engagements to CM engagements, it can continue to engage TBMs all the way to its 
minimum engagement altitude (2,000 meters).  These revised optimized tactics are shown 
below in Table 58.  The entries in red are the revised values based on the decoupled TBM 
and CM engagements.  The LT maximum altitude is starred in the table because this 
value was a dependent variable, just as in previous cases.  The LT maximum altitude was 
the larger of the UT system’s minimum engagement altitude minus 5,000 meters of the 
maximum altitude of the LT system’s interceptor.  This data is also shown graphically for 







Table 58: Revised ADA Tactics with PT System Included (Entries in Red Are New Based on 
Decoupled CM and TBM Engagements) 
System Lower Tier 
Attack Size Altitude Range Shot Doc Interceptor Max* Min Max Min CM TBM CM TBM 
Small 20000 2000 NA NA 1 1 C C 
Medium 30000 2000 NA NA 1 1 C A 
Large 30000 2000 NA NA 1 1 C A 
     
System Upper Tier PT Defense   
Attack Size Altitude Shot Doc Range Shot Doc   Max Min TBM Max Min CM   
Small 47150 42150 1 20000 100 2   
Medium 53842 34839 1 20000 100 1   
Large 48183 43177 1 20000 100 1   
 
 





Figure 183: CM Engagement Ranges for Revised Tactics with PT System 
  
 
 These revised tactics were tested with the predictive models before being used in 
the high fidelity model.  The predictive models only estimate the average values for each 
of the four outcomes. The results of this test is shown in Figure 184.  This graph shows 
that the new tactics with the PT system included should reduce the damage to the aircraft 
and POL sites and increase the number of MOSs available for all attack sizes.  The cost, 
however, will likely increase from what it was in the tactics only optimization and will 
likely be comparable to the base case. 
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Figure 184: Predicted Average Outcomes for Base and Revised Optimized Cases with PT System 
 
8.15. Test the Optimal Blue Tactics, with PT system, in High Fidelity Model 
 
Just as in the optimization of the tactics only, the optimized solution must be 
tested in the high fidelity simulations, since the optimization made use of predictive 
models that sacrifice a small amount of accuracy for speed.  The new optimized input 
tactics, now with the PT system included, were coded into the EADSIM input files using 
a wrapper function.   
For each sized attack, the single optimized set of ADA tactics was tested against 
all the fire plans on the red optimal frontier.  The leakers from these simulations were 
then passed to the runway cratering and airfield effects models described in sections 6.2 
and 6.4.  In each attack size, the optimized tactics were tested against 500-1,500 
optimized fire plans.  Because the programs were stochastic, this process was repeated 
10-20 times creating an array of 500-30,000 observations of each outcome.  The results 
of this test are shown below in Figure 185.  In this figure, the red line is a cumulative 
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distribution function (CDF) of the stochastic outcomes of the base case.  The blue line is 
the CDF of the outcomes for the optimized case.   
 
Figure 185: Simulation Results of the Base Case, Tactics Only Optimization, and Optimization with 
new PT System Included 
 
Each graph in Figure 185 includes the CDF of base case as the black line, the 
CDF of tactics only optimization as the red line, and the CDF of optimization of tactics 
with the PT system as the blue line.  For the small-sized attack, the additional PT system 
reduced the amount of damage to aircraft and POL sites from both the base case and the 
tactics optimization only case.  The PT system also increased the amount of useable 
runway slightly as compared to the base case all for, approximately, the same cost as the 
optimization of the tactics alone.   
For the medium-sized attacks, the addition of the PT system resulted in 
approximately the same probability of damage for the aircraft and POL sites as compared 
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to the tactics only optimization, but a small increase in the probability of available 
runway.  The probability of the cost was slightly greater than that of the tactics only case, 
but less than the base case.  
For the large-sized attack, the addition of the PT system reduced the probability of 
damage to both the aircraft and POL sites and also increased the probability of available 
runway.  The cost, however, was slightly greater than the optimization of tactics alone, 
but still less than the base case. 
Because the simulations were stochastic, the changes to the outcomes outlined 
above could have been due to random chance and not because there was an overall 
change in the process.  In order to verify that the changes are statistically significant, a 
Student’s T-Test of the means was conducted with a 95% confidence level for the base 
case and the optimized tactics with the PT system.  The results of this test are shown 
below in Table 59. 
Table 59: T-Test Results for Base Case and Optimized Tactics with PT System 
P-value from T-test %AC %POL %MOS Cost 
Small 0 0 0 0 
Medium 0 0 0 0 
Large 2.7E-164 4.6E-277 2.5E-125 0 
 
The results of the T-Test help to answer the second research question: Will the 
proposed method allow for rapid optimization tactics against a complex attack that is 
reproducible in the high fidelity system?  The hypothesis for this research question was 
that the optimized result from the proposed method will show an equal amount or a 
reduction in the damage to the airfield for a lower or equal cost over the base case, with a 
95% confidence level, for both the case with and without the new system.  In both the 
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tactics only case (Table 54) and the tactics with a new system (Table 59), the results 
show that the new method will optimize the results of the high fidelity simulations.   
The optimized results show that the two highest weighted criteria, which were 
reduced damage to aircraft and reduced damage to the POL sites, both showed a 
reduction in the probability of damage.  All cases also showed a decrease in the 
probability of the cost.  The lowest weighted priority, damage to the runway, showed a 







9.  CONCLUSIONS 
“You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today.” 
             - Abraham Lincoln 
 
Oftentimes, military planners view airbases and seaports far from the front lines 
as sanctuaries that are beyond the reach of the enemy forces.  This is especially true 
during the last decade and a half of war against a low-tech enemy while we have 
vulnerable, large, open bases.  There will come a time in future conflicts when this will 
not be the case due to the growing proliferation and stock piling of TBMs and CMs.  
Even in previous conflicts that did involve TBMs and CMs, the raids were relatively 
small and easily handled by our current systems and doctrine.  The proliferation of 
technology will increase the number and complexity of these missile systems and the 
current systems and doctrine will not be able to manage these large and complex strikes.  
This research demonstrated a methodology to optimize ADA tactics and organization 
against such overwhelming attacks. 
The conclusions from this work fall into one of two categories: conclusions about 
the proposed methodology and conclusions about ADA analysis in general.  For the 
proposed methodology, this work demonstrates that machine learning and optimization 
plays an important role in ADA system’s tactics and organization analysis.  Once built, 
the predictive models run in fractions of a second compared to the minutes or hours 
required for the higher fidelity ADA and weapons effects simulations.  This is especially 
true given that both these simulations are stochastic; so many runs of a particular input 
set are required to produce meaningful results. 
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Secondly, before any analysis of the friendly ADA tactics and organization, it is 
necessary to optimize the enemy fire plan.  In any ADA analysis, the most controlling 
variables of the simulation are the enemy fire plan.  In military graphics, the enemy 
forces are drawn in red and friendly forces in blue.  If there is not considerable thought 
and analysis that goes into the red fire plan first, then any analysis of the blue ADA 
systems is dubious at best.  All new officers in the Army are taught: “Pick up the red pen 
first.” This emphasizes to young officers the value of creating a template of the enemy 
position and then developing the most likely enemy course of action, before planning any 
mission or course of action by the friendly forces.  This same thought process applies to 
ADA system’s analysis.  The proposed analysis starts first with an optimization of the 
enemy fire plan before moving to the ADA system’s own tactics optimizations.   
Looking at ADA analysis in general, one of the most important conclusions is that 
ADA tactics should be optimized based on weapons effects analysis and not simply 
trying to minimize the number of leakers.  This work proposed and demonstrated a 
method to tie together existing research for weapons cratering and weapons blast analysis 
in order to create an effects model for an airfield.  A similar process could be used for an 
effects model for other likely missile targets such as seaports, assembly areas, and 
command and control nodes.   
The airfield damage effects model allows the analyst to articulate the damage 
caused by the leakers, which goes beyond knowing merely that there were leakers.  This 
is important because the damage done by the leakers can cause a change in the ability of 
the friendly force to accomplish their mission.  This analysis also showed that different 
types of leakers cause different damage.  Therefore, if some damage is more critical to 
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reduce, such as damage to the aircraft, as opposed to the runway, the weapons effect 
models allows the analyst to tailor the tactics and systems to meet these goals.   
9.1.  Review of Objectives 
The three major objectives of this work and their status are listed below in Table 60.  
All of the research objectives were achieved.   
 
Table 60: Review of Research Objectives 
Number Objective Met? 
1 
Determine a method to merge existing tools for ballistics, cratering 
in concrete, and weapons effects to create a program that will 
optimize the enemy fire plan to create the most damage to runways, 
POL sites, and aircraft for a set number of cruise and ballistic 
missiles as opposed to simply maximizing the number of leakers. 
Yes 
2 
Determine a method to close existing ADA capability gaps through 
changes to organization and/or doctrine against a given set of 
complex threats, at a given location, and for a given a set of ADA 
systems, that will optimize the defense at the lowest cost. 
Yes 
3 
Determine a method that combines ADA simulations and weapons 
effect simulations such that the method maintains the same 
accuracy as high-fidelity models but runs at least an order of 
magnitude faster.    
Yes 
 
The first research objective sought to develop a weapons effects tool for an 
airfield.  This work developed a weapons cratering program that uses a six-degree of 
freedom model to propagate munitions to the ground, it then evaluated three different 
concrete penetration models and selected the one that best matched new experimental 
data.  Finally, it uses best-fit curves from experimental data for explosive cratering in 
concrete. For damage to targets, this work uses weaponeering guided and unguided 
impact accuracy methods to determine where munitions impacted on the airfield.  Then a 
lethal area analysis is implemented to determine the damage caused by different 
weapons.  
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The second objective was to determine a method to close a capability gap in an 
ADA system’s defenses in order to defeat a complex threat, raid made up of both TBMs 
and CMs, for the lowest cost.  The cost element is sometimes overlooked in other 
capability gap analyses.  Adding more capability should always increase the probability 
of achieving a certain objective, but any added capability must be economically feasible.  
In this work, all of the ADA interceptors were assigned a cost, relative to one of the 
missiles.  This cost was based not only on the actual purchase price of the interceptor, but 
also on its existing inventory and how easy it is to obtain more during a wartime 
situation. 
The final objective was to find a method to speed up the ADA and weapons 
effects simulations, while still maintaining the same level of accuracy.  This is needed 
because the ADA and weapons effects simulations used in the methodology of objective 
two can take minutes to hours for a single run and the stochastic nature of the simulations 
requires a large number of runs for a single input set.  This work made use of designs of 
experiments and machine learning to develop predictive models for both the ADA and 
weapons effects simulations.  These predictive models can run on a computer in a 
fraction of a second and maintain enough accuracy to allow them to be used in an 
optimization process as opposed to the higher fidelity simulations.  In order to ensure that 
the optimized solution is better than the base case, it is then run in the high fidelity 
simulations and compared to the base case. 
This methodology of objective two was demonstrated by optimizing an ADA 
system to defend an airfield at the lowest cost.  This demonstration also made use of the 
damage effects tool and predictive models of objectives one and three.  This 
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demonstration began by optimizing the enemy fire plan to maximize the effects the 
enemy force would want to achieve.  Following the red optimization, the second part of 
the new methodology was demonstrated by optimizing the tactics of the ADA system 
without any new equipment in order to try to close the gap through tactics alone.  When 
this was not possible, this work demonstrated the last part of the methodology by 
selecting and testing a new material solution.  It used a sensitivity analysis to identify the 
characteristics of a new ADA system that would be the most beneficial.  It then optimized 
the tactics with the new system in order to determine if the operational goals were met.    
9.2.  Review of Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Each of the above research objectives had a corresponding research question and 
hypothesis.  These are shown below in Table 63 along with a very brief statement about 
the outcome of the outcome of the hypothesis.  A more detailed explanation of the results 












Table 61: Results of the Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Objective Research Question Hypothesis Outcome 
1 
Will a fire plan 
optimized to 
achieve a given 
effect (destruction 
of aircraft, POL 
sites, or runway) be 
the fire plan with 
the greatest number 
of leakers? 
A fire plan weighted with 
CMs, as opposed to TBMs, 
will destroy more point targets 
such as POL sites and aircraft 
and a fire plan weighted with 
TBMs, as opposed to CMs, 
will destroy more area targets 
such as the runway.  These 
will not necessary be the fire 
plans with the most leakers. 
Mostly true.  If the 
aircraft are not 
stationary, then 
they are an area 
target and TBMs 
are more effective 
against them. 
2 
Will the proposed 
method allow for 
rapid optimization 
tactics against a 
complex attack that 
is reproducible in 
the high fidelity 
system?  
 
The optimized result from the 
proposed method will show an 
equal amount or a reduction in 
the damage to the airfield for 
an equal or lower cost over the 
base case, with a 95% 
confidence level, for both the 
case with and without the new 
system. 
True for small and 
medium sized 
attacks.   
 
Large sized attacks 
saw reduced 
damage and cost, 
except for the 











Space filling designs of 
experiments coupled with 
predictive models will be able 
to the shape factors for the 
distributions of the outputs of 
higher fidelity models to such 
an extent that more than 95% 
of validation cases pass the 
chi-squared test at a 99% 
confidence level and will run 
at least an order of magnitude 
faster.  
True for the 
weapons effects 
models.   
 




 The first research question corresponds to the first research objective about 
building a weapons effect model from existing research.  This question asked if a fire 
plan optimized to achieve a certain effect such as destruction of the aircraft or destruction 
of the runway be the fire plan with the most number of leakers.  Before beginning the 
research, it was hypothesized that the greater accuracy of CMs would make them more 
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effective against smaller targets such as the parked aircraft or the POL sites.  Conversely, 
the greater blast damage and size of the resulting craters and the larger spread of the 
submunitions would make TBMs more effective against the area targets such as the 
runway.  This hypothesis turned out to be mostly true.  The TBMs were more effective 
against the runway and the CMs were more effective against the POL sites. However, 
instead of CMs being more effective against the aircraft, the TBMs were slightly more 
effective.   
This is mainly due to the mobile nature of the parked aircraft.  The friendly forces 
understand that the parked aircraft are a lucrative target for missile attacks.  It is wise to 
not park them close together where a single missile has a greater chance of destroying 
multiple aircraft.  However, for ease of maintenance and logistics, each aircraft type 
generally has a specified parking area on the airfield.  In this simulation there were three 
types of aircraft (aircraft A, B and C).  Each aircraft type had a parking area with multiple 
parking locations.  When placing the aircraft, they were restricted to their own parking 
area, unless that parking area was completely full.  At which point, the remaining aircraft 
could be parked anywhere on the airfield.   
In order to spread the aircraft out as much as possible and to simulate the random 
nature of aircraft coming and going from the airfield, the aircraft were parked on the 
airfield such that they maximized the minimum distance between aircraft while still 
parking in their designated locations.  This meant that for a given number of each aircraft 
type, the first aircraft was randomly assigned a location within its designated parking 
area.  The subsequent aircraft were placed at the location that maximized the minimum 
distance between all aircraft already placed.  This continued until all aircraft were parked.  
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Because the location of the aircraft changes throughout the day, the aim points of the 
missiles were based on the parking locations and not necessarily the occupied locations.  
Each leaker then randomly targeted a given aim point which may or may not happen to 
be near aircraft, depending on the random draws of that particular simulation run.   
The fact that the missiles were aimed at a large area and not at a specific target 
made the aircraft more of an area target than a point target.  Because they were aimed at 
the general area of the aircraft, the larger damage radius of the TBMs made them more 
effective. Thus, the logic of the hypothesis was true, that TBMs would be more effective 
against area targets and CMs more effective against point targets. But the initial 
characterization of aircraft as point targets was incorrect. 
 The second research objective was about using the proposed methodology to 
conduct a trade study for changes in doctrine (tactics) and organization for an ADA unit.  
The research question asked if the proposed method would allow for rapid optimization 
of tactics against a complex attack that is reproducible in a higher fidelity simulation.  
The proposed method would only be valuable if the results were reproducible in the 
accredited higher fidelity simulations.  The hypothesis for this question was that when the 
optimized results were tested with the higher fidelity simulations the optimized results 
would have a lower amount of damage for an equal or lower cost as compared to the base 
case.  This hypothesis was shown to be true for the small and medium sized attacks.  For 
the large sized attack, the optimized case reduced the damage to the aircraft and POL 
sites and reduced the cost. However, the damage to the runway was increased for both the 
optimization of the tactics only and the optimization of the tactics with the new point 
defense system.  The damage to the runway was the lowest weighted criteria in the 
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selection of the optimized tactics in both cases.  This meant that the optimized solution 
favored reduced damage to the aircraft and POL sites and a lower cost, over reduced 
damage to the runway.  A different arrangement of weights would show different results.  
The increased damage to the runway for the large sized attack can be attributed to the 
reduced engagement space for the UT system in both cases.   
The optimized solution included a reduced engagement shape to limit the number 
of UT interceptors that would be fired.  The UT interceptor was the most expensive 
interceptor at four times the cost of the LT interceptor type A.  Reducing the UT 
engagement space reduced the cost of the defense, but allowed more TBM leakers 
through that layer.  The large sized attack included 30 TBMs.  The LT system was 
limited to either 20 interceptor A missiles or 16 interceptor C missiles depending on the 
chosen missile type.  The optimal Pk for these missiles was around 80%, so the LT 
system was only expected to destroy 16 TBMs with interceptor A or 13 TBMs with 
interceptor C.  The remainder of the incoming TBMs had to be destroyed by the UT 
system.  Therefore, as the UT system’s engagement space was reduced, the number of 
unchallenged TBMs increased.  If the LT system included additional interceptors, then 
the results would have been much closer to that of the base case and most likely at a 
lower cost.  An additional iteration of the optimization process with the proposed 
methodology could prove this to be true. 
 The final objective was to find a way to combine the weapons effects and ADA 
simulations, but use predictive models in order to make the models run faster on a given 
computer.  This was needed because stochastic optimization processes require many 
function calls.  If these function calls are too long, then the optimization process can 
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become so long that it is impractical.  This is especially true since the random nature of 
the ADA and weapons effect simulations requires many runs for each input vector in 
order to understand the range of possible outcomes.  Therefore, the research question was 
designed to see if machine learning and design of experiments could create a fast running 
predictive model of the outputs from the higher fidelity simulations.  It was hypothesized 
that the output ranges of each input could be modeled with a known distribution so that 
the predictive model only had to calculate the shape parameters of that distribution in 
order to predict the range of results.   
 This hypothesis was correct for the weapons effects model, but could not be 
shown as correct for the ADA simulation models.  For the two weapons effects models, 
the runway damage model and airfield damage model, the predictive models were able to 
predict the shape factors of the validation set (a random set of 20% of the data that was 
not used to train the predictive model) to such an extent that visually, the predicted and 
actual histogram of the data matched, and statistically, the two predicted and actual 
distributions passed the chi-squared test (test that they were from the same unknown 
distribution) with 99% confidence level. 
 This was not the case for the ADA simulations model.  The author tried 
innumerous different prediction models and fitting strategies, but was unable to find an 
adequate predictive model for the shape factors of the output distributions.  Instead, 
predictive models were created for the average output of each outcome  (number of 
leakers for a particular missile type, or the number of interceptors fired by the ADA 
system).  These predictive models were later used in the optimization process and the 
solutions found with the predicted average outcomes were superior to the base case using 
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the higher fidelity models to find the actual outcome distributions, so the models proved 
adequate.  Thus, while the hypothesis was not shown to be true for the ADA simulation, 
the predictive models that were constructed still met the research objective. 
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10. CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
“Effective missile defense—not only homeland defense but also the ability to defend US 
allies abroad and our friends—must be achieved in the most cost-effective manner that 
modern technology offers.” 
-  Donald Rumsfeld, Former US Secretary of Defense 
 
This work is critical to the ADA community.  Because actual tests of the systems 
are typically too expensive, the testing and optimization of the systems is done with 
simulations.  These simulations are accredited based on hardware in the loop and the 
limited actual testing that does take place.  This dissertation made use of the DoD 
accredited software EADSIM.  The EADSIM simulation, like many other ADA 
simulations, is very detailed and requires run times on a modern computer ranging from 
minutes to hours for a single run. The simulation also does not include a weapons effect 
model.  This work attempts to address these two issues by creating fast running 
prediction models and designing a weapons effect model based off test data and other 
validated models. 
The cost of ADA systems and interceptors is much greater than the cost of TBMs 
and CMs.  This places the ADA systems on the wrong side of the cost equation.  Further 
proliferation of technology will only increase this problem.  The ADA community needs 
to find new ways to defeat these threats.  This dissertation shows a methodology to 
rapidly examine different tactics and new systems.  This research will contribute the 
following to the greater body of knowledge: 
1. Proposed and demonstrated a methodology to optimize ADA tactics and 
organization that examines non-material solutions first and then new material 
solutions. 
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2. Created and demonstrated a weapons effects model for an airfield that enables the 
creation of optimized fire plans that achieve a certain effect. 
3. Demonstrated that the weapons effects model could be used to minimize damage 
to different parts of the target area as opposed to simply minimizing the number 
of leakers in the analysis of ADA defensive systems. 
4. Showed that the shape parameters of output distributions from damage effects 
models could be predicted with machine learning tools.   
 
In almost all ADA analysis the most controlling variables are the number of 
missiles that are inbound to the target.  In a majority of the literature, and in a large 
number of analysis that the author has either taken part in or reviewed, there are only one 
or two TBM and CM fire plans and they are either assumed or given.  This work created 
and showed a methodology that allows an analyst to quickly develop optimized fire plans 
to achieve certain effects.  The work also showed that there are a large number of 
optimized fire plans that form a non-dominated frontier of fire plans that each is 
optimized to maximize certain objectives.  ADA analysis can use this methodology to 
create and validate their fire plans before beginning a new ADA simulation. 
In a majority of the literature, the goal of the ADA systems optimization is to 
minimize the number of leakers.  This work showed that minimization of the number of 
leakers does not necessarily minimize damage.  Instead, minimization of different missile 
system types is essential.  In this analysis, the author for demonstration purposes, created 
the blast and damage data; however, it was well within reasonable bounds of what would 
be expected from real TBMs and CMs against soft targets like aircraft and POL sites. The 
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analysis showed that TBMs are more effective against area targets, such as the runway 
and mobile aircraft while the CMs are more effective against point targets such as the 
POL sites.  Thus, if one of these targets was more critical then the other, then 
minimization of the missiles that caused the most damage to that target would be easier to 
achieve than trying to minimize the number of leakers of all missile types. 
Once the enemy fire plan is created, this work showed a new methodology to 
optimize the ADA system’s tactics and organization.  The long run times and large 
number of runs required for optimization of a stochastic simulation many times prevents 
a full exploration of the design space.  The proposed methodology, when combined with 
predictive models of the simulations, allows for this full exploration and later 
optimization.  This dissertation was completed with unclassified sources as a way to 
document the methodology; however, the results could be easily repeated with classified 
data and real systems’ data.  
In order to build on this work, future analysis could include counter measures and 
jammers on the TBMs and CMs.  This work only examined TBMs and CMs without any 
counter measures besides early release submunitions.  The missiles with submunitions 
were only vulnerable to being intercepted before they released their submunitions.  Once 
these submunitions were released they were too numerous and hard to hit, so the 
interceptors had no effect on them.  Other counter measures that are becoming more 
prevalent on missiles systems include jammers and decoys.   
Jammers are most often installed on CMs since their effect is diminished at longer 
ranges.  There are two common missile jammers: noise jammers and digital radio 
frequency memory (DRFM).  A noise jammer emits a large amount of random returns 
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within a specific frequency band in order to cause the background noise to increase.  The 
hope is that the background noise will increase enough to hide the true return signal.  A 
DRFM records the incoming signal and then emits a false return signal that will mimic 
the true return.  This creates a line of false targets on the radar.  The operator must then 
choose one of these targets to shoot at and if the false targets are spaced far enough apart 
the true target will be outside the interceptor’s seeker field of view when it reaches the 
location of the false target. 
Another way to improve upon this work would be to look at a larger number of 
TBM and CM launch points.  Section 7.2.5 described how the TBMs were limited to a 
specific area, called a ballistic missile operations area (BMOA), based on the hide sites of 
the launchers (TELs).  However, there could be many more of the BMOAs than what was 
used in this work.  Additionally, CMs are not as limited, so they can be launched from 
many different locations to include approaches that are out of the sector of the phased-
array radars.  The out-of-sector CMs would help to highlight the benefits of a 360-degree 
radar system, such as the one used on the PT system. 
Not only could this analysis be repeated with more TBM and CM launch 
locations, it could be repeated for multiple targets being guarded by multiple ADA 
systems.  This type of analysis would help to highlight trades in organization since the 
total number of launchers and interceptors could be fixed, but these launchers and 
interceptors moved from one location to another in order to tailor the organization of the 
ADA defense at each defended asset.  The effects analysis could also be extended to 
other likely targets such as seaports, assembly areas, and command and communications 
hubs.   
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This could also be extended in time so that, as opposed to looking at a single raid 
like what was done in this analysis, multiple raids could be examined over a long 
campaign in order to identify times and places where the ADA system’s tactics and 
organization need to change in order to ensure that different areas of the asset are more 
defended based on the needs of the rest of the campaign.   
Finally, the rapid calculations of the prediction models make them good 
candidates for use as the adjudication tool in wargames.  Wargames require that the 
adjudication tool determine combat losses and weapons effects quickly, so that the pace 
of the game is not significantly slowed.  An ADA centric wargame would allow the 
enemy force to choose their optimized fire plan based on the effects that are required at a 
particular time and place, based on the needs of the rest of the campaign.  This would be 
an improvement since this analysis assumed that all the optimized fire plans were equally 
likely.  On the friendly side, a wargame would help the ADA system analyst optimize the 
organization of the ADA systems defense in order to achieve the required protection of 
key assets that enable the rest of the campaign plan for the blue forces. 
 Overall, this dissertation helps the ADA community by fixing some of the 
problems that the author has experienced with the ADA system’s analysis.  The analysis 
of ADA systems will increase in complexity in the coming years due to the rapid 
proliferation of arms. The number of TBMs and CMs that the ADA systems will have to 
contend with will increase every year. New ways are needed to explore different methods 
of dealing with this growing problem.  
  
 334 
APPENDIX A: RADAR BASICS 
 
 The radar is the heart of the air defense system and it is the device that detects and 
tracks the TBM, CM, and other targets.  RADAR is an acronym for RAdio Detection 
And Ranging; however, the acronym has become so common that most people generally 
accept it as a common usage word.  A radar is an electrical system that transmits 
electromagnetic (EM) waves toward a region of space and receives (and subsequently 
detects) the EM waves “reflected” from any objects in that region [164].  EM waves are 
actually absorbed by a target and then new EM waves are re-radiated outward in all 
directions to include back towards the radar system and are therefore detectable.  While 
this explanation is more technically correct, most people prefer to think of the EM waves 
simply bouncing off the target and returning to the radar similarly to a sound echo off a 
canyon wall.  Each model is applicable in different situations.  Generally the reflection 
model works well, except in cases where one is investigating the actual energy re-
radiated by a target.   
 





The ability of the radar to detect a target is governed by the Radar Range 
Equation (RRE).  This equation is derived from the diffusion principles of the EM waves 
as they spread out across an ever-growing sphere as they propagate outwards.  The 




                                             
 SNR = Signal-to-Noise Ratio 
 Pt = Power of the transmitter in watts 
 Gt = Gain of the transmitter (unitless) 
 Gr = Gain of the receiver (unitless) 
 λ = Wave length of carrier wave in meters 
 σ = Mean Radar Cross Section (RCS) in square meters 
 np = Number of pulses that are coherently integrated (unitless) 
 R = Range to the target in meters 
 k = Boltzmann’s constant (1.38 x 10-23 watt-sec/K) 
 T0 = Standard Temperature (290 K) 
 F = noise figure of the receiver (unitless) 
 B = instantaneous receiver bandwidth in Hz 
 Ls = Radar system loss (unitless) 
 
 SNR is used because the both RCS and noise are random variables.  They will 
change from scan-to-scan and pulse-to-pulse.  Thus, in order to detect a target, the signal 
from that target must be sufficiently greater than the noise of the system.  This noise is a 
result of thermal noise in the receiver, clutter (unwanted wave returns), EM interference 
from other EM sources, and possibly jamming from an enemy system. Figure 187 below 
shows a detection system in the presence of random noise.  The radar is able to detect the 
signal if that signal crosses a certain threshold value.  The bin index in the x-axis of 
Figure 187 is a reference to range bins or a discreet range set.  The signal amplitude 
shows the resultant amplitude of the received signal from all reflections in that range bin 
to include a target, clutter, and the signal noise. 
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Figure 187: Radar Detection in the Presence of Noise (Image From [164]) 
 
 
 The amount of energy re-radiated by an object is quantified as its Radar Cross 
Section (RCS).  Most literature sources use the Greek letter “σ” to represent RCS.  RCS 
has units of square meters, but it is not governed by size alone.  Generally, larger objects 
will have larger RCS values, but the RCS also depends on the material and the complex 
reflection pattern with the associated constructive and destructive interference pattern 
from EM waves being re-radiated in all directions by all the different parts of an object.  
Metallic objects re-radiate EM waves better than carbon based material such as wood or 
living tissue.  Typical RCS values range from 10-5 m2 for insects to 106 m2 for large Navy 
ships [164].  Due to this large span, a logarithmic power scale is often used with a 
reference value of one square meter. 
𝜎 𝑑𝐵𝑠𝑚 = 𝜎 𝑑𝐵𝑚! = 10𝑙𝑜𝑔!" 𝜎   
The RCS of an object is typically shown on a radar diagram.  This diagram shows 
the expected calculated or measured RCS of an object from various aspect angles.  These 
angles start from 0 degrees with the radar looking directly down an aircraft or missile’s 
nose to 90 degrees where the radar is looking directly at a broadside view of the aircraft 
or missile.  This continues to 180 degrees where the radar is viewing the object from the 
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rear and then around to 270 degree where the radar is looking at the opposite broadside 
view of the missile or aircraft.  An example of an RCS plot is shown in Figure 188.  The 
left side of Figure 188 shows a computer generated RCS plot of a simple aircraft model 
made of triangles, cones, and cylinders.  This can be compared to the right side of Figure 
188, which shows the measured values from a full scale A7C Corsair aircraft.  Note that 
the RCS value can vary drastically depending on the aspect angle.  In the simulate model 
the RCS changes from -38 dB to +14 dB.  This represents a linear range of 0.000158 m2 
to 25.12 m2 or a change of a factor is 5.  The A7C is even more dynamic changing from -
52 dB to +45 dB or a change of a factor of 11. 
  
Figure 188: Radar Diagram of RCS from Simulated Aircraft (Left) and from 
Actual A7C Aircraft (Right) (Images From [164])  
 
These diagrams clearly show that RCS is not constant.  Even a radar scanning an 
object several times a second may get changing returns if the object is moving fast 
enough or has high speed components such as propellers.  Thus, RCS is typically 
represented as a random variable.  At distant ranges, an object will naturally go through 
intermittent detections as its changing RCS produces larger and smaller SNR values in 
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the RRE shown at the beginning of this section and the target return signal moves above 
and below the detection threshold shown in Figure 187. 
The large variations in RCS for a target necessitate the need for a detection model 
that uses random variables for the RCS.  These models are called Swerling Radar 
Models, named after their inventor Peter Swerling.  Swerling models are the basis for 
modern radar detection models [164].  There are five basic Swerling models.  A Swerling 
0 model is one where the RCS does not change with aspect angle.  For most real-world 
targets, this is not the case.  Swerling 1 and 2 models, are used when the target does not 
have a dominate scatterer [173, 174].  The radar diagram of a target of this type will have 
an approximately circular shape.  These targets are modeled with an exponential 
distribution.  Swerling 3 and 4 models have a dominate scatterer [173, 174].  The radar 
diagram will have an oval shape where the RCS values tend to enlarge in one direction 
and tend to shrink 90 degrees from that orientation.  These targets are modeled with a 
chi-squared distribution [174].   Swerling extended his models into probability of 
detection tables.  A derivation and an explanation of these is located in [164].   
Swerling models 1 and 3 differ from 2 and 4 in how fast the RCS values change 
compared to subsequent “pings” of the radar.  This is primarily a function of the targets 
speed and range to the radar.  If the target-radar angle is changing faster than the 
decorrelation angle, or the change in aspect angle where the radar will have significantly 
different returns, then there will be scan-to-scan decorrelation and the Swerling models 2 
and 4 need to be used.  Otherwise a Swerling 1 or 3 model is used [173].  A summary of 
these models is given below in Table 62. 
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Table 62: Swerling Models (From [173]) 
   
 
Because CMs are generally long and narrow with shorter wings, they will have a 
dominant scatterer along the fuselage.  They also generally travel at high speeds and will 
have a higher likelihood of pulse-to-pulse decorrelation so they are typically modeled 
with as a Swerling 4.  Most SRBMs do not have a separating Reentry Vehicle (RV) and 
thus have a dominant scatterer.  They also travel extremely fast and making them ideally 
modeled with a Swerling 4.  Most MRBMs do have a separating RV.  This RV is cone 
shaped and usually does not have a dominant scatter, but will be moving at extremely 
high speed.  Thus, MRBMs are typically be modeled with a Swerling 2.  
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APPENDIX B: DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS OVERVIEW 
 
There are many advantages of current high fidelity ADA models such as 
EADSIM.  These models have good radar representation and flight dynamics models 
built in that will allow the analysis to include the critical detection component.  In 
addition, they are designed to handle several different types of threats all flying at 
different profiles.  Their main disadvantage, however, is time and computation space.   A 
typical campaign-length simulation of EADSIM with thirty Monte Carlo runs can take 
10-30 hours to run on a standard desktop computer and will produce 2 gigabytes of data.  
In order to be useful in evaluating the entire design space of tactics and fire doctrine, this 
run time must be sped up and the data storage requirement reduced.   
A Design of Experiments (DOE) is a method to quickly sample the design space 
in the most efficient manner possible.  It was first developed for experiments in 
agriculture during the 1920s.  In the 1950s, its use expanded to other fields including 
engineering [175]. There are three main types of DOEs: Screening, Optimization, and 
Modeling [176].  The purpose of a screening model is to determine which factors have 
the largest effect on variability of the outcome.  This is meant to focus the experimenter 
on those factors that have the largest “control” over the process and reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem [177].  In Figure 189, the 2-level screening test in the 
upper left is an example of a screening model.  The purpose of an optimization model is 
to determine the factor settings that will either minimize or maximize an objective.  In 
Figure 189, Box-Behnken and Face-Centered Central Composite designs on the lower 
left and lower right are optimization designs.  Finally, the purpose of the modeling design 
is to sample the design space in such a way that an efficient “meta-model” or a model of 
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a model can be fit to the process so the outcome can be predicted for any given 
combination of inputs.  Each of these DOEs is meant to help the experimenter understand 
the underlying process that leads to the outcome, but they do so in different ways. They 
are also designed to help the experimenter understand the underlying processes with 
fewer experiments or model runs than a full-factor experiment, where all possible 
combinations of factors are tested as shown in the upper right of Figure 189. 
 
 
Figure 189: Types of Designs of Experiments (Image From [156]) 
 
Design of Experiments Principals 
In order to understand how these designs help the experimenter to understand the 
design space and the underlying process, it is important to cover several principles behind 
DOEs and their subsequent use in regression modeling.  One of the first principles 
needed is that interactions between factors can play a large role in the outcome of a 
process.  In many processes, the synergistic effect between two or more factors can have 
an impact that must be considered beyond just looking at the factors operating 
independently.  For example, consider an experiment of the best combinations of 
ingredients to bake bread.  The amount of flour, yeast, and water is important but there is 
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likely to be a strong relationship between the amount of yeast and water.  This 
relationship will manifest itself in the form of an intersection term.   
The second major principle is called the scarcity-of-effects.  This principle states 
that the variability in the outcome of the process is likely driven by only a couple of the 
design variables.  This is also commonly called the Pareto principle [178] after an Italian 
economist Vilfredo Pareto [179].  It is also sometimes known as the 80-20 Rule meaning 
that 80% of the outcome is controlled by 20% of the variables [156, 179, 180].  Although 
the actual numbers are rarely exactly 80% and 20%, the principle has been shown true in 
many real-life applications [178]. 
Related to the principle of interactions is the principle of hierarchy.  This states 
that in a regression model, the largest source of variability will be from the first-order 
terms (main effects) followed by the 2-level interaction terms, then the 3-level interaction 
terms, etc [178].  This is the main principle behind screening designs.  These designs are 
meant to only test for the main effects since they will have the largest influence on the 
variability of the outcome.  
 Finally the heredity principle is related to all the principles mentioned.  This 
principle is also related to modeling and it states that if a second order interaction is 
deemed important meaning that it has a strong influence on the variability of the 
outcome, then the main effects factors that make up that 2-level interaction are also 
important and should be included in the model [178].   
DOEs can be used for both “real-world” models and for computer experiments.  
The main difference is that real-world processes are subject to noise and error. That is  
𝑦 = 𝑦!"#$!% + 𝜖    
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where y is the output of the process and ε is the error or noise in the result.  This means 
that real-world DOEs must be designed and conducted taking into account this noise.  To 
do this there are several key strategies.   
The first strategy for dealing with noise is replication of trials [135, 178].  
Typically the noise is assumed to have a normal distribution with a mean of zero and 
some standard deviation, N(o,σ).  From the central limit theorem, if the outcome is 
sampled an adequate number of times then the results will form a normal distribution 
with a mean of yactual and a standard deviation of σ [133].  Replicating the design runs 
will allow the experimenter to estimate the effect of the noise.   
A second strategy for dealing with noise is blocking [135, 178, 181].  Blocking is 
when the experiments are arranged into relatively homogenous groups.  This will help to 
eliminate some of the random error within the blocks since the experiments are similar.  
The subsequent analysis can then explore the variability between blocks to help isolate 
the true effects from the random noise [135]. 
A third strategy that helps somewhat with noise, but is mostly used to control 
bias, is randomization.  By randomizing many of the experiment aspects under the 
control of the experimenter, the effect of uncontrollable factors can be reduced when the 
outputs are averaged. This helps to eliminate systematic effects of random and 
uncontrollable effects [135].  For example, if an experiment is conducted on the ballistic 
flight of projectile, the winds aloft may not be able to be accurately measured during the 
actual experiment even though these will affect the flight of the projectile.  By running 
the experiments in a random order, when the results are averaged, the overall effect of the 
wind will not bias the end results. 
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In computer models, random noise and uncontrollable variables are typically not 
an issue.  If the model is deterministic than there will never be a difference between runs 
using the same inputs.  So blocking, replication, and randomization do not really apply.  
In stochastic simulations that rely on a random number generation tool, replication is 
needed to compute summary statistics, but blocking and randomization is not needed 
because the error source is known.  There is no unknown noise like what occurs in real-
life experiments.   
In both computer models and real-world models, there are several other key 
principles that effect the choice of DOE and later the choice of regression.  The first is 
called aliasing or confounding.  A DOE is designed to assess the most information with 
the fewest trials, or at least fewer trials than a full-factorial design.  This reduction in 
trials, however, comes with a cost.  The cost is that the experimenter will not be able to 
discern the cause of some of the variability from different factors.  This is called aliasing 
or confounding [135, 178].  The amount of aliasing increases as the number of 
independent trials decrease.  For example, in a screening design the main effects are 
confounded with 2-level interactions and higher, but not with other main effects.  This 
means that the experimenter cannot determine how much the outcome changed as a result 
of just the main effects or because of interactions between those main effects.   
The amount of confounding is quantified by the resolution of the design.  A 
resolution III DOE confounds the main effects with 2-level and higher interactions, but 
does not allow the main effects to be confounded with each other.  A resolution IV DOE 
does not have any confounding between the main effects or two-factor interactions, but 
does allow confounding between the two-factor and higher interactions.  A resolution V 
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DOE does not confound the main effects or two-factor interactions with each other, but 
does confound the three-factor and higher interactions [175, 176, 182].   
Another key principle is that of orthogonally and specifically orthogonal DOEs.   
In many experiments, both real world and computer experiments, the experimenter wants 
to study the effects of several input variables.  If these variables or trials themselves are 
correlated then it will be difficult to determine if the change in the outcome was from one 
factor or the other [135].  This can be overcome with orthogonal DOEs.  Orthogonal 
DOEs have no correlation between design trails.  This helps to maintain the independence 
of the independent variables [176] and allows the outcome of each trial to be individually 
and uniquely identified.  For computer models, aliasing and orthogonally must be 
considered [182].   
Typically, DOEs and surrogate modeling will be used on complex computer 
models that require long run times.  The experimenter wants to estimate the outputs or 
optimize the outputs using the fewest design trials, since those trials are computationally 
expensive. Typically, these computer programs have many input parameters.  In DOEs, 
the number of trials needed is correlated to the number of input factors and the number of 
levels of those factors.  Thus, it is typically advisable to reduce the number of input 
factors under investigation.  This can be done through intelligent selection and/or through 
statistical selection.   
In intelligent variable selection, the experimenter selects input parameters based 
on experience and judgment.  These input parameters should be the ones that have the 
most effect on the outputs under study.  The experimenter then fixes the other input 
parameters at a certain value.  This value could be an average value or a set given value.  
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For example, in the design of an airplane, the experimenter could set the parameters of 
the atmosphere to a standard value (the standard atmosphere).  In addition, if the 
experimenter knows that the engine has already been selected, it would be appropriate to 
set the computer model’s engine parameters to the known values of the chosen engine.  
When doing intelligent selection, the experimenter must acknowledge that there could be 
interactions between the set variables and the variables under test that will not be 
captured and thus, not included in the analysis.   
In statistical variable selection, the experimenter uses a screening DOE followed 
by an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to select the critical input variables (the input 
variables that have the most effect on the variability of the response) [178].  For a good 
introduction to ANOVA see Hines, et al. [133], or Rushing et al. [181].  Screening DOEs 
are orthogonal level III resolution DOEs.  This means that each run is independent from 
the other and the main effects are not confounded; however, the 2-level and higher 
interactions are confounded with the main effects.  Thus, the screening DOE and 
ANOVA analysis will show the relative contribution on the variability of the outcome for 
only the first order terms (main effects) for each of the input variables under study.  
Typically, the Pareto principle will apply, which states that most of the variability of the 
output is controlled by only a few input variables.  Again, this is normally called the 80-
20 Rule meaning the 80% of the variability is controlled by 20% of the inputs.  After the 
ANOVA, the experimenter will identify the critical variables and will set the other 
variables not chosen to a set value, typically an average value.   
Once the number of input variables has been scoped down to a reasonable size, 
the experimenter must choose the type of DOE to use for the main analysis.  The type of 
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DOE used should correspond to the type of analysis that the experimenter plans to use.   
Both of these are tied to the shape of the underlying function under investigation [135, 
177, 183, 184].  The selection of the correct DOE for the given problem and regression is 
called optimal design [135, 178].  Screening DOEs are useful when tied to ANOVA 
because they give a minimum variance estimate of the slope of the response as a function 
of the inputs [135].  Other orthogonal optimization DOEs such as the Box-Behken and 
Central Composite designs are useful for low order polynomial regression such as 
Response Surface Equations (see following section).  These types of orthogonal DOEs 
attempt to minimize some function of the covariance matrix of the least squares estimates 
of the parameters.   These designs can be grouped into three main groups based on which 
function they use: D-optimal designs minimize the determinate of the covariance matrix, 
A-optimal designs minimize the average variance of the trace of the covariance matrix, 
and I-optimal designs minimize the average variance of the predicted response(s) over the 
design region [135]. 
 
Design of Experiments for Computer Models 
While DOEs were originally designed for real-world experiments, they have 
evolved into an efficient tool for computer experiments as well.  There are, however, 
some key differences in a computer experiment as compared to a real-world experiment 
and these differences change the criteria for selection or design of a DOE.    
Many times in computer experiments, the goal is to predict the output from 
computationally expensive computer programs.  This type of experiment does not lend 
itself well to optimization DOEs.  For predicting the output of a computer experiment for 
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any given set of inputs a non-orthogonal design is needed.  This DOE should sample the 
interior of the design space in such a manner that it will have a high predictive power that 
accurately estimates the process under scrutiny. [176, 185]. These models are called 
space-filling designs.  Of the DOE models in Figure 189, the only space-filling designs 
are the random DOE and the Latin Hypercube.  
The Random DOE shown in Figure 189 can be used in computer experiments 
since it does sample the interior of the design space, but because it is random, there is no 
systematic spread of the sample points.  Some areas of the design space will naturally be 
sampled more than others.  This can be countered, to an extent, through the use of 
stratification where the design space is separated into n distinct regions and one point is 
randomly populated within each region [135].  This is useful if the experimenter knows a 
priori where the output will change rapidly since the size of the regions can be 
independently controlled to sample these areas more than others.   
If the experimenter does not know the shape of the output he or she may want to 
ensure that the sampling points are spread uniformly throughout the design space.  Also, 
more specifically, the projection of the input points into the design region for each of the 
variables is spread evenly.  Therefore, a design with widespread points distributed evenly 
across the range of each of the input variables is desirable.  This feature is sometimes 
referred to as stratified sampling [177].  A design that does this is in a systematic manner 
is called Latin Hypercube Design (LHD).  LHD DOEs were first proposed by McKay, et 
al. in 1979 [186].  Fang, et al. generalized the LHD notation and design methodology by 
denoting a LHD design of n runs of S input factors as LHD (n,S), and representing the 
design as a n x S matrix in which each column is a random permutation of [1,2,…,n]  
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[187].  The LHD divided each of the s variables into n regions, each with a size of 1/n, 
and ensures that a single point is placed inside each of the n divisions such that the one-
dimensional projection onto each of the s variables is uniformly spaced.  Because each 
LHD is a random permutation, it is a natural extension of the random design with the 
additional constraint that the one-dimensional projection into each input variable must be 
uniformly distributed [135, 137, 188].   The random nature of a LHD, however, can lead 
to designs that do not fill the entire design space well, such as the design on the left of 
Figure 190.  Both designs in Figure 190 project evenly into each of the two design 
variables, but the design on the left clearly does not sample the upper left and the lower 
right region of the design space well.  Therefore, a LHD generally needs additional 
constraints to ensure even sampling.   
 
Figure 190: Examples of Two Latin Hypercube Designs (Image From [184]) 
 
There have been many methods proposed to help ensure that the LHDs are more 
space filling.  The easiest way, as suggested by Fang, is to generate a LHD and then 
examine its bivariate scatter plot.  If the plot does not look reasonably uniform, than 
generate a new LHD.  While this is certainly easy, it is time consuming and subject to the 
judgment of the experimenter [137].  A more methodical approach that is easy to 
implement is called cascading LHD.  In a cascading LHD, the experimenter starts with a 
LHD across the entire design space.  Then at each point in the LHD, the experimenter 
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defines a smaller design space and generates a new LHD.  This is repeated as many times 
as necessary.  By developing ever smaller LHDs within each original LHD, the final 
design is still guaranteed to be orthogonal and maintain the projection properties of the 
normal LHD design [135].  A second method to ensure adequate space filling properties 
is to maximize the minimum distance between points.  This type of LHD is called 
maximini (Mm LHD) or φp LHD where φp is the root-sum of the distances between 
points.  The general distance between points can be found by: 





, 𝑡 = 1 𝑜𝑟 2 
where xi and xj are any pairs of point in the design space, and np is the total number of 
points in the LHD.   The variable t is selected based on the type of distance the 
experimenter chooses, 1 for rectangular distance and 2 for Euclidian distance [135, 184].  









Minimizing φp is equivalent to maximizing the distance between points in the 
LHD.  The general idea is to generate a number of LHDs and once all the designs are 
generated, calculate φp for each design and select the one with the smallest φp.  It has 
been shown that this is equivalent to the D-optimal criteria (minimizing the determinate 
of the information matrix: (X’X)-1) and is thus one class of optimal design [188].  Many 
methods have been proposed on how to select the LHDs and an excellent summary is in 
Viana, et al. and Kennedy [137, 184].  The main advantage of LHD is that when any 
dimension is removed, the remaining points project into the lower dimensional space and 
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still maintain their uniform stratification [138].  That means that no design points are lost 
because two points project on top of one another.  This makes LHD good for experiments 
where multiple responses are estimated and each input may not influence every output. 
In general, maximizing the minimum (Mm) distance between points seems like a 
good way to fill the space.  The Mm LHD adds the constraint that the 1-D projection into 
any design input should be uniform, but what if that constraint is removed?  One of the 
most common DOEs that simply spreads the points throughout the design space as best as 
possible is called “sphere-packing”.  This DOE can be visualized as arranging the design 
points so as to pack as many spheres into the cube as possible [185]. Figure 191 below 
shows an example of the sphere-packing scheme.  The main difference between the 
sphere-packing scheme and the Latin Hypercube is that the Latin Hypercube 
compromises some of the spread of points to help ensure more uniform spacing.  
Generally, sphere-packing designs fill the design space better than LHDs [183], but 
typically the designs are not orthogonal and will not uniformly project into each design 
variable uniformly [137]. 
 
Figure 191: Sphere-Packing Schemes (Image From [185]) 
 
In general, pure space-filling designs will result in a larger minimum distance 
between points, but LHD will ensure that each dimension has an equal number of points 
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uniformly spread though the design space.  This uniform spread of points is desirable 
since it ensures a good sampling of all dimensions; however, when a histogram is 
constructed of a LHD, generally there is good sampling of the interior points, but the 
number of points at the extremes is smaller.  This is due to the nature of how the various 
n-dimensional points project into each dimension.  Therefore, another set of designs 
measure how close the resulting histogram of each dimension is to the uniform 
distribution.  These designs are aptly named uniform designs.  Because the uniform 
design samples each level in an systematic fashion, they are useful for obtaining a good 
estimate that involves the integral of the unknown function [185].  In fact, the uniform 
design has been shown to minimize the upper bound on the absolute error of a point 
estimator, such as the mean, of an unknown function.  However, in computer models the 
experimenter is generally concerned with predicting the overall function output and not 
just a point estimate of that output [135].  The points of the uniform design are also not 
guaranteed to be evenly spaced across each dimension and generally takes much longer 
to generate than space-filling designs of LHD [185].   
 
DOE Wrapper Functions 
The process of populating the DOE with outputs from the computer model 
involves a series of steps.  These steps are executed by a computer code called the 
wrapper function.  The wrapper function serves as the interface between the DOE and the 
actual computer code that we are trying to model as illustrated in Figure 192.   
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Figure 192: Wrapper Program and its Function 
 
The wrapper function reads the inputs from the ith line of the DOE input table.  It 
writes these input values to the correct locations on the input files for the computer 
model.  It then runs the computer model and opens the output files.  It locates the specific 
outputs we are truing to model and writes these values to the output portion of the DOE 
table.  If file size and computer space is a concern, it can also delete the output files once 
the needed values have been extracted.  It then repeats this process for all i lines in the 
DOE.  Once the DOE is populated with outputs from the wrapper function, the next step 
is to develop a surrogate model that correctly predicts the outputs from the computer 
model.  The creation and selection of surrogate models is explained in the next appendix. 
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APPENDIX C: SURROGATE MODELS OVERVIEW 
 
A surrogate model is a model of a model.  It is generally used as a faster running 
predictive model of the higher fidelity, but longer run time, computer model. This 
surrogate model should be highly accurate (able to correctly predict outputs) and faster to 
run than the actual computer model.  All of the surrogate models that will be introduced 
are equation type models.  The equations are typically very complex, but a computer is 
able to calculate them in a fraction of a second.  This allows us to very quickly estimate 
the output from a computer model that may take minutes to days to execute.  Because the 
surrogate model is predicting any input vector, the model needs to be trained using points 
that cover the entire input space.  To do this efficiently, designs of experiments (DOEs) 
are typically used for the training and validation sets of these models.  DOEs are 
explained in the previous appendix. 
There are many different types of surrogate models.  The ones that are used in this 
work are introduced below and include a Response Surface Equation (RSE), an Artificial 
Neural Net (ANN or NN), and Gaussian Kriging.  In general, it is difficult to know 
beforehand which surrogate model will best predict a given output.  The general approach 
is to build several models for each output and evaluate each to select the one that best 
predicts the output of a test set the best with minimum bias.   
 
Response Surface Equations 
A Response Surface Equation (RSE) is a mathematical function that links the 
input variables to some desired output variable via a polynomial function.  It was 
originally developed by Box and Wilson [189] to examine real-world experiments, yet it 
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has been found that it is also a good approximation for computer experiments whose 
output does not drastically change over the input space.  A second order RSE is one of 
the most widely used because it is very flexible, can take on a wide variety of forms, is 
relatively easy to use, and has proved useful in solving a wide variety of problems [187, 
190].  The general form of a second order RSE is given below [190]: 










y =Output response 
βi = Regression coefficients of first degree terms 
βii = Regression coefficients of pure quadratic terms 
βij = Regression coefficients of cross-product terms 
xi,j = independent variables 
ε = error 
 In the RSE, the xij terms are the independent variables from the DOE and the y 
term in the dependent variable from the DOE.  The β terms are the unknowns.  The goal 
of finding an RSE is to solve for all the β terms using a least squares methodology such 
that the xij terms are mapped to the y terms with the smallest amount of error, ε; meaning 
that the sum of the squares of the error is minimized.  This is expressed in the equation 
below: 










L =Sum of the square of the error  
εi = error terms 
yi = output (dependent) terms 
βi = Regression coefficients of first degree terms 
xi,j = input (independent) terms 
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 Linear algebra has fortunately found relatively simple expressions to solve for the 
regression coefficients, β.  The above equations can be rewritten in matrix form as [190]: 
 
 y=X β + ε 
 Where 
 y = output (dependent) variable vector 
 X = input (independent) variable matrix 
 β = regression coefficient variable matrix 







           𝑋 =
1 𝑥!! … 𝑥!!





















If the kernel of the matrix X is zero, meaning that it is invertible and full rank, 
then the sum of squares of the error of the above equation is minimized by the following 
equation [191]: 
𝜷 =(XTX)-1AT y 
Using this equation, the regression coefficients in the original RSE equation can 
be solved for in such a manner that the sum of the square of the error is minimized.    
The RSE formulation has many advantages.  From the coefficients, one can 
determine the importance of a factor.  A large coefficient means that the corresponding 
factor has a large influence on the overall variability of the result.  The sign of the 
coefficient also indicates the direction of this influence (positive or negative).  Also, the 
process explained above for solving the coefficient values is relatively easier and 
computationally faster than the other surrogate methods that will be introduced.  The 
main disadvantage of RSEs occurs with highly nonlinear, discontinuities, or other 
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irregular behavior of the response.  The smooth nature of the RSE has difficulty modeling 
rapidly and irregularly changing outputs.   
The RSE also has difficulty if the variance of the output changes over the range of 
the inputs.  When this happens the residual plots will exhibit a characteristically funnel 
like shape.  Afterwards, the variance can attempt to be smoothed by applying a transform 
to the inputs.  The most common transforms are a log transform or a square-root 
transform.  These transforms are special cases of the more general Box-Cox power 




 𝑖𝑓 𝜆 ≠ 0
𝑦𝑙𝑛 𝑦     𝑖𝑓 𝜆 = 0
 
In order to determine which value of lambda (λ) to use, a Box-Cox test can also 
be applied. The Box-Cost test tries different values of lambda from -5 to +5 and plots the 
resulting sum of squares of the error (SSE) against these lambdas.  The value of lambda 
that minimizes the SSE is then chosen as the transform. 
 
Artificial Neural Nets 
Artificial Neural Nets (ANN) attempt to mimic how neurons in the brain function 
and process information.  It approximates a function from a set of inputs via weighted 
summations into different activation functions.  The general form or architecture of an 
ANN is shown in Figure 193.  Each input is assigned an input node and each output 
(response) is assigned an output node.  Therefore, there will be as many input nodes as 
input variables in the input layer and as many output nodes as the number of responses 
we are approximating in the output layer.  Note in Figure 193 that each input node is 
 358 
connected to each hidden node via an edge.  Also, each hidden node is connected to each 
output node via another edge.  A weight value is applied to each of these edges and an 
ANN works by multiplying each input by the edge weight, summing all those weighted 
inputs together and then applying an activation function inside the hidden node.  In some 
ANN architectures, a basis is also added to the inputs after they are multiplied by the 
weights.  The output from each activation function in each hidden node is then multiplied 
by the output edge weight and the weighted outputs are summed together at the output 
node.   
 
Figure 193: General Neural Net Architecture (Image From [192]) 
 
The goal of training the ANN is to evaluate which edge weights lead to outputs 
that most closely match the training responses.  The architecture decisions that are left up 
to the user are the number of hidden layers, the number of nodes in each hidden layer, 
and the type of activation function to apply in each hidden node.  In general the number 
of hidden nodes is limited by the size of the training data set and the complexity of the 
underlying function it is tying to approximate.  Too few hidden nodes and the ANN may 
not have enough degrees of freedom to fit complex functions.   The upper limit is dictated 
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by the size of the training set and again the complexity of the function.  Too many hidden 
nodes can lead to over fitting.  Also, each hidden node has an input weight and an output 
weight that must be determined.  If there are too few training points, then the weight 





       𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 2 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 10 
where: 
Nh = Number of hidden nodes 
NS = Number of sample points in the training set 
Ni = Number of input variables 
No = Number of responses 
 
The general form of the ANN can be expressed in matrix format. This makes the 
data manipulation much easier.  Figure 194 shows the same ANN as Figure 193, but in a 
condensed form that allows us to build the matrix format of the ANN.  Here, it is 
assumed that there are R inputs and these can be arranged into an input vector P that is 
Rx1.  It is also assumed that there are S hidden nodes.  This makes the matrix of edge 
weights is a SxR matrix.  If there are basis to be added to each hidden node, that bias 
matrix, b, is Sx1.   
 
Figure 194: Diagram of a Single Layer ANN in Matrix Format (Image From [193]) 
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           𝑊 =
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The evaluation of an ANN multiplies the input vector by the weight vector and 
adds the bias.  These results are then added together so the resulting matrix expression is: 





Hj is the input to the jth hidden node of the S total hidden nodes 
Wi is the input weight matrix 
P is the input vector 
b is the bias vector 
(WP+b)i is the ith element of the weighted input vector 
R is the total number of input variables 
 
The input vector H, will be a Sx1 matrix.  The activation function in each node 
(which can be the same of different for each node) is applied, element wise, to each 
element in H vector.  There are many choices for this activation function.  A good list of 
activation functions from [193] is shown below in Table 63. 
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Table 63: Artificial Neural Net Activation Functions (Image From [193]) 
 
These transformed inputs are then multiplied by the exit edge weights and 
summed together in the output node.  If there are T output nodes, the matrix notation for 
the output is: 





Hj is the input to the jth hidden node of the S total hidden nodes 
W is the output weight matrix (different than the input weight matrix) 
P is the input vector 
b is the bias vector 
(WP+b)i is the ith element of the weighted input vector 
S is the total number of hidden nodes 
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Once the architecture, number of hidden layers, number of nodes in each layer, 
and activation function in each hidden node are chosen, the goal of training the ANN is to 
adjust the weight and basis values to minimize the error between the resulting prediction 
and the training output.  The training set is a subset of the total DOE that is used to train 
the ANN.  The ANN uses the inputs from the DOE as test cases and attempts to match 
the predicted output to the actual output from the DOE by minimizing the squared error 
terms: 
𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 𝑦! − 𝑦! ! 
where yi is the ith response and ŷi is the ith estimate of that response.  Typically some form 
of gradient decent algorithm is used on the weight function to minimize this error. This 
general form of training is called back propagation and is the most common way to train 
ANN. 
The main advantages of ANNs are when the design space exhibits discontinuities 
or rapidly changing behavior [46, 194, 195].  A single or double layer ANN has been 
shown to solve just about any non linear problem [149].  In fact, they have been called 
universal approximators [196].  The main disadvantage of ANN is that the resulting 
function approximation is a “black box.”  Unlike a RSE where the size is the coefficient 
on a given term explains its influence on the output, there is no such value in an ANN.  
Neural nets are also very easy to over fit the data and instead model the underlying 
process plus noise.  This results in a model that can easily predict the training data, but 
fails to generalize to other data sets [197].  This can be prevented by using a good 
validation set and a process called k-fold cross validation.  In k-fold cross validation, the 
data is divided evenly into a series of bins, such as into fifths.  The first bin is withheld 
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and the model is fit to the remaining data.  This fitted model is then tested with the 
withheld bin and the error is stored.  This process is then repeated with a different 
withheld set until a model has been created with all bins withheld. After all models have 
been created, the model with the smallest error is used [195, 198].   
 
Gaussian Krigging 
Kriging is an n-dimensional interpolation method developed by South African 
geologist D.G. Krige in his a master’s thesis for interpolation of mining data [199].  All 
interpolation methods use some correlation function with distance to describe the 
influence of known points around the prediction of an unknown point.  Typically, the 
closer (in Euclidian space) that a known point is from the unknown point, the more 
weight the known point’s value has on the prediction of the unknown point.  The magic 
of kriging is that the value of surrounding points are weighted according to their spatial 
covariance, as opposed to their distance only [177, 200].  For deterministic experiments, 
this is extremely attractive because the error shrinks to zero around known points, so 
those points are predicted exactly [137, 175, 187].  The general form of the kriging 
equation is given as [177, 187]:  
𝑦 = 𝛽!!!!! 𝑓! 𝑥 + 𝑍(𝑋)   
In this equation, f is a chosen basis function over the entire experimental domain, 
typically chosen as the Gaussian correlation function [177].  The error term, z, is a 
stochastic process, but unlike other interpolation methods that assume the error at each 
point is independent and identically distributed, the kriging model assumes that it is has 
spatial correlation of [177, 201]: 
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𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑍 𝑥! ,𝑍 𝑥! = 𝜎!𝜓(𝑥!𝑥!) 
where σ2 is the variance  and Ψ(xi xj) is the correlation function between two 
points given as [187]: 
𝜓 𝜃; 𝑥! , 𝑥! = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝜃! 𝑥! − 𝑥!
!!!
!!!       where 0<p≤2 
The θ term is a local “influence” term and the p term is a correlation parameter.  
These terms can be individually chosen for each estimate and thus form a vector of 
inputs.  In general, for a constant value of p, the correlation function, ψ, approaches zero 
as the distance between points increases and approaches one as the distance decreases.  
The amount of correlation adjacent points have is controlled by the changing the value of 
p.  This is demonstrated below in Figure 195.  As the value of p is decreased from 2 to 
0.1, the correlation curve changes from a smooth Gaussian curve to a sharp discontinuous 
peak.   
 
Figure 195: The Effect of Changes in p on Correlation.  (Adopted From Image in [188]) 
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A similar plot can be created for the θ, or influence term.  This is done below in 
Figure 196.  With a θ value of 0.1, the correlation between neighbors is high as indicated 
by the large smooth solid curve.  As the influence term is increased to 10, the correlation 
between points decreases, as demonstrated by the sharper dotted line. 
 
 
Figure 196: The Effect of Changes in θ on Correlation.  (Adopted From Image in [188]) 
 
The values of θ and p are chosen to minimize the generalized error in the model.  
The maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) for the mean and variance of the error (µ,σ2) 





𝑦 − 1𝜇 !𝜓!!(𝑦 − 1𝜇)
𝑛  
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These can then be substituted into the concentrated log-likelihood function [188]: 





2 𝑙𝑛 𝜓 ) 
This function is not differentiable, so the values of θ and p are typically solved for 
with a stochastic optimizer, such as a genetic algorithm, particle swarm, or simulated 
annealing.   
 
Surrogate Model Selection 
Each of the surrogate models described above, RSE, ANN, and kriging have their 
own advantages and disadvantages.  In practice, it is typically not known beforehand 
which will produce the best predictor for a given process.  Therefore the best practice is 
to fit several models of different types and evaluate each to see which produces the best 
fit and more importantly, which predicts an unknown point with the least error.  The error 
is measured as the root mean sum of squares of the prediction error (RMSE) [133, 190]: 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 =
𝑦! − 𝑦! !!!!!
𝑛  
Here, yi is the ith response and ŷi is the ith estimate of that response and n is the 
number of test points.  Another measure of the goodness of fit is the coefficient of 








where SSR is the sum of squares of the residuals, SSy is the total sum of squares, ŷ 
is the estimate of y and 𝑦 is the mean of y.   
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The fit or prediction capability of a surrogate model can also be measured 
graphically by examining the actual v. predicted plot and the residual v. predicted plots.  
A sample actual by predicted plot for both a good fit (or prediction) and a poor fit (or 
prediction) is shown below in Figure 197.  For a perfect fit, the predicted points would 
exactly match the actual points from the validation set, so the points in the plot would fall 
on a 45-degree line.  In practice, this rarely happens, as there is normally some amount of 
prediction error.  This causes the points to randomly fall above and below the 45-degree 
line.  The closer the points are to this 45 degree line, the better the prediction or modeling 
capability of the surrogate model. 
 
Figure 197: Sample Actual v. Predicted Plot for a Good Fit (Left) and a Poor Fit (Right) (Image 
From [202]) 
 
 Ideally, the model should be unbiased such that the error in the prediction is 
random with a mean of zero.  If this is true, the predicted points are equally likely to have 
a positive error as a negative error (over verse under predict). This is best examined in a 
plot of the residuals v. predicted values.  A sample residual plot is shown below in Figure 
198.  For a good fit and an unbiased model, the points should be randomly scattered both 
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above and below zero error.   The model should also not show any tendency to over or 
under predict for any subset of the points.  This would be indicated if the residuals were 
smaller for low values of x, but were large for larger values of x (or vise-versa).  The 
residuals for the plot on the right of Figure 198 show a bias to over predict the values. 
 
Figure 198: Sample Residual v. Predicted Plot for a Good Fit (Left) and a Poor Fit (Right) (Image 
From [202]) 
 
To determine a model’s prediction capability, the test points are divided into two 
groups: a fit set and a validation set.  The general rule is to initially divide your design set 
so that a random 80% of the design points are in the fit set and 20% are in the validation 
set [135, 187].  The model is then fitted to the fit set (holding the validation set 
completely independent) and then the fitted model is tested against the validation set to 
measure its prediction capability. 
The best way to build the fit set and validation set is to design a DOE with the 
needed number of points to fit a model (the initial number of points is generally 
recommended as ten times the number of design points), and then augment the DOE with 
an additional set of points to form the validation set.  In practice, the validation set could 
be random points within the design space or an augmentation to the validation set space-
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filling design.  By using an augmented space-filling design the experimenter is assured 
that the validation points are spread throughout the design space and placed at an optimal 
distance from all the points in the fit set.  In addition, if the model shows a poor 
prediction capability, these points can be added to the original fit set and a new validation 
set generated.   
The process of creating a surrogate model begins when the model is fitted to the 
fit set.  This is done without any influence from the validation set.  If the fitting of the 
model is a stochastic process (as in ANN and kriging) the fit set can be further divided 
into a fit set and a validation set.  This is typically done through a process known as k-
fold cross validation.  In a k-fold cross validation, the model is fitted k times to a subset 
of n-k points in the fit set (where n is the total number of points in the set).  The model is 
then evaluated for the k points that were held out of the fit set.  This is repeated k times 
with new points each time and the model with the best fit for the k hold out points is 
chosen as the surrogate model. 
Once the model is trained with the fit set, it is then used to predict the values of 
the design points in the validation set.  In both the fit set and the validation set, the R-
squared and the RMSE are calculated and the actual v. predicted plot and residual v. 
predicted plot are created.  The accuracy of the model to predict the fit set is called the 
model fit error (MFE) and the accuracy of the model to predict the validation set is called 
the model representation error (MRE). 
A good model must not only predict well, it should also be unbiased in its 
prediction. This means that it should not systematically under or over predict.  To test for 
this bias, it is common to create a histogram of the residuals.  This histogram should be 
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centered at zero, be unimodel, and appear to have a normal distribution.  By ensuring that 
the distribution is centered at zero, we ensure that the residuals are equally positive and 
negative meaning that the model equally over and under predicts.  By ensuring that the 
model has a normal distribution shape, we ensure that the model has mostly smaller 
residuals with occasional large under or over predictions.   In fact, the construction of a 
response surface equation demands that the residuals be normally distributed.  A neural 
net and kriging model do not require the residuals be normally distributed, but it is good 
when they are because it helps to ensure the model is unbiased.  Once the histogram is 
created, a normal quantile plot can also be created to visualize how different the 
histogram is from a theoretical normal distribution.  This is shown below in Figure 199. 
 
Figure 199: Sample Residual Histogram and Normal Quantile Plot (Image From [203]) 
 
Ideally, all points in a normal quantile plot would fall on the 45-degree line y=x.  If 
the normal quantile plot exhibits a nonlinear shape, then the data is probably not linear.  
A statistical test to determine if the data is from a normal distribution is called the 
Shaprio-Wilk Test [204].  This test has the null hypothesis that the data is normally 
distributed.  Thus, for a given alpha value, say 0.05, the null hypothesis is rejected if the 
p-value statistic from the test is less than this value (0.05) indicating that the evidence 
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suggests the data is not normally distributed.  If the p-value is greater than the chosen 
alpha value, then there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that it is not from a normal 
distribution.    
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This section will show the fit quality for the neural nets (NN) created from the 
ADA simulation explained in sections 7.6 and 7.7.  Each of these NN models was created 
using a routine that slowly increased the size of the hidden layer and calculated the R2 of 
the k-fold cross-validation of the training set at each step.  This continued until the 
calculated R2 showed a decrease of 10% from its peak value.  Once the number of hidden 
nodes was calculated, the net was trained on the full set of training data using both a pure 
linear and radial basis function as the activation function of the output nodes.  The final 
activation function was chosen based on the largest R2 of the training set.  The NNs were 
then trained five times over the training set and the final output was an average of these 
five outputs.  Once the network architecture was determined, the net was tested against 
the validation set (20% of the data chosen at random).  
The results below show the actual verse predicted graphs for both the training and 
validation sets and the histogram of the fit error with the training and validation sets 
stacked on top of each other.  A good fit will show a linear relationship between the 







Upper Tier (UT) System against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the UT system. 
Table 64: TBM1 Leakers for Upper Tier System  
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.029 0.121 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.319 1.080 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.992 0.983 
 
 




Figure 201: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM1 Leakers v. UT System 












































































































































Error history with data
transform: sqrt(x)
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Upper Tier (UT) System against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the UT system. 
Table 65: TBM2 Leakers for Upper Tier System  
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.017 0.071 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.116 0.647 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.993 0.987 
 
 




Figure 203: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM2 Leakers v. UT System 
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Upper Tier (UT) System against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 3 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 3 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the UT system. 
Table 66: TBM3 Leakers for Upper Tier System  
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.021 0.143 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.130 1.417 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.993 0.981 
 
 




Figure 205: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM3 Leakers v. UT System 
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Upper Tier (UT) System against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of UT interceptors 
that were shot against incoming TBM missiles. 
Table 67: Interceptors Shot for Upper Tier System  
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.029 0.033 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.489 0.190 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.975 0.951 
 
 




Figure 207: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptors Shot for UT System 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor A. 
Table 68: TBM1 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor A 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.039 0.100 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.396 0.622 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.987 0.972 
 
 




Figure 209: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM1 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor A 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor A. 
Table 69: TBM2 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor A 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.031 0.082 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.213 0.533 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.991 0.970 
 
 




Figure 211: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM2 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor A 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 3 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 3 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor A. 
Table 70: TBM3 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor A 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.053 0.176 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.366 1.086 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.979 0.942 
 
 




Figure 213: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM3 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor A 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Ballistic Missiles – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of LT type A 
interceptors that were shot against incoming TBM missiles. 
Table 71: Interceptors Shot for Lower Tier System Interceptor A Against TBMs 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.056 0.207 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.278 1.083 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.955 0.873 
 
 
Figure 214: Lower Tier System Fit for Number of Interceptor A Missiles Shot Against TBMs for 




Figure 215: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptor A Missiles Shot Against CMs 
for LT System with Interceptor A 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor A. 
Table 72: CM1 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor A 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.201 0.422 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 1.594 2.706 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.947 0.898 
 
 




Figure 217: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM1 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor A 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor A. 
Table 73: CM2 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor A 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 15 RMSE 0.109 0.228 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.802 0.821 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.976 0.942 
 
 




Figure 219: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM2 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor A 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor A against Cruise Missiles – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of LT type A 
interceptors that were shot against incoming CM missiles. 
Table 74: Interceptors Shot for Lower Tier System Interceptor A Against Cruise Missiles 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.318 0.514 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 3.164 2.737 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.962 0.931 
 
 
Figure 220: Lower Tier System Fit for Number of Interceptor A Missiles Shot Against CMs for 




Figure 221: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptor A Missiles Shot Against CMs 
for LT System with Interceptor A 












































































































































Error history with data
transform: sqrt(x)
 384 
Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor B. 
Table 75: TBM1 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor B 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.017 0.106 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.149 0.037 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.994 0.995 
 
 




Figure 223: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM1 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor B 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor B. 
Table 76: TBM2 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor B 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.017 0.065 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.183 0.627 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.992 0.986 
 
 




Figure 225: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM2 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor B 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 3 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 3 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor B. 
Table 77: TBM3 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor B 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.035 0.042 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.317 0.261 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.989 0.982 
 
 




Figure 227: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM3 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor B 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Ballistic Missiles – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of LT type B 
interceptors that were shot against incoming TBM missiles. 
Table 78: Interceptors Shot for Lower Tier System Interceptor B Against TBMs 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.035 0.076 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.223 0.466 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.980 0.953 
 
 
Figure 228: Lower Tier System Fit for Number of Interceptor B Missiles Shot Against TBMs for 




Figure 229: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptor B Missiles Shot Against CMs 
for LT System with Interceptor B 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor B. 
Table 79: CM1 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor B 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.184 0.244 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 1.334 1.196 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.956 0.935 
 
 




Figure 231: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM1 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor B 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor B. 
Table 80: CM2 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor B 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.147 0.210 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 1.544 0.775 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.969 0.942 
 
 




Figure 233: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM2 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor B 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor B against Cruise Missiles – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of LT type B 
interceptors that were shot against incoming CM missiles. 
Table 81: Interceptors Shot for Lower Tier System Interceptor B Against Cruise Missiles 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.329 0.395 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 2.783 3.248 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.996 0.995 
 
 
Figure 234: Lower Tier System Fit for Number of Interceptor B Missiles Shot Against CMs for 




Figure 235: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptor B Missiles Shot Against CMs 
for LT System with Interceptor B 
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 391 
Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor C. 
Table 82: TBM1 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor C 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.009 0.020 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.080 0.186 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.997 0.996 
 
 




Figure 237: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM1 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor C 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor C. 
Table 83: TBM2 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor C 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.005 0.012 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.046 0.065 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.999 0.996 
 
 




Figure 239: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM2 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor C 


















































































































































Error history with data
transform: sqrt(x)
 393 
Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) Type 3 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of TBM type 3 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor C. 
Table 84: TBM3 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor C 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 5 RMSE 0.010 0.010 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.103 0.119 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.997 0.994 
 
 




Figure 241: Error Histogram of Fit Error for TBM3 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor C 
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Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Ballistic Missiles – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of LT type C 
interceptors that were shot against incoming TBM missiles. 
Table 85: Interceptors Shot for Lower Tier System Interceptor C Against TBMs 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 15 RMSE 0.026 0.088 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.380 0.585 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.986 0.940 
 
 
Figure 242: Lower Tier System Fit for Number of Interceptor C Missiles Shot Against TBMs for 




Figure 243: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptor C Missiles Shot Against CMs 
for LT System with Interceptor C 
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 395 
Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor C. 
Table 86: CM1 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor C 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 15 RMSE 0.053 0.119 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.399 0.821 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.984 0.973 
 
 




Figure 245: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM1 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor C 
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 396 
Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the LT system with 
interceptor C. 
Table 87: CM2 Leakers for Lower Tier System with Interceptor C 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 15 RMSE 0.023 0.127 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.258 0.813 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.994 0.978 
 
 




Figure 247: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM2 Leakers v. LT System with Interceptor C 
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 397 
Lower Tier System with Interceptor C against Cruise Missiles – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of LT type C 
interceptors that were shot against incoming CM missiles. 
Table 88: Interceptors Shot for Lower Tier System Interceptor C Against Cruise Missiles 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.072 0.525 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.560 3.331 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.984 0.904 
 
 
Figure 248: Lower Tier System Fit for Number of Interceptor C Missiles Shot Against CMs for 




Figure 249: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptor C Missiles Shot Against CMs 
for LT System with Interceptor C 
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 398 
Point Defense (PT) System against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 1 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 1 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the PT system. 
Table 89: CM1 Leakers for Point Defense System  
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 10 RMSE 0.073 0.157 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.502 0.643 
Hidden Layer Pure Linear R2 0.981 0.951 
 
 




Figure 251: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM1 Leakers v. PT System 
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 399 
Point Defense (PT) System against Cruise Missiles (CMs) Type 2 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of CM type 2 
missiles that leaked through the defenses when faced against the PT system. 
Table 90: CM2 Leakers for Point Defense System 
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 15 RMSE 0.063 0.111 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.770 0.695 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.989 0.972 
 
 




Figure 253: Error Histogram of Fit Error for CM2 Leakers v. PT System 
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 400 
Point Defense (PT) System against Cruise Missiles (CMs) – Interceptors Shot 
This section shows the fit of the neural net that predicted the number of PT interceptors 
that were shot against incoming CM missiles. 
Table 91: Interceptors Shot for Point Defense System  
Neural Net Architecture Fit Data 
Data Transform Square Root Set Training Validation 
Number of Hidden Nodes 15 RMSE 0.029 0.033 
Activation 
Function 
Output Layer Hyperbolic Tangent Max Error 0.489 0.190 
Hidden Layer Radial Basis R2 0.975 0.951 
 
 




Figure 255: Error Histogram of Fit Error for Number of Interceptors Shot for PT System 
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